
New South Wales Police

Strike Force Neil

Cronulla Riots



Review of the Police Response

Policy and Associated Documents

Volume 4 of 4


Item No. 6

Media - Associate Professor Catharine Lumby - University of Sydney - Biography

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Assoc Prof Catharine Lumby – University of Sydney



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map

Email

A widely published print journalist, Catharine Lumby has worked as a news reporter, feature writer and opinion columnist for The Sydney Morning Herald, The Age newspapers and The Bulletin magazine. She has also worked as a news reporter for ABC television. Her PhD thesis examined the rise of a tabloid culture in news and current affairs reporting in the US and Australia. She is the author and editor of four books and 23 book chapters and refereed journal articles. Her most recent book, coedited with Elspeth Probyn is Remote Control: New Media, New Ethics (Cambridge University Press, 2003) co-edited with Professor Elspeth Probyn. She has been awarded three Australian Research Council Grants and is currently a member of the ARC-funded Australian Cultural Research Network. She is a member of the Advertising Standards Board, the national body which hears complaints against advertisers, and a member of the National Rugby League's Education and Welfare Committee. She is on the editorial advisory boards of Continuum: Journal of Media and Cultural Studies (Carfax) and M/C: Journal of Media and Culture (University of Queensland).

In 2006, Catharine Lumby received a five year ARC Discovery Grant jointly held with Kath Albury, Dr Jenny O'Dea and Professor Elspeth Probyn to research the role of sport in the emotional and social development of young Australians.

Assoc Prof Lumby will be away on leave in Semester Two of 2006

Research Interests

- The history and contemporary focus of Australian and US television news and current affairs
- The representation of gender in the media, popular culture and advertising
- Young women, self-image and media consumption
- The attitudes and behaviours of professional football players towards women and the role and status of women in the culture of Australian rugby league
- The cultural significance of celebrity in contemporary life
- Media ethics
- The media's role in shaping the contemporary public sphere and public debate
- Censorship, public policy and the production and consumption of pornography in Australia

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Source – internet search on 08/04/06
http://www.arts.usyd.edu.au/departs/media/?page=staff&id=catlumby&publications=more#publications

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- [Book] 1999 Gotcha: Life In A Tabloid World, Allen and Unwin, Sydney.
- [Book] 1997 Bad Girls: The Media, Sex and Feminism in the 90s, Allen and Unwin, Sydney.
- [Chapter] 2004 "Our Man At the Cultural Studies Cliff Face", *Frank Moorhouse: A Celebration* , National Library, Canberra.
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- [Chapter] 1997 "Back To The Brady Bunch', *The Retreat From Tolerance* , ed. P. Adams, ABC Books, Sydney.
- [Chapter] 1997 "Vanishing Point", *Planet Diana: Cultural Studies and Global Mourning* , ed. Re: Public, Research Centre in Intercommunal Studies, University of Western Sydney, Sydney.
- [Chapter] 1995 "Tabloid Television", with John O'Neill, *Not Just Another Business:Journalists, Citizens and the Media* , Pluto Press, Melbourne.

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Current Classes

- MECO1003 Principles of Media Writing

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Current Supervising Postgraduates

Jose Borghino	*Literary Journalism: Precursors and Imposters*
Melissa Deitz	*Watch This Space: How Media Activists and Culture Jammers are fighting the post-capitalist culture wars*
Kim McNamara	*On Location: Celebrity and Space*
Wesley Metham	*Toward an Anarchistic Theory of Culture*

Source – internet search on 08/04/06
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Item No. 7

Media - Professor Graeme Turner - University of Queensland - Biography

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
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→ Director

Print version

Professor Graeme Turner, FAHA



Graeme Turner is Professor of Cultural Studies and Director of the Centre for Critical and Cultural Studies since 1999. He is one of the key figures in the development of cultural and media studies in Australia and has an outstanding international reputation in the field. His work is used in many disciplines—cultural and media studies, communications, history, literary studies, and film and television studies—and it has been translated into seven languages. Graeme's research interests are largely in Australian media and popular culture, and his current research project is an ARC-funded study of talkback radio.

Graeme's most recent publications are *Ending the Affair: the decline of television current affairs in Australia* (UNSW Press, 2005), and (with Stuart Cunningham) the second edition of *The Media and Communications in Australia* (Allen & Unwin). Other recent publications include *Understanding Celebrity* Sage, 2004) and *The Film Cultures Reader* (Routledge, 2002). Forthcoming articles in *Media International Australia* and *The International Journal of Cultural Studies* deal respectively with talkback radio and with the 'demotic turn' in reality TV and celebrity culture.

Graeme Turner was elected President of the Australian Academy of the Humanities in November 2004, and is the Convenor of the ARC Cultural Research Network. While he no longer takes undergraduate classes, he continues to provide research supervision to postgraduate students enrolled at the University.

Email: graeme.turner@uq.edu.au Phone: 07 3365 7183

Related links for: Director

Graeme Turner - Publications
A categorised list of books, chapters, and articles

Graeme Turner - Research
Graeme's research interests include talkback radio, television news and current affairs, celebrity, and nation, globalisation and belonging.

Item No. 8

Media - Report of media coverage proceeding Cronulla Civil Disorder

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The University of Sydney

Report on Media Coverage Preceding Cronulla Civil Disorder

Prepared by Associate Professor Catharine Lumby, Director Media and Communications Degree, University of Sydney, in consultation with Professor Graeme Turner, Director of the Centre for Critical and Cultural Studies, University of Queensland.

Summary

The media does not directly cause events, but it does influence and even accelerate events by shaping the public's understanding of reality. In the days leading up to the civil disturbance at Cronulla some elements of the media fed public debate about ethnicity, religion and antisocial behaviour in ways which undoubtedly encouraged, if not actively caused, the perception that Anglo-Australians were under attack by Lebanese/Middle Eastern gangs and that the police force was unable to protect them. In particular, an analysis of the extensive coverage given to these claims by a number of commercial talkback radio hosts in the week preceding the disturbance arguably reinforced the perception that young men of Middle Eastern appearance were roaming beaches and other public areas in gangs and attacking Anglo-Australians without any provocation, and doing so without any response from the authorities. Demographic data on the audience for such talkback shows suggests that a significant proportion of the senior members of the Shire community are likely to have been influenced by these broadcasts and to have contributed to the broader community perception of the issues in the week leading up to the disturbance.

Background

In preparing this report, the author relied in the first instance on print media reports and commentary that analysed the nature and scope of media coverage of the events leading up to the Cronulla civil disorder. A sample of more than 100 articles were viewed. Expert opinion on media coverage was also taken into account. As a result of this primary analysis, a decision was made to look particularly at broadcasts on the commercial radio station 2GB as there was a clear and broad consensus by many key commentators and reports that the debate was most focused and intense in this forum. This report does not claim to be a definitive analysis of all media coverage Australia-wide of relevant events or issues in the week preceding the civil disorder. It is, rather, a close analysis of a key sample of media coverage.

Analysis

An analysis of broadcasts by three 2GB radio talkback hosts, Alan Jones, Ray Hadley and Jason Morrison shows that the following issues and themes dominated discussions broadcast on their programs from Monday 5th December to Friday 9th December (the week leading up to the civil disorder at Cronulla Beach).

The dominant themes and issues were:

- Young men of Middle Eastern appearance are akin to animals – they "hunt in packs", they are "mongrels".

- Young Men of Middle Eastern appearance are both vicious and cowardly. They attack Anglo-Australian men without provocation and they always do it in gangs.

- The police have a policy of 'going soft' on young men of Middle Eastern appearance because they don't want to be accused of racism and/or they are afraid of these gangs. They are either indifferent to the suffering of the community or wilfully under-resourced by those managing them.

- Violence by young Middle Eastern men has reached epidemic proportions in the Sutherland shire. 'Ordinary' Australian families are no longer safe on the beach or at the local park in some regions. They attack women and children, they steal clothes and wallets, they swear and spit, they have no respect for Australian institutions and traditions.

- Young men of Middle Eastern appearance are racially motivated in their attacks but Anglo-Australians are afraid to say so because they are so careful not to racially stereotype anyone.

- The police claim that there has only been one assault of this type recorded at Cronulla beach in the past year is simply wrong. The reality is that people are afraid to report assaults because they fear revenge attacks.

- The community are now being forced to take matters into their own hands because noone can or will protect them. People who initiate vigilante justice are only doing what they have to do to protect their families, even if it is wrong to take the law into your own hands.

- On the evidence of the transcripts, the hosts were mostly careful not to explicitly condone vigilante behaviour and in some cases explicitly warned against it. On the other hand, they also frequently expressed strong sympathy with those callers who were calling for such action, and thus implicitly acknowledged that theirs was an understandable, if unwise, reaction in the circumstances. Further, while in conversation with several callers who were calling for the community to take on

the responsibility of protecting themselves, some responses could be reasonably interpreted as indicating tacit approval for such action.

Throughout the talkback coverage there was a continual sliding between the following terms: Middle Eastern, Middle Eastern appearance, Lebanese and Muslim, often with no acknowledgement that these descriptors are extremely broad and do not map neatly onto one another. There was also evidence that the hosts frequently conflated unrelated events – the civil disorder at Macquarie Fields, the stabbing of a newsreader, and a group sexual assault, in building the claim that the police were unable to protect Anglo-Australians from men of Middle Eastern appearance.

Conclusion

While we need to be extremely wary of any claim that the media or media commentators have the power to directly cause real events, there is no question that the media influences public perception and feeds into social behaviours and attitudes. An analysis of the commercial talkback radio broadcasts referred to above demonstrates a framing of events and issues which could only have reinforced existing fears and prejudices about men of Middle Eastern appearance and contributed to the belief that Anglo-Australians were under attack.

Addendum: Analysis of 2GB broadcasts

December 5:

Alan Jones: In relation to attack on lifesavers the following exchange went to air:

Caller: What kind of grubs do we have here?
Jones: What kind of grubs? This lot were Middle Eastern, we're not allowed to say it but I am saying it".

The above exchange highlights a common theme promoted by talkback hosts – the notion that those who are prepared to stand up and denounce Middle Eastern young men are brave lone voices. The young men of Middle Eastern appearance are also referred to in the broadcast by Jones and by callers he endorses as "mongrels" and "cowards".

Ray Hadley took up the theme with similar vigour engaging enthusiastically with a caller who claims her son was bashed in an unprovoked attack. She describes young men of Middle Eastern appearance as being "like animals hunting in packs". Hadley responds with an anecdote about a holiday he had which was ruined when the resort was "invaded by young people of Middle Eastern appearance". He goes on to say it would be a good thing if one of these young men drowned.

December 6:

Alan Jones begins broadcast by linking a comment the NSW Police Commissioner made referring to the Macquarie Field riots as a "disturbance" to a range of other assaults as a way of suggesting that the police are indifferent to the suffering of the community when it comes to assaults by men of Middle Eastern appearance. He goes on to reiterate a claim made by a caller to his Dec 5 program that her son had been the victim of an Australia Day bashing by Lebanese young men and that "nothing had happened".

Jones reads from a letter claiming that "it's not just a few Middle Eastern bastards at the weekend, it's thousands" whom he refers to as "human pollution". Jones goes on later to note that "racism is a one way street, if you say something about someone over there all hell will break loose but they can say whatever they like about you and nothing happens".

Ray Hadley: The program is once again largely focused on the theme that attacks by young men of Middle Eastern appearance are epidemic and that we need to

consider extreme solutions including considering policies to ban people gathering in large groups.

December 7:

Alan Jones – Becomes more specific in his commentary about Cronulla claiming that "the truth is they are Lebanese gangs...let's identify who these people are". He now begins to fully develop the theme that the community has to take matters into their own hands because the police are no longer protecting them. In a discussion with a guest expert he discusses gang-related violence in California which allegedly forced the local community to form their own 'gangs', Jones responds: "And you say the ingredients are here, we've got the pack mentality, we've got the Lebanese gangs and the disrespect, you've got mind-numbing rap music, they've got the weapons and the knives and, like the US, the gangs are drawn along ethnic lines."

December 8th:

Alan Jones: Begins by summing up the alleged thrust of the emails he has received which he claims show "the listeners are saying one thing...this is at Hurstville, this is at Strathfield, this is at Bondi, this is at Manly, this is suburban this stuff and these people only know one thing, they hate us and they're going to take over". He then cites an alleged text message sent out by local "youngsters" in the Sutherland Shire encouraging others to go to the beach on the following Sunday "to support Leb and Wog bashing day". While Jones urges listeners not to take the law into their own hands, his prefacing comments make it clear that he is sympathetic to their frustration and that he "understands" them.

In response to a caller who says she has seen abuse of people of Middle Eastern appearance on the beach and that there "are two sides to everything" Jones makes the (inaccurate) claim that "we don't have Anglo-Sax on kids over there raping women in Western Sydney". He also notes that "there is a religious element in all of this".

Ray Hadley Program (Jason Morrison filling in): Says that "people only start talking about taking the law into their own hands when they think nothing has been done and that is the case 100 % with what's going on in Cronulla". He says that a "brawl" on the weekend is inevitable. He also claims that "every Saturday and Sunday and Friday nights...we have gangs of young Lebanese men who show up and look for trouble". He also claims to have seen the "Aussie versus the Lebanese thing going on" first hand. He also describes two young men he

interviewed at the beach who talk about showing "these wogs this is our territory" as "level-headed".

A woman calls in to say that her husband is Lebanese and that makes her son Lebanese. He responds "No it doesn't, that makes your son an Australian and your husband an Australian". He also later endorses an email from a listener who claims "We are experiencing circumstances that have caused leaders of other countries through history to declare war on people not assimilating in their country". He later laughingly endorses a comment by a caller that we might need to "put in the Australian army".

December 9

Alan Jones: Begins by commenting on the Asst Police Commissioner's comment that we have ethnic populations who are just as entitled to use the beach as anyone by comparing "ethnic" populations to guests in our community who "have to behave" inside the Australian house and who have "basic behavioural problems". He goes on throughout the program to implicitly compare the 'problem' group to visitors to Australia rather than as inhabitants,


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Media Policy - NSW Police

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NSW POLICE





Public Affairs Branch
July 2004

Title:	NSW Police Media Policy
Subject:	Policy and Procedures
Command responsible:	Public Affairs Branch
Available to:	Restricted
Publication date:	July 2004
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Version:	5.6
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The purpose of this policy

Policing in NSW attracts more public attention than any other topic. Whether investigating crime, protecting public safety, securing large-scale public events, combating death and injury on the roads, mounting rescue operations, managing emergencies, preparing to meet the threat of terrorism or performing any of its many other daily tasks, the work of NSW Police is endlessly fascinating to the public.

This is reflected by the intensive coverage of policing issues by the news media, which devote more time and space to them than to any other area of government activity.

That means every NSW Police officer works under an intense spotlight of media interest. The way every officer behaves under that scrutiny directly contributes to the way the media report NSW Police and the way the public perceives police. This, in turn, directly affects police morale and effectiveness.

This policy will help you deal with media. By following it, you will play your part in building positive public opinion of your work and that of your colleagues. The most effective way Police can communicate with the community is via the news media.

Most of what you need to know about dealing with the media is contained in this policy. If in doubt, consult the **Police Media Unit (PMU)**. Like this policy, it is there to help you. Even if you are confident in dealing with the media, you should always keep the PMU informed of any contact you may have with media organisations.

All NSW Police employees are required to comply with the principles outlined in this policy. Breaches of this policy may result in disciplinary action and/ or criminal or civil sanctions.

Introduction

Every day NSW Police needs help and co-operation from news media for a variety of reasons:

- To warn the public about emergencies and dangers;
- To appeal for information about people who are missing or wanted;
- To ask for the public's help to solve crimes;
- To reduce exaggerated and irrational fear of crime;
- To tell the daily story of police work to the community and so build the public's respect and admiration for police and the work they do.

Every single day journalists need information held by NSW Police to do their jobs. That job is to inform the public about important and 'newsworthy' issues and events. Journalists also need people to interview to convey that information; to tell the story.

These are opportunities to speak directly to millions of people in our community via the media. No modern organisation can afford to waste or ruin such opportunities.

Aim

The aim of this policy is to make the relationship between NSW Police and the working media function smoothly. If NSW Police are considerate of the needs of the media, we can ask and expect the media's assistance in policing NSW for the benefit of the community.

Scope

This policy applies to all forms of media: local and metropolitan press, radio, television, public speaking (especially where media is present), the Internet and any other medium that can be used to transmit information to a broad audience.

It applies to all NSW Police employees, sworn and unsworn, including those who are on sick leave, recreation leave, leave without pay or suspended from duty.

Accountabilities

All NSW Police employees are reminded of their obligations under the terms of their employment to maintain the confidentiality of information gathered in the course of the duties. Breaching this policy may render you, NSW Police or both liable to criminal and civil sanctions.

Breaches of this policy may also contravene the *Police Act 1990* and the *Crimes Act, 1900*. Both statutes contain severe penalties for the unauthorised disclosure of information.

Getting help

The **Police Media Unit (PMU)** is part of the **Public Affairs Branch** under Support Command. It is staffed around the clock, seven days per week. It contains experienced media professionals, both sworn police and civilian.

The PMU is there to help you. PMU staff can:

- give you advice on public statements and dealing with media;
- anticipate media and public response;
- draft statements for release;
- liaise with Legal Services to safeguard the judicial process;
- organise media conferences;
- disseminate information instantaneously to media organisations state-wide;
- send **Media Liaison Officers (MLOs)** to attend a scene and provide advice and media management on-site, any time, day or night.
- send the **NSW Police Media Spokesperson** (Inspector) to a scene to undertake the task of media interviews where the relevant commander is too busy or prefers not to engage media directly.

Contact the PMU whenever you need help, you are in doubt, or you are dealing with:

- suspicious death;
- emergencies or disasters;
- major arrests;
- serious crimes;
- controversial issues;
- incidents involving 'celebrities';
- requests to interview, photograph or film police.

Contact
Police Media Unit (PMU):
Phone - 02 8263 6301;
Eaglenet - 45101;
Memo - #pmu or media@police.nsw.gov.au

Helping the media help the police

Different kinds of journalists have different needs. A newspaper journalist may prefer a 'live' interview, but may also be able to get by with a photograph and a written statement. A radio reporter must have 'tape' - a speaking voice to tell the story. Television requires visual images - without them a TV journalist's story has little chance of appearing in the day's news bulletins.

By understanding and trying to meet these needs, we lay the foundations of professional and co-operative relationships with media outlets and the people who manage and work for them.

This does not mean negative stories about police will never appear. For example, the media may have a "watchdog" role in ensuring ethical and professional standards of policing. If journalists discover information that reflects poorly on police, they believe they have a professional duty to report it.

It is reasonable to expect journalists to conduct themselves honestly and ethically. While journalists and police do this and work cooperatively, we can expect the great majority of reporting on policing to be fair and balanced and the public perception of police will be enhanced.

The Australian Journalists' Association Code of Ethics requires journalists to identify themselves as journalists and state the organisation they represent when approaching anyone for information.

If you have doubts about the bona fides of a person claiming to be a journalist, ask them for identification and contact the PMU for advice.

Rule One – Fairness

News media work under intense competitive pressure. The professional consequences can be severe when a journalist misses an important news story that a rival organisation reports.

This means giving information about important stories selectively to one outlet can create ill-feeling among those who miss out. The damage to relations can be long-lasting and very harmful to NSW Police.

It also means that the best and most competitive journalists strive every day to find and file stories no one else knows. To do so, they use all of their contacts energetically and will try every possible tack to get information not known to rival reporters. Be aware of this and very careful with confidential information, especially when dealing with journalists you know. Fairness is the guiding principle in dealings with media.

Get to know your local media

Commanders – whether in Local Area Commands (LACs), specialist areas or squads – are encouraged to engage with those elements of the media most interested in their area of work. For example, LACs should get to know their local newspaper editors, reporters and radio journalists and talk with them regularly. We depend on these people to keep our communities informed of all the work police are doing.


Notifying the PMU before releasing information to local papers allows the organisation to be coherent in what it is saying to various media outlets across the state and when it is saying it. It may also alert you to broader issues and ensure consistent messages are being given across all areas.

PMU advice can also help you get the best coverage for news in your area, for example by timing it so as not to clash with other announcements that may overshadow yours. This helps you communicate important information to as many members of your community as possible.

Crime Stoppers and local media

The PMU regularly prepares media releases for local and regional media outlets encouraging people to use Crime Stoppers to report crime and information about crime.

Harnessing local media to tackle local crime problems can be a powerful weapon in your crime-fighting arsenal. Contact the PMU to make use of it.



Public release of information

Authority to release

Any information released to the media or directly to the public must be properly authorised. Breaching this policy may render you, NSW Police or both liable to criminal and civil sanctions.

Comment on police policies and procedures[1] can only be given or authorised by:

- The Commissioner;
- Deputy Commissioners;
- Senior Assistant Commissioner;
- Assistant Commissioners and equivalent specialist Commanders; and
- Executive Directors, where appropriate.

It is the responsibility of the corporate spokesperson to develop an overview of strategy, policy and operational practice for a particular portfolio. The corporate spokesperson should be consulted prior to commenting on police policies and procedures in their area of responsibility. Additionally, where possible, the corporate spokesperson should address the media where comment on a specific policy or procedure is required.

Comment on routine police operations or investigations[2] can be given or authorised by:

- The officer in charge of the operation or investigation (namely Duty Officer, Investigations Manager, Crime Manager); or
- The relevant Local Area Commander/ specialist equivalent or their appointed delegate.

Consider whether the issue has implications for other commands. If it does you must gain approval from the relevant senior commander and inform the PMU before commenting.

Privacy

In NSW, every person has legislated rights to privacy.

The *Privacy and Personal Information Protection (PPIP) Act 1998*, sets out *Information Protection Principles (IPPs)*. Section 27 of (PPIP) Act exempts NSW Police from complying with the IPPs, except in relation to **administrative** and **educative** functions. Generally, information is released to the media to meet a key **operational** function.

However, the following principles apply to **all** media disclosures by NSW Police.

Personal information as defined by the PPIP Act; means information or an opinion about an individual whose identity is apparent or can reasonably be ascertained from the information or opinion.

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[1] For the purposes of this policy, "policy and procedures" include those NSW Police policies, standard operating procedures or guidelines, which have been corporately endorsed and adopted on a state-wide or regional basis.

[2] This includes deployment of resources and operational tactics utilised for operations under the direct command of that officer.

(1) Collection of information for non-operational purposes

In almost all circumstances, NSW Police collect information for operational purposes. Nonetheless, there may be rare occasions when NSW Police can assist victims of crime and their families by obtaining personal information for release to the media. In such circumstances informed consent to collect and release the information must be obtained from the individual or their next of kin.

For example:
Taking a photo from the home of a murder victim and releasing it to media without family permission could be intensely distressing to relatives and a terrible violation of their privacy.

However, discussing the media interest in such a photo with a family, assisting them to prepare a statement for media, identifying a suitable family representative to be interviewed and acting as intermediary between the family and the media could be one of the most valuable services anyone could provide. It shields the family from further intrusion and distress and satisfies the need for public information.

(2) Information must be accurate and reliable

Personal information released in accordance with this policy must be accurate and reliable, with facts clearly differentiated from opinion or suspicions.

If personal information is not confirmed as factual, but is deemed appropriate to disclose for operational reasons, its reliability status should be clearly conveyed to the recipient.

(3) Disclosed information should be proportionate to the purpose of the disclosure

Personal information that is disclosed about an individual should be limited to that information which is required to achieve the purpose of the disclosure.

(4) The personal affairs of an individual should not be disclosed unless there is an operational need or a risk of harm to any person.

For the purposes of this section, *personal affairs* of an individual includes information relating to an individual's political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, ethnic or racial origin, trade union membership, health or sexual activity.

What you can say during an investigation (prior to proceedings commencing)

When a person is to be charged with an offence, the judicial process starts at the point of arrest or when information is layed before a Justice.

Before this happens you can release:

- the kind of offence;
- the time and place (street name and town/suburb but not house/flat number which might identify the victim);
- the sex, age and suburb/town and occupation of victims (taking care not to identify them especially in small communities);

- the name and rank of the relevant commander or senior investigator (if approved);
- descriptions of suspects and vehicles, weapons, clothes and other articles involved;
- appeals for public help to locate suspects;
- descriptions of remarks made by defenders, but not direct quote (eg, "The man threatened staff and demanded money");
- descriptions of injuries;
- the hospital(s) the injured attended;
- public reassurances about police action to deal with the matter.

What you must never say

Never release anything that could:

- Hinder or jeopardise an investigation;
- State or imply that someone who has not yet been charged is guilty of a crime (eg, "Police are looking for a man who last night murdered a security guard..");
- State or imply that a particular crime has been committed (eg, "The victim was murdered with a blunt instrument...");
- Speculate on the cause of a death;
- Prejudice a trial; or
- Distress victims of crime or their families unless there is an operational need or risk of harm to any person.

You must not say or release anything which:

- lays blame on or belittles anyone;
- details amounts of stolen money;
- details criminal methods (beware 'copycat' criminals);
- quotes specific conversation with victims;
- reveals distinguishing methodology used by criminals or investigating police.

What you can say after proceedings have commenced

Once a person has been arrested or information has been sworn before a Justice, careless or unauthorised statements or releases of information by police can have drastic consequences.

These include:

- Violating someone's right to privacy;
- Damage to the reputation of innocent people;
- Jeopardising court proceedings against people guilty of crimes, who may escape penalty as a result.

Different information can be released at various points in the **process from arrest, to charging to appearance in court.** Proper checking and authorisation from appropriate commanders is crucial.

Once a person is in custody but not yet charged, you **should only say:**

- He/she is in custody;
- Where they are held;
- He/she is being interviewed by police in connection with an incident or offence;
- What the person's age, sex, occupation, suburb/town is;
- Where they were arrested (no house or unit numbers);
- When they were arrested;
- The Command(s), Unit(s) or Squad(s) involved in the arrest.

Do not identify the person more than this.

After charging

Once charges are laid you can add:

- What the charges are;
- The court in which he/she is set to appear;
- The date set for appearance;
- Whether bail was granted or refused.

The Police Fact Sheet detailing the allegations may be released to the media for accurate court reporting, but only after it has been read out in an open court or admitted in proceedings (retained and placed with court papers). You should always check with the prosecutor to see if this has occurred. The discretion to release the fact sheet rests with the Officer in Charge of the Case. A key consideration is whether the release of the material will jeopardise future operations or the successful prosecution of the offender.

At this stage, 'the matter is before the court'. This means it is ***'sub judice'***. No other information can be released. Media making further requests (eg, the alleged offender's name) should be directed to the court.

You must never make statements that:

- Refer to the psychological state of an alleged offender;
- Discuss prior convictions or criminal record;
- Canvass motive or absence of motive;
- Allude to the possibility of other offences by the alleged offender;
- Say the alleged offender has or has not made statements or admissions;
- Canvass forensic or other examinations or identification 'line-ups';
- Reveal a refusal to submit to examinations or tests (**except** breath tests for alcohol);
- Reveals distinguishing methodology used by criminals or investigating police.

Commenting on a case – or releasing information about it – that is before the courts can potentially abort a trial.

Always consider the repercussions of your actions and statements. For example; an offender may be acquitted because of careless statements made to the media.

In most cases, courts are public forums where media can attend to report on evidence and proceedings. No one outside the court should comment until the case has concluded and until the period allowed for appeals has passed – usually **21 days after a conviction.**

Contempt of Court

The law of contempt, sub judice, is designed to protect the administration of justice. It is a contempt of court if there is any interference with the course of justice. This can occur with the publication of certain material after an arrest and before the matter has been dealt with by the court. For example, releasing photographs of accused persons and exhibits (dealt with separately) has in the past attracted the attention of the courts and is risky. Such a publication can cause miscarriages of justice.

If in doubt, seek advice from the PMU, which will, in turn, consult Legal Services.

Defamation

Defamation occurs when material published contains 'an imputation calculated to injure the reputation of another by exposing him or her to hatred, contempt or ridicule or implications that tend to lower the Plaintiff in the estimation of right thinking members of society'.

There are a number of defences to an action of defamation. Making sure the material you publish is accurate and you are justified in releasing it will enable you to argue a reasonable defence to an action in defamation.

If in doubt, seek advice from PMU or direction from Legal Services.

Release of photographs

'Wanted' photos

NSW Police may release photographs of people for whom first instance or arrest warrants have been issued by a court, provided the publication of the photo serves a valid operational purpose. Such a release to the public or news media must be authorised by the Commander of Public Affairs or the office of the Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner.

Other 'persons of interest'

In certain matters, police may also issue photographs of individuals they wish to interview in relation to offences but for whom no warrant has been issued. For example, detectives may wish to question a person captured by security cameras misusing an Automatic Teller Machine (ATM).

In such a case it is crucial that no information is issued with the image that canvasses the person's guilt or innocence. Use words such as "Police would like to interview the person in this photo in relation to these matters". Do **not** use words that would allow a reasonable reader to infer the person is guilty of an offence.

Advice from Legal Services should be obtained before any such releases.

Convicted persons

The Crown Solicitor has advised that NSW Police is exempt from the *Privacy and Personal Information Protection (PPIP) Act* for the purpose of releasing photographs of **people who have been convicted** of offences. Such a release to the public or news media must be authorised by the Commander of Public Affairs or the office of the Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner.

Advice from Legal Services should be obtained before any such releases.

Police-held footage

This includes ERISP, "in-car" video, PolAir and Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) footage.

The release of police video footage captured during interview (ERISP) or operations is possible but can create legal problems in certain circumstances.

Such footage should **not** be released to the public or news media without the approval of the Commander of Public Affairs or the office of the Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner, who will consult Legal Services in every instance.

Photographs/video of exhibits

Media may be allowed to film exhibits (such as seizures of drugs or firearms) under controlled conditions that will not create problems during later court proceedings. Seek advice from the PMU prior to any such releases.

If such control is not possible, the PMU's Multimedia Production Unit can be deployed to film the exhibits and have the resulting edited footage checked by Legal Services before release to media.

Protecting witnesses, victims of crime and police conducting covert operations

Crime, especially violent crime, can be a horrific experience for those who suffer it. Where it results in death or serious injury, the effect on immediate family is usually devastating.

Trying to assist families with the added complication of intense media attention can be very difficult. Contact the PMU for assistance to help families prepare statements and make media appearances. PMU staff can advise you or attend the scene to help directly.
Never release information or images that could:

- Identify a crime victim or his/her address (including companies and organisations);
- Identify a witness;
- Embarrass or distress a victim (eg, details of sexual assaults or wounds);
- Reveal details of a crime that might be known only to the perpetrator.

You can release information:

- That identifies a deceased person (only after next of kin have been informed and they have had reasonable time to tell other relatives and friends);
- That identifies a missing person who is presumed dead (only as above);
- That identifies a deceased person when no relatives can be found in Australia and police need to appeal for public information;
- That identifies victims of crime (including companies and organisations) if this is likely to help the investigation and you have gained the victim's permission.

Commanders should ensure that police performing duties as undercover, street-level and surveillance operatives are protected from media exposure. This includes photographs, video footage or releasing personal information about that officer.

Describing people to media

The words used to describe crime victims, witnesses, suspects and offenders can be highly contentious – especially when they refer to ethnic or racial origin.

When misused or misunderstood, they can cause great damage to general community harmony, police relations with various communities and can damage investigations that often depend heavily on community support and information.

For these reasons the terms listed below are approved for use. Use them and avoid all other alternatives.

There are three categories of approved descriptive words that you can use to build a useful overall description.

Physical

Use Forensic Services Group's (FSG) list of characteristics. More can be added. If in doubt, consult FSG or the PMU.

Build – large, athletic, obese
Height – estimate in centimetres
Complexion – fair or pale, olive, tanned
Hair colour – blonde, ginger, white, grey, brown
Hair length – shaved, short, medium, long
Hair style – straight, wavy, curly, spiky
Face – round, chiselled, heart shaped
Eye colour – brown, hazel, black, blue
Eye type – sleepy, bloodshot, crossed
Eyebrows – fine, bushy, plucked
Glasses – sunglasses, plastic, half frame, bifocals
Mouth – full, wide, hare lip
Facial hair – moustache, beard, sideburns, goatee
Nose – thin, broad, flared

Ethnic Descriptors

You need to use great care when applying ethnic descriptors. By themselves they are very limited in usefulness since they can be emotion or prejudice driven responses from witnesses that may be wrong. They can also lead other members of a given community to feel they are unfairly under suspicion and create hostility to police and other community groups.

However, they can also form a valid and useful part of an overall description that could lead to the arrest of an offender. In this case there is no reason to shy away from using them.

Use **only**: "The person is of...

- White/European appearance;
- Black/African appearance;
- Asian appearance;
- Indian/Pakistani appearance;
- Aboriginal appearance;
- Pacific Islander appearance;
- Mediterranean/Middle Eastern appearance; or
- South American appearance."

Nationality

A person's nationality has no bearing on their appearance, so it is irrelevant in a physical description.

However, it may still be pertinent information and is appropriate for release when this is the case. For example, when fears are held for the safety of a foreign national travelling in Australia or information about an offender, crime victim or missing person is needed from other people of the same nationality or language group.

000/VKG

No recordings, transcripts or other documents relating to emergency calls to 000 or police radio communications (VKG) can be released without the express approval of the Commissioner or Deputy Commissioners.

Methodology

Do not disclose methodology used by police or criminals publicly.

If you reveal **criminal methods**, others may well attempt to copy the crime, perhaps successfully. If you reveal **police methodology**, criminals may be able to plan against it, avoid detection/capture and thwart police efforts to prevent crime.

Money

When a large sum of money has been stolen, revealing the full amount can have a powerful stimulating effect on others and lead to more thefts.

For this reason use only non-specific descriptions: "a sum of money was taken".

If investigators believe it may help a particular investigation to give more information, use terms such as 'a substantial sum' or 'a considerable sum'.

Drugs

As with cash, detailing the amount, weight or commercial value of stolen drugs can also provoke copycat crimes – especially when the site of the theft is mentioned; eg a hospital or pharmacy. Say "a quantity of drugs was stolen". Following an arrest, you should use the wording of the charges laid.

Cannabis crops are described by the number of plants. You can release the 'street value' of illicit drugs as estimated by investigators. Appropriate NSW Police standards must be used and are available on the intranet (refer Drug Squad Homepage).

Missing people

Always get permission from next of kin before releasing identifying information about missing persons.

If permission cannot be secured and there is a pressing concern for the person's safety, release a photograph along with name, age, town or suburb, physical description, information about the disappearance and any relevant medical information.

Crime Statistics

Statistics measuring rates of crime are always contentious and often used to try to demonstrate how successfully or otherwise police are doing their job.

Statistics are complex and open to a range of interpretation. They can be influenced by many factors including collection methodology, reporting procedures and seasonal fluctuations. Comparing different sets of statistics (eg, interstate figures) may be invalid or prone to error.

It is therefore dangerous to publish or comment on statistics without expert guidance.

In NSW the Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research (BOCSAR) is the agency responsible for collecting, analysing, releasing and commenting on state-wide figures and trends. However, Commanders might be called on to comment on local trends within their LACs to public meetings, community groups or local media.

Commanders should not be reluctant to highlight improvements within their areas or to address problems indicated by deteriorating figures as measured by BOCSAR. Local media outlets will always be keenly interested in both sides of this equation.

Security and Counter-Terrorism

Only the Commissioner, Deputy Commissioners and the Assistant Commissioner, Counter Terrorism – or other officers specifically delegated by them – are authorised to comment on terrorist threats, threat levels or the security environment in NSW.

It is critical that all NSW Police comply with these principles. Loose or ill-informed remarks about these issues have the potential to cause widespread public anxiety as well as enormous economic harm.

It is also possible that remarks may be used to advantage by people planning terrorist attacks or severely disrupt investigations into such activities.

If pressed by local media to discuss security or potential terrorist targets in your local area, you must say you are not authorised to speak about such matters and refer the media to the Assistant Commissioner, Counter Terrorism via the PMU.

Note: In the event of a terrorist incident you should refer to the NSW Counter-Terrorism Public Information Plan and Guidelines.

Bomb threats and suspicious objects

The operational commander, in consultation with the Assistant Commissioner, Counter Terrorism and the Bomb Disposal Unit will decide how much detail about any device is appropriate for public release.

Always advise the PMU as soon as you learn of either an explicit threat or a suspicious package/ object that requires a police response. There is potential for mass public alarm if word-of-mouth and media reports spread about such incidents.

Such reports can grow with phenomenal speed in a vacuum of factual information. It is the PMU's job to provide that information to media. This role both calms public anxiety and protects safety in the event there is a genuine threat.

The PMU will rapidly inform the public about evacuations, road closures and transport disruptions, but no other police comment should be made before official advice from investigating police.

The PMU will also liaise with other key government agencies to co-ordinate messages and ensure the public receives reliable, consistent information.

There may be security issues associated with media filming bomb squad officers and vehicles. They should be asked not to film these.

Media should **not** be given close access to or detailed descriptions of explosive or similar devices.

Do **not** release the name of a person or organisation targeted by such an incident unless they agree.

Major crimes, incidents, accidents and disasters

Note: In the event of a terrorist incident you should refer to the NSW Counter-Terrorism Public Information Plan and Guidelines.

Fires, floods, storms, explosions, major road accidents, plane crashes, chemical spills, industrial disasters and public emergencies attract massive media attention.

Contact the PMU as early as possible. A Media Liaison Officer (MLO) will be deployed immediately to the scene to help both media and operational police to get their jobs done while keeping the public informed of developments.

The MLO will work with on-site commanders to establish a suitable area for media to gather, where briefings and interviews can be provided. The MLO will negotiate scene access for media to report and film, depending on the operational imperatives of police commanders.

He/she will also maintain close contact with the PMU to ensure all information issuing from NSW Police is accurate and consistent. The PMU will liaise with other relevant agencies, especially the other emergency services, to ensure coherent and accurate information is provided to the public.

By helping to manage access and providing timely information and interview subjects for media, we can avoid a situation where frustration and building pressure on reporters results in a loss of control. This can create major problems for police, compromise crime scenes, severely hamper operations and possibly endanger lives.

Before an MLO gets to a scene, contact the PMU for advice. When the MLO arrives it is crucial for commanders to provide the person with a thorough briefing.

Interviews should be given by the commander on scene or their delegated officer. If preferred, the role can be filled by the PMU spokesperson, if available.

Critical Incidents

A Critical Incident may arise where a person dies or is seriously injured in an incident involving a level of police interaction. These include:

- Shootings – both by police and when an officer is shot;
- Fatal or serious accidents;
- Deaths or serious injuries in custody;
- Self harm or attempted suicides in custody;
- Deaths or serious injuries during police operations.

Following a critical incident, the Local Area Commander (LAC) will be responsible for any **interim** statements. LACs should consider liaising with the senior critical incident investigator prior to any media release.

As there is likely to be significant media interest in a matter where police are being investigated, the Police Media Unit should provide the media with the basic approved facts including the time, date and general nature of the incident.

A critical incident will be independently investigated by specialist Police from external Commands and are subject to independent review. Additionally, deaths arising from critical incidents will be reported to the Coroner. During the investigation phase, no public comment should be given without the express authorisation of the relevant Region Commander or specialist Commander equivalent and, where relevant, the Coroner.

(For further information on critical incidents, you should refer to the NSW Police *Guidelines for the Investigations and Management of Critical Incidents*, available on the intranet).

Charging of Police Officers or Police Employees

When arresting and charging police officers or employees in accordance with Section 148 of the *Police Act, 1990*, you should ensure that timely advice is provided to the relevant Deputy Commissioner. Such advice must include any anticipated media coverage or issues.

No public comment regarding the arrest and/or charging of Police officers or employees should be made without the approval of the relevant Region Commander or specialist Commander equivalent.

Sieges

Police attending a siege should assume the Person of Interest (POI) is listening to and watching media coverage. This can be a highly dangerous or a powerful tool in safely resolving the matter, depending on how it is managed.

An MLO will 'background' media on the situation and alert them to possibly catastrophic consequences of their reporting.

Information and access given to media must be entirely at the discretion of the operational commander and senior police negotiator.

Unless these officers authorise it, **never** talk to media at such a scene about:

- Police strategies;
- Demands of a POI;
- Identity of POIs or hostages;
- Type and number of police attending;
- Emotional or psychological state of POIs.

Media representatives should be asked to notify police immediately if they or their organisations receive any contact from a person involved in a siege. It must also be made very clear that any attempt by media to contact anyone inside the besieged premises could directly cost lives.

Crime Scenes and Search Warrants

Media must never be allowed to enter premises being searched under a warrant. Media can and should be excluded from a designated crime scene, unless granted permission to enter by the commander on the scene.

On the other hand, there are no grounds to prevent media being present, filming and reporting in any ordinary public street or place. You should only move reporters on if there are legitimate legal, safety or operational reasons. If you grab at or try to cover cameras or other equipment, you risk 'becoming the story'.

Restricted Air Space

The Duty Operations Inspector (DOI) can request Air Services Australia (Air Traffic Control) to restrict pilots and aircraft from certain air space

Air Services Australia can only declare an area to be restricted airspace if they believe it is necessary in the interests of public safety or for the protection of the environment.

If you believe that media helicopters over a scene are endangering safety of persons or the environment, contact the DOI to have the air space restricted and inform either the MLO on scene or the PMU, who will inform reporters and newsrooms.

Note: Personal annoyance at media interest in a particular incident or investigation is not sufficient grounds to request such a restriction.

Media 'Blackouts'

In crisis situations it may be appropriate to ask all media to refrain temporarily from reporting an incident at all; for example, a siege where hostages lives are directly threatened and the offender is known to be watching media coverage.

This type of request can only be made in the most exceptional circumstances and must come from the Assistant Commissioner, Counter Terrorism, Region Commander or above.

Marches, rallies and demonstrations

The PMU will deploy an MLO to work closely with the forward commander at the scene. That person will advise on time, place and content of any media interviews that are needed.

Abduction, Extortion and Product Contamination

Never release information about an abduction, extortion or product contamination in progress unless you are authorised by the commanding officer after consultation with the PMU and the people or organisations concerned.

It is crucial to manage public information during this type of incident. Mishandling the release of information can cause major commercial damage, public danger and even loss of life.

Escapees

People who have escaped from custody can be identified by name and photograph.

If an escapee is considered dangerous, this should carry a strong warning for members of the public not to approach the person but report any sighting to police or Crime Stoppers.

If an escapee has been convicted of serious crime such as murder or sexual assault, all efforts should be made to notify any victims and their families before media report the escape.

If 'mug shot' photos are released, the police identification brooches should be cut or covered.

Department of Community Services (DOCS) Cases

DOCS and NSW Police work together to detect, protect and rescue children who are victims of violence or abuse or at risk of such abuse. It is unlawful to reveal the identity of children who are DOCS 'clients'.

Any release of information about cases involving DOCS should be approved by both agencies.

Protection of Children

The identity of children connected with Criminal Proceedings as defendants, witnesses or otherwise, must never be published. The *Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act, 1987*, provides penalties for publishing the identity of children in these circumstances. This includes where the person **was a child at the time** of the Criminal Proceedings.

The Coroner

The roles and functions of the State Coroner and Deputy State Coroner are defined by the *Coroners Act, 1980*. These responsibilities include; to ensure that all deaths, suspected deaths, fires and explosions are properly investigated, including holding an inquest/ inquiry where desirable. Public speculation or commentary about matters before the Coroner have the potential to jeopardise coronial proceedings.

Police media statements should never speculate about cause of death. It is legally a matter for the Coroner to determine and media inquiries should be referred to the Coroner's Office.

When false information about a death is circulating, contact the PMU, which will notify the Coroner and seek permission to correct it. Any clarifying statement must be approved by the Coroner's office.

Deceased people

Names of people who have died should never be released before next of kin have been informed and have had time to tell other family members.

Sometimes, the condition of victims is such that visual identification is unreliable. In these cases, names should only be released once formal identification of a body has been effected. If such a release is urgent for investigative reasons, the Coroner must approve the release.
The Coroner should also approve any release of details about the manner of a death.

Cause of death can only be published after the Coronial *post-mortem* examination is complete. Media inquiries should be deflected to the PMU or the Coroner.

Suicide

Suicide should never be stated or implied by police media statements. It is for the Coroner to decide if suicide has occurred.

Never reveal or confirm the existence of suicide notes or their contents.

If it is operationally necessary to confirm suicide, you must get the Coroner's permission. The PMU can assist you with this process.

Deaths of celebrities

Advise the PMU, which will advise the Coroner, as soon as you learn of the death of a famous person. Only information that the Coroner approves should be released.

Speaking publicly

All officers who undertake media interviews must take appropriate care with their personal presentation. Uniformed officers must ensure that their uniform and appearance complies with the *NSW Police Handbook*. This includes wearing hats during interviews.

When you are approached by the media

Media comment should only be given by properly authorised senior officers. At the LAC level, this means the Superintendent and Duty Officers, Crime Managers and others approved by the Commander. Advise the PMU beforehand.

Region Commanders should provide media comment on all issues to do with budgets, policies, staff and crime patterns within their regions. Please keep the PMU advised.

Talk radio and current affairs television are powerful generators of news and controversy. Always seek PMU advice if approached by these media outlets.

Conferences

There is a growing industry in conference and seminar organisation and it requires a steady supply of people to speak and make presentations. In the current environment, security issues are particularly topical and police are in big demand for these events.

You must not accept an invitation to address such a gathering unless you have permission from the Corporate Spokesperson/ Region Commander or equivalent. He/she must also approve any material to be presented.

When you wish to voice your opinion

Every NSW Police officer has the right to his/her own opinions and to express them in public debates. You must not do so, however, in your capacity as a **NSW Police officer.**

If you write newspaper articles, letters or other papers for publication, call talk-back radio programs, post opinion on the Internet, address public meetings or sign public notices/ petitions you must only do so as a private citizen. Otherwise you may be wrongly taken to be speaking for other police or NSW Police as a whole.

You must make it clear that the views expressed are your own and not refer to your position or profession.

Politics

Similarly, you have the same rights to join political parties and hold and express political views as any other NSW citizen. You must not do so speaking as a NSW Police officer, only as a private citizen. Your conduct and affiliations with political parties must at all times be consistent with the *NSW Police Code of Conduct and Ethics.*

Industrial associations

When speaking to media or the public as a representative of your union, you must make this position clear. Do not allow your remarks to be interpreted as official NSW Police positions. Do not wear police uniform or give your police rank or position.

Secondary Employment

Officers working within the media industry on approved secondary employment must not:

- Provide advice on policing issues, practices or procedures;
- Arrange access to NSWPOL staff, equipment or resources;
- Engage in conduct that constitutes a conflict of interest.

Media coverage of operations

Media relish the chance to directly cover police operations, especially covert and dramatic action. Operational police may be happy to see their successful work reported to a wide audience, yet there are many circumstances where informing media in advance would be to breach operational security, placing the desired outcome and the safety of police at risk.

Seeing their good work, professionalism and courage receive mass public recognition is a powerful morale booster for police and serves as a balance to negative media reports.

The PMU can help negotiate and manage media access to operations by careful and timely advice to media on suitable filming and reporting opportunities, once operational commanders are satisfied the situation is secure.

Always advise all police involved in an operation if media are expected to be present at any stage.

"Ride Alongs"

Prior to allowing members of media organisations to accompany Police on duty, you should contact the PMU for advice. In some circumstances, it will be necessary to enter into a written agreement with members of the media covering:

- An indemnity agreement;
- Assurances from media organisations that they will obtain consent from the lawful occupants of private property to enter such property or film individuals or their property.

You must always consider whether allowing the media to participate in ride-alongs will unduly compromise police investigations, operations or the successful prosecution of offenders.

Make use of Multi-Media's Production Unit

The **Multi-Media Production Unit** evolved from the former **'Police TV'** program. If the presence of media on an operation is too unsafe or the risk of breaching operational security too high, trained staff from this unit can be deployed to report the police action with an assurance of complete security.

The resulting footage can then be edited, legally checked and issued to news media within a few hours. This is an excellent way to assist news coverage of police work with minimal risk. The PMU works closely with Legal Services to ensure all images released are legally sound and will not breach the terms of warrants or jeopardise court proceedings.

Media must never be allowed to enter premises being searched under a warrant.

Public Relations Unit (formerly Film & Television Liaison Unit)

Any requests to film NSW Police other than for news/current affairs style programs should be referred to the **Public Relations Unit**. The Unit manages filming requests involving police personnel and resources for television series, films, documentaries, external training videos, mini-series, student videos and commercials/advertisements (where appropriate).

The Unit also arranges the provision of specific technical advice for scriptwriters, authors and production companies and provides access to NSW Police personnel, facilities, uniforms, and equipment to the film and television industry for research or production purposes.

Item No.

10

Media Policy - NSW Public Information Services Functional Area Supporting Plan

CABINET-IN-CONFIDENCE


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NEW SOUTH WALES

PUBLIC INFORMATION SERVICES

FUNCTIONAL AREA SUPPORTING

PLAN



A FUNCTIONAL AREA SUPPORTING PLAN OF THE NEW SOUTH WALES STATE DISASTER PLAN (DISPLAN)

AUTHORISATION

The New South Wales State Public Information Services Functional Area Supporting Plan has been prepared as a Supporting Plan to the New South Wales State Disaster Plan (Displan), to co-ordinate media resources, to provide for the controlled release of public safety and/or warning messages and public information, and to co-ordinate the interaction between all media agencies during emergency operations.

This Supporting Plan is authorised in accordance with the provisions of the State Emergency and Rescue Management Act, 1989 (as amended).

Endorsed

.....
Chairman
State Emergency Management Committee

AMENDMENT LIST

1. Proposals for amendment or addition to the contents of the Public Information Services Functional Area Supporting Plan are to be forwarded to:

   The Secretary
   NSW State Emergency Management Committee
   P.O Box A792
   SYDNEY SOUTH NSW 1235

   Email: semc@oes.nsw.gov.au

2. Amendments promulgated are to be entered in the undermentioned table when entered.

Amendment		Entered	
Number	**Date**	**Signature**	**Date**
Complete Rewrite	September 2000		

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Definitions

Note: These definitions should be read in conjunction with those contained in the New South Wales Disaster Plan (Displan)

Agency
means a government agency or a non-government agency.[source: SERM Act]

Combat Agency
means the agency identified in Displan as the agency primarily responsible for controlling the response to a particular emergency.[source SERM Act]

Command
in this plan means the direction of members and resources of an agency / organisation in the performance of the agency / organisation's roles and tasks. Authority to command is established by legislation or by agreement with the agency / organisation. Command relates to agencies / organisations only, and operates vertically within the agency / organisation.[source: Displan]

Control
means the overall direction of the activities, agencies or individuals concerned [source: SERM Act]. Control operates horizontally across all agencies / organisations, functions and individuals. Situations are controlled.

Co-ordination
means the bringing together of agencies, organisations and individuals to ensure effective emergency or rescue management, but does not include the control of agencies, organisations and individuals by direction.[source: SERM Act]

Displan
means the New South Wales State Disaster Plan. The object of Displan is to ensure the co-ordinated response to emergencies by all agencies having responsibilities and functions in emergencies. [source: SERM Act]

District
the State is divided into such districts as the Minister may determine by order published in the Gazette. Any such order may describe the boundaries of a district by reference to Local Government Areas, maps or otherwise.[source: SERM Act]

District Emergency Operations Controller(DEOCON)
means the Region Commander of Police appointed by the Commissioner of Police, as the District Emergency Operations Controller for the Emergency Management District.

Emergency
means an emergency due to an actual or imminent occurrence (such as fire, flood, storm, earthquake, explosion, accident, epidemic or warlike action) which:

(a) endangers, or threatens to endanger, the safety or health of persons or animals in the State; or

(b) destroys or damages or threatens to destroy or damage any, property in the State; being an emergency which requires a significant and co-ordinated response.[source: SERM Act]

For the purposes of the definition of *emergency*, property in the State includes any part of the environment of the State. Accordingly, a reference in the Act to:

(a) threats or danger to property includes a reference to threats or danger to the environment, and

(b) the protection of property includes a reference to the protection of the environment.

Functional Area

means a category of services involved in preparations for an emergency, including the following:

a. agriculture and animal services;
b. communication services;
d. engineering services;
e. environmental services;
f. health services;
g. public information services
h. transport services;
i. welfare services. [source: SERM Act]

Functional Area Coordinator

in this plan means the nominated co-ordinator of the Public Information Service Functional Area, who is tasked to co-ordinate the provision of Functional Area support and resources for emergency response and initial recovery operations, who, by agreement of Participating and Supporting Organisations within the Functional Area, has the authority to commit the resources of those organisations.

Incident

in this plan means a localised event, either accidental or deliberate, which may result in death or injury, or damage to property, which requires a normal response from an agency, or agencies.

Participating Organisation

in this plan means the Government Departments, statutory authorities, volunteer organisations and other agencies who have either given formal notice to the Functional Area Co-ordinator, or have acknowledged to the State Emergency Management Committee, that they are willing to participate in emergency management response and initial recovery operations under the direction of the Controller of a combat agency, or Co-ordinator of a Functional Area, with the levels of resources or support as appropriate to the emergency operation.

Recovery

in relation to an emergency includes the process of returning an affected community to its proper level of functioning after an emergency. In this plan this refers to the 'initial recovery' operations to satisfy personal and community needs, and to restore services to the level where the continuing process can be managed by local government and the normal responsible agencies.

Response

in relation to an emergency includes the process of combating an emergency and of providing immediate relief for persons affected by an emergency. [source: SERM Act]

State Emergency Operations Controller (SEOCON)

means the person appointed by the Governor, on the recommendation of the Minister, responsible in the event of an emergency which affects more than one Emergency Management District, for controlling the allocation of resources in response to the emergency. The State Emergency Operations Controller is to establish and control a State Emergency Operations Centre. [source: SERM Act]

Supporting Organisation

in this plan means the Government Departments, statutory authorities, volunteer organisations and other specialist agencies who have indicated a willingness to participate and provide specialist support resources to the Functional Area Co-ordinator during emergency operations.

ABBREVIATIONS

DEOCON	District Emergency Operations Controller
DPIC	District Public Information Centre
FMC	Forward Media Centre
FMO	Forward Media Officer
JMIC	Joint Media Information Centre
PICC	Public Information Services Co-ordination Centre
PIFAC	Public Information Services Functional Area Co-ordinator
PIFASP	**Public Information Services Functional** Area Supporting Plan
PMU	Police Media Unit
SEOC	State Emergency Operations Centre
SEOCON	State Emergency Operations Controller
SEWS	Standard Emergency Warning Signal

PART 1 - INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

101. The Public Information Services Functional Area Supporting Plan (PIFASP) is a Supporting Plan of the New South Wales State Disaster Plan (Displan), developed pursuant to the State Emergency and Rescue Management Act, 1989 (as amended), and should be read in conjunction with that Plan. The Plan sets out the arrangements made by the Public Information Services Functional Area Co-ordinator (PIFAC) to coordinate public information support and media resources in the event of an emergency which is under the control of an emergency operations controller, or in the event a combat agency controller has requested and has received approval for assistance.

102. The Plan has been developed to reflect the changing needs of public information and the way in which emergency management organisations broadcast important information to the community in a timely and co-ordinated manner. **The Plan also allows for responding agencies to promote their activities during the course of any operation.**

AIM

103. The aim of this plan is to detail the arrangements for the co-ordination of the collection, collation and dissemination of public information in a multi-agency emergency which is under the control of an emergency operations controller. This includes the co-ordinated release of public safety / warning messages and public information, public education, and interaction between all media agencies during all phases of emergency operations.

SCOPE

104. The response to an emergency by a combat agency is in accordance with their Standing Operating Procedures, and is not dealt with further in the Plan, although they may seek assistance through SEOCON for PIFAC to help with Public Information requirements.

105. During any emergency it is paramount to protect lives and property, and to:

1. keep the community informed of what is occurring;

2. ensure the dissemination of public information is effectively controlled and managed to limit misinformation and unnecessary distress or panic in the community;

3. issue warnings and directions; and

4. reassure people that all possible appropriate measures are being taken to alleviate the consequences of the event.

106. This can be achieved by cooperation between all Agency / Functional Area Public Information Staff, and the public media. All media personnel need to be aware of the information flow system, and what can be done to assist.

107. This plan does not cover non-media related public information services or warning systems such as door knocks, public address systems on site, etc. But warning of these activities might be covered in the Public Information strategy.

CONCEPT

108. The concept of the Public Information operation is to provide a co-ordinated multi-agency response of media resources to assist, as necessary:

a. a designated combat agency at the request of the controller, during combat agency managed operations; and

b. Emergency Operations Controllers at all three emergency management levels during emergency response and initial recovery operations.

109. The Public Information Services Coordination Centre (PICC), which maintains "monitor" status at all times and is to coordinate the State Emergency Operations Controller's (SEOCON) media requirements, and establish communication between participating agencies and the public media. The PICC is activated when so directed by the SEOCON, when media services / public information needs to be co-ordinated in support of an operation controlled by an emergency operations controller or at the request of a combat agency.

110. When the PICC is activated, the Public Information Services Functional Area Coordinator (PIFAC) arranges for additional media liaison resources, and coordinates the interaction between responding agencies involved and the public media.

111. The setting-up of public hotlines is the responsibility of the State Emergency Operations Centre during an emergency (when required), but the publicising of the numbers is the responsibility of the designated combat agency, and / or the Public Information Services Coordination Centre.

112. A key strategy is the establishment of a Joint Media Information Centre (JMIC). The JMIC is a process by which the resources and information of the responding agencies can be combined to meet the public information needs. The structure, roles and responsibility of the Joint Media Information Centre are addressed in this plan. A JMIC is applicable to all emergencies regardless of who is in control.

STRUCTURE

113. The structure of the Public Information Services Functional Area is:

- Public Information Services Functional Area Coordinator (PIFAC);
- Public Information Services Coordination Centre (PICC); and
- Joint Media Information Centres.

DISTRICT PUBLIC INFORMATION CO-ORDINATORS

114. District Public Information Services Co-ordinator (DPIC) is to be appointed to each District to provide public information support to the DEOCON and PIFAC. Their details are to be supplied to PIFAC and the Police Media Unit (PMU). PIFAC is to arrange training for the DPIC.

115. Should the DPIC or DEOCON require further Public Information assistance, this can be obtained by the DPIC requesting assistance from the PIFAC through the SEOCON.

116. District Public Information Plans are not required as the DPIC will operate within the **Aim, Scope and Concept** of the Public Information Services Functional Area Supporting Plan. However, DPIC / DEOCON should develop SOPs which mirror the PIFASP.

PART 2 - ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

201. The Public Information Services Functional Area assists in emergency response and initial recovery operations by developing public information strategies. This includes coordinating the release of official and current information to the public about the emergency and about safety measures being undertaken. This is achieved with the assistance of the media by:

a. establishing Public Information Coordination Centres;

b. advising Emergency Operations Controllers on public information strategies and public information needs;

c. arranging media conferences on behalf of the State and District Emergency Operations Controllers;

d. when appropriate, arranging access by representatives of the media to the area(s) affected by the emergency;

e. when appropriate and practicable, arranging for Joint Media Information Centres at designated locations at or near emergency locations;

f. preparing media releases on behalf of the State and District Emergency Operations Controllers;

g. preparing and issuing official announcements and directions to the public regarding warning messages, if necessary preceded by the Standard Emergency Warning Signal (SEWS);

h. preparing general public information and public education for broadcast by the media; and

i. advising the media what can be done to assist.

PUBLIC INFORMATION SERVICES FUNCTIONAL AREA COORDINATOR (PIFAC)

202. The Public Information Services Functional Area Co-ordinator (PIFAC) is nominated by the Police Service and approved by the Minister for Emergency Services.

203. PIFAC is responsible for managing the Public Information support to the State and District Emergency Operations Controllers, as detailed in this Plan.

PUBLIC INFORMATION COORDINATION CENTRE (PICC)

204. The State Public Information Co-ordination Centre (PICC) is located at the New South

Wales Police Service Public Affairs Branch (Media Unit), located on Level 7, Police Headquarters, the Avery Building, 14-24 College Street, Darlinghurst 2010.

205. The roles of the PICC are to:

a. coordinate the release of general public information on behalf of all agencies and Functional Area Coordinators;

b. as directed, prepare and issue official announcements, public safety messages and warnings for broadcast by the media. If necessary, these should be preceded by the Standard Emergency Warning Signal (SEWS);

c. monitor all media broadcasts relating to the emergency;

d. rectify incorrect information;

e. act as the primary point of contact for all media; and

f. establish and maintain communications / liaison with:

- Forward Media Centre (FMC) / Joint Media Information Centres (JMIC)
- State Emergency Operations Centre - Media Liaison Officer (SEOC-MLO);
- Combat Agency Control Centres;
- Functional Area Coordination Centres; and
- District Public Information Coordinators (DPIC).

206. The Police Media Unit will provide the basis for staffing the PICC. Media Liaison Officers (MLOs) and additional support staff will be provided as directed by PIFAC from emergency service organisation's and functional areas.

207. In major or prolonged emergencies, agencies not directly involved may be required to assist by providing Media Officers or support staff to assist in staffing the PICC.

208. Each agency/Public Information Services Functional Area members should update their contact details and confirm nominees every three months. Contact details should be forwarded to PIFAC.

PICC MEDIA LIAISON OFFICERS

209. In the event that emergency services organisations and functional areas are required to provide MLOs to the PICC, they are to:

a. prepare appropriate media / technical information statements for their respective agencies;

b. respond to media enquiries on matters related to their respective agencies;

c. provide the media / information communication link between their respective agencies and the PICC;

d. keep the PICC staff informed on the activities and future intentions of their agencies; and

e. assist and support the PIFAC to ensure a coordinated effort to meet the media and community's information needs.

STATE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTRE - MEDIA LIAISON OFFICER

210. The SEOC-MLO is provided by the Police Media Unit, and is to:

a. advise SEOCON of media related activity - ie, how the emergency is being reported overall and the likely impact it will have;

b. advise SEOCON on the Public Information Strategies being employed - how the strategy is going to assist in Response and initial Recovery phases;

c. establish and maintain communication links with the PICC;

d. obtain any necessary approvals for the release of information from the SEOC;

e. relay operational tasking directions to the PICC; and

f. liaise as necessary with Ministerial Media Officers, ie, Premiers Dept, Minister for Emergency Services .

AGENCY CONTROLLERS AND FUNCTIONAL AREA CO-ORDINATORS

211. Each Agency Controller and Functional Area Co-ordinator is to:

a. develop and implement SOPs for the initial response of agency / functional area Media Liaison Officers;

b. ensure that the SOP reflects the roles / responsibilities of MLO in this Plan;

c. provide suitably trained MLO to the PICC or JMIC as required; and

d. ensure PIFAC is provided with the current contact details of MLO to enable 24 hour access.

FORWARD MEDIA OFFICER (FMO)

212. When required a Forward Media Officer (FMO) will be deployed by the PIFAC, from the PICC to the area of operations. The FMO will:

a. provide media /information advice and media coverage feedback to the Site Controller;

b. provide the primary point of contact for on-site media by preparing and issuing media releases and arranging appropriate conferences;

c. coordinate media access to the site in accordance with the Site Controllers direction; and

d. maintain the public information flow to the PICC and the JMIC.

213. The FMO is to be provided by the Police Media Unit.

214. The FMO might also incorporate in Media and Public Information Strategies consideration for organisations or groups affected by the emergency. This consideration might take the form of a briefing prior to the release of information, as the result of information released may have an adverse affect on the organisations or groups involved.

JOINT MEDIA INFORMATION CENTRE

215. During any major multi-agency operation, regardless of whether it is controlled by a combat agency or an emergency operations controller, consideration should be given to the establishment of a Joint Media Information Centre (JMIC) near to the area of operations.

216. A JMIC will consist of media officers from the main participating organisations and will be under the direction of a Media Officer from the lead agency.

217. A JMIC will generally be located close to a designated media assembly area and will be the location to which all media representatives are directed.

218. When in operation the JMIC is to:

a. provide media representatives with timely, consistent and easy-to-understand information about the emergency response, initial recovery and mitigation operations;

b. provide on-site spokespersons from responding agencies;

c. forward media inquiries to the Forward Media Officer in the forward operations centre; and

d. provide media representatives with times and locations of media conferences.

219. The JMIC is to reflect the team concept of operations.

MEDIA ORGANISATIONS

220. The successful management of public information requires close and effective co-operation with the media. This would include a commitment from the media to seek confirmation / clarification of public information prior to broadcast or publication. Public Information might take the form of:

a. scheduled and controlled media releases / conferences to keep the community informed of what is occurring;

b. reassurance that all appropriate measures are being undertaken to mitigate the consequences of the emergency;

c. education information on how to save life and protect property; and / or

d. warnings and directions (may include the Standard Emergency Warning Signal - SEWS - as necessary).

221. For public information to be successful there has to be **co-operation with all media.**

222. When calling upon the media to assist with broadcasting/publishing public information, the media may require assistance from the Forward Media Officer (FMO), Joint Media Information Centre (JMIC) or the Public Information Coordination Centre (PICC) to fulfil their commitment to report events as they occur.

223. Where practicable, every assistance should be afforded the media so they may meet their commitments, and in doing so, broadcast official and current information to the community.

224. In return, Emergency Operations Controllers might seek the use of media resources, ie helicopters, vision, regional network resources, to gain a greater appreciation of the effects of the emergency.

PARTICIPATING ORGANISATIONS

225. Participating and supporting organisations are listed at ANNEX A.

PART 3 -COORDINATION ARRANGEMENTS

ACTIVATION

301. This plan is activated by the PIFAC when:

a. SEOCON is required to control an emergency;

b. SEOCON directs its activation in support of an emergency operations controller; and

c. In the event that SEOCON approves a request for assistance from a combat agency.

ALERT STAGE

302. When advised by SEOC of an *alert*, the PIFAC:

a. warns nominated contact personnel from the Participating and Supporting Organisations that they may become involved, of the situation;

b. activates and staffs the PICC to watch keeping status;

c. identifies a Media Liaison Officer for deployment to the SEOC (sufficient MLOs to allow for 24 hours operations are to be nominated);

d. establishes and maintains communication links with the appropriate District Public Information Coordinator; and

e. collects, processes and disseminates information between the appropriate agency control centres and functional area coordination centres.

STANDBY STAGE

303. When advised *Standby*, PIFAC:

a. warns nominated contact personnel from those Participating and Supporting Organisations that may be involved, of the changed situation and calls for Media Liaison Officers as required for the various centres;

b. directs the PICC to be fully staffed and operational;

c. deploys a MLO to the SEOC to act as the media adviser to the SEOCON, and to establish and maintain the communication links between the SEOC and the MSCC;

d. deploys the appropriate Public Information Services resources to establish and operate a FMC(s);

e. based on available intelligence on the event, proposes a plan of operations, including listing a priority of tasks and allocating appropriate resources;

f. keeps Agency and Functional Areas MLO's informed; and

g. provides initial background briefings to media. Technical details on the event are to be provided by the responsible combat agency.

CALL OUT STAGE

304. When advised of *Call Out*, PIFAC:

a. coordinates the media resources required for assigned tasks;

b. calls on those Participating and Supporting Organisations, involved in the emergency, to remain on 24 hour alert, and if necessary, to provide full-time MLO to the various Media Centres;

c. ensures the MLO assigned to the SEOC is kept fully informed of the status of media resources, and the assessed capability of the media resources to sustain operations;

d. through the SEOC-MLO, ensures that SEOCON is kept fully informed of progress and developments relating to the media during the course of the emergency;

e. maintains direct and continuous communication links with:

i PICC / SEOC

ii PICC / FMO/JMIC and

iii PICC / Agency Control Centres and Functional Area Control Centres; and

f. maintains regular updates to the media.

STAND DOWN

305. When advised of *Stand Down*, the PIFAC:

a. informs the Participating and Supporting Organisations of the Stand Down declaration, and of any ongoing requirements for the coordination of Media resources during initial recovery operations;

b. determines the degree of ongoing mobilisation of the PICC, and details for debrief of all PICC staff, including all MLOs;

c. makes arrangements for a formal *debrief* of all organisations involved in providing media services;

d. following the *debrief*, prepares a post operation report, highlighting lessons learnt, and amendments needed to media policy and / or plans;

e. debrief 'real' media;

f. performs additional tasks assigned, including State debriefing requirements; and

g. closes communications FMO, and advises Agencies / Functional Areas Participating and Supporting Agencies of stand down.

PART 4 - CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS

PUBLIC INFORMATION COORDINATION CENTRE (PICC)

401. The PICC is located at:

Police Media Unit
Level 7
Police Headquarters
The Avery Building
14-24 College Street
Darlinghurst 2010

Telephone (02) 9625 4200 Facsimile (02) 9339 5630

CONTROL

402. Control of the Public Information Services Functional Area and of the PICC is vested in the nominated officer from the Police Media Unit.

NOTE: The roles and responsibilities of agencies / organisations and functional areas involved in emergency response and initial recovery operations is described in Displan. Displan also describes the inter-relationships with the operational arms within the emergency management structure, that is, combat agency, other organisations and functional areas.

COMMUNICATIONS

403. Communication links are established and maintained between all activated Emergency Operations Centres, Agency Control Centres and Functional Area Coordination Centres, and to Participating and Supporting Organisations.

PART 5 - ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

501. Administration and logistics are normally contained in the Standing Operating Procedures for Control / Coordination Centres.

ARRANGEMENTS FOR REVIEWING, TESTING, EVALUATING AND MAINTAINING THIS PLAN

502. This Plan is to be reviewed after every activation as part of the PICC debrief process outcome, and / or at least every two years.

503. Updating and improvements to media training of District Emergency Operations Controllers is to be made as necessary after each review of the Plan

ANNEX A

PARTICIPATING AND SUPPORTING ORGANISATIONS

Participating Organisations

NSW Police Service
NSW Agriculture
Ambulance Services of NSW
NSW Fire Brigades
Rural Fire Service
NSW State Emergency Service
Department of Community Services
Ethnic Affairs Commission
Department of Public Works and Services
Environment Protection Authority
Rail Access Corporation
NSW Health Department
Australian Red Cross (NSW Division)
Sydney Airports Corporation Limited
Premiers Department

Supporting Organisations

Australian Broadcasting Authority
Australian Broadcasting Corporations
Federation of Australian Commercial Television Stations
Federation of Australian Radio Broadcasters
AGL
Transgrid
Sydney Water

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Item No. 12

Ministerial Media Release - Macquarie Fields Report

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CARL SCULLY MP
Minister for Police
Leader of the House

MEDIA RELEASE

Wednesday 29 June 2005

MACQUARIE FIELDS REPORT

The Minister for Police, Carl Scully, and Police Commissioner Ken Moroney today announced new measures after receiving the NSW Police report into the handling of the unrest in Macquarie Fields earlier this year.

The report's 15 recommendations have been accepted by Mr Scully and Mr Moroney in full.

In the biggest change to the management of future major public disturbances, Local Area Commanders (LACs) will be supported by a new Major Incident Response Team (MIRT).

"The report found that police officers on the ground performed courageously and professionally in a hostile environment," Mr Scully said.

"But it also demonstrated that LACs, who are chiefly responsible for community policing, needed more support to manage a significant public disturbance.

"This calls for an appropriately trained command and control unit independent of the LAC with more resources."

The report's major findings were:

- That better tactical decisions could have been made;
- That police officers on the ground displayed discipline, courage and professionalism in an increasingly hostile and difficult environment;
- That the unrest was contained within a relatively small area and ultimately resolved with few injuries and minimal property damage, and;
- That resources were adequate and available.

The major recommendations include:

- A Major Incident Response Team be deployed to all significant public order incidents, allowing the Local Area Commander to better coordinate routine local issues;
- A Public Order Management Committee be formed and chaired by the Deputy Commissioner (Operations) to minimise the impact of any future episode of civil unrest on local communities and police;
- All Local Area Commanders to undertake the Major Incident (Public Order) Management Course;
- New and improved riot equipment to be trialled and/or issued including hydration systems for all OSG police and armbands to facilitate the identification of personnel during deployments, and;
- Improved management practices for significant public order incidents covering operational orders, briefings, debriefings, and maintenance of a command log.

Level 36, Governor Macquarie Tower, 1 Farrer Place, Sydney NSW 2000
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The MIRT will comprise:

- an accredited Forward Commander (a Superintendent or above);
- a Logistics Coordinator;
- a Planning Coordinator;
- a Traffic Coordinator;
- a Public Information Coordinator; and
- an Intelligence Coordinator.

Mr Scully said the NSW Police report was a frank, honest examination of how the disturbance in Macquarie Fields was handled.

"I said at the time that we needed to support our police while the unrest was going on, and that afterwards would be the time to sit down and assess what happened," he said.

"I also said it should surprise nobody that that assessment would find that some things could - with the benefit of hindsight - have been handled better, and that's what this report finds."

Mr Moroney said he would move to implement the report's recommendations immediately.

"I particularly endorse the report and its commendation of those police officers who worked to restore order to the Macquarie Fields community.

"Equally, I wish to extend my appreciation to the many members of the Macquarie Fields community who worked - and still work - with local police to provide a safer community.

"We need to assess this report against a range of actions and decisions made in this period and apply the lessons learnt to a range of command and tactical operational training programs.

"Commanders and Duty Officers will be required to undergo a range of compulsory training programs that better prepare them for incidents of this type.

"We will continue rolling out specialist public order training programmes for Operations Support Group Commanders and Tactical Advisers.

"General Duty police and all new recruits will continue to receive specialist Public Order Management Protective Equipment Training (POMPET); more than 800 officers have already completed this course since October 2004.

"Additional equipment will be provided to police at the local level and in specialised groups that helps them to better respond to and manage these incidents.

"More than anything else, I want NSW Police to learn from this incident – at all levels - and apply those lessons to both tactical and operational decision making."

Media Contacts: ***Minister's office - Jim Hanna on 0414 828 629***
Commissioner's office – Dave Rose on 0408 485 550

MACQUARIE FIELDS – 15 POINT PLAN

Outlined below are the 15 recommendations arising from the investigation into the public order incident at Macquarie Fields. Following each is a brief explanatory note to assist in understanding the rationale for the recommendation and any relevant background.

1. **Where a *significant public order incident* occurs a specialist Major Incident Response Team (MIRT), as detailed within this *Report*, be deployed to assume command of the incident allowing the Local Area Commander to coordinate routine local issues.**

It is clear that the key challenge for NSW Police arising out of this incident is how to better respond at a managerial level, should similar circumstances arise. The MIRT will provide an appropriately trained command and control unit independent of the local area commander with appropriate resources to ensure that both local policing and a specialist response to a large scale incident can be maintained. The MIRT will report to the relevant region commander and Deputy Commissioner (Operations).

2. **A Major Incident Response Team be comprised of an accredited Forward Commander, Investigation Coordinator, Operations Support Group Commander, Logistics Coordinator, Planning Coordinator, Traffic Coordinator, Public Information Coordinator, Intelligence Coordinator and any other person deemed appropriate by the Forward Commander.**

It is important that the MIRT be able to travel and deploy as a discrete operational unit with appropriate membership. MIRT officers will come together, after being released from their day-to-day duties, should an incident of the magnitude of Macquarie Fields recur.

3. **As a priority, Local Area Commanders undertake the Major Incident (Public Order) Management Course which incorporated an assessment of the Commanders ability to manage a public order incident.**

The establishment of this course was a recommendation arising from the investigation into the incident at Redfern in February 2004. Since then, the course has been developed and piloted. Its statewide roll-out has commenced and already 27 Superintendents and 31 Inspectors have undertaken it. Clearly, such training needs to be – and will be – a priority for NSW Police.

4. **At all *significant public order incidents*, an appropriate command post must be established using either the Emergency Operations Centre for the Region, Mobile Command Post or other suitable premises.**

There has been some debate as to whether the command post at Macquarie Fields could have been better located to ensure an appropriate operational response to the ongoing incident. Since the Redfern Inquiry, mobile command posts have been available for deployment by request to the 24-hour available duty operations inspector.

5. **At all *significant public order incidents* formal briefings and debriefings must occur and be appropriately documented, to ensure the free exchange of information. Such material shall be treated confidentially.**

Whilst informal discussions/briefings occurred during the Macquarie Fields incident, there was not a formalised, structured approach to review what had occurred and to plan for what was to come. NSW Police Incident and Emergency Standing Operating Procedures will be amended to accommodate this recommendation to address the need for appropriate records to be kept of the events that occurred.

6. **At planned or recurring *significant public order incidents*, operational orders must be prepared.**

Whilst the preparation of such orders has been the best practice model for some time, particularly for planned large scale events, they will now also be required for "unplanned" and/or ongoing events. These orders set out clearly the aim of the operation, the resources required and other things such as operational tactics.

7. **At all public order incidents where Operations Support Group (OSG) police are deployed an Operations Support Group Commander and Tactical Advisor be deployed.**

Up until now, an OSG unit may well have been deployed without a commander also trained in OSG methods. Whilst not necessarily a problem, it is clearly preferable that the commander be trained in the same methods as those she or he is commanding. The first formal OSG Commanders course will commence in October with 10 officers due to take part. A further 20 officers have been identified as Tactical Advisors to OSG and they will undertake training in November 2005 and April 2006.

8. **Successful completion of the formal training programs and subsequent accreditation be a prerequisite to deployment as an Operations Support Group Commander or Tactical Advisor**

Traditionally, OSG commanders have been handpicked by the relevant region commander and have not had – or been able to access – any specific training in how to command an OSG unit. The new training programs outlined above, which arise from the implementation of recommendations arising out of the Redfern inquiry, will substantially improve 'middle management' of public order type incidents.

9. At all public order incidents a comprehensive and contemporaneous command log be maintained and filed at the command where the incident occurred.

No such records were kept at Macquarie Fields in a consistent, formalised or standardised fashion. Obviously, this makes it very difficult to reconstruct what happened, be it for an internal inquiry or for an external agency such as the Coroner. More particularly, better record keeping in the future will make it easier to learn from such incidents if robust records are kept.

10. The Operations Support Group trial arm bands or tabards to facilitate the identification of personnel during deployments.

Such armbands are a useful means of clearly identifying – in low light or dark conditions as well as in good light – who is part of the OSG command team. With police converging from different commands, such easy identification will clearly be a great asset when an incident is unfolding to ensure command and control arrangements run smoothly.

11. The 700 'Camelbak' Hydration Systems recently ordered by New South Wales Police be issued to all Operations Support Group police.

Police at Macquarie Fields found it difficult to leave the line to get water. During summer months, and in full kit, dehydration becomes a live issue. These tanks will ensure police have access to water the entire time they are deployed.

12. Continued development of mass arrest procedures for every Local Area Command incorporating appropriately resourced arrest kits.

Such procedures have been developed and implemented in those commands who regularly deal with large scale events, such as those in and around the CBD as well as others like Flemington which was responsible for a large amount of policing of the Olympic precinct. As Macquarie Fields demonstrates, an incident like this can occur anywhere and it is therefore appropriate that all commands are aware of, and able to implement, these procedures.

13. The training of police in Public Order Management Protective Equipment be continued with a priority on frontline officers.

As a result of the Redfern inquiry, a training course in "the basics" was developed for police not traditionally involved in public order management. Almost 400 recruits (396) have undertaken the training as it has been part of initial training since after the Redfern incident occurred (the first recruits were trained in November 2004). More than 400 (432) other officers in higher risk commands have also been trained. In 2005/06, it will be a mandatory component of continued training ensuring virtually all available police are trained during the coming financial year.

14. A new Public Order Management Committee be formed and chaired by the Deputy Commissioner (Operations). The committee shall absorb the *Operations Support Group and Public Order Management Steering Committee* and the *Operations Support Group Coordination Committee.*

The two current committees were established after the inquiry into the Redfern incidents. The recommendations being progressed by those committees are either implemented or being implemented. However, there is an ongoing need for best practice solutions to be developed for public order type incidents, especially those on a large scale. Having the Deputy Commissioner (Operations) chair the committee will ensure it has a statewide ambit.

15. The Public Order Management Committee shall include the Inner Metropolitan Region Commander as the Corporate Spokesperson on Public Order and also as a representative of Region Commanders.

Inner Metropolitan region has the largest number of planned public order events on an ongoing basis. These include events as diverse as the City to Surf, the Gay and Lesbian Mardi Gras and the annual cricket season. Demonstrations, when they occur, also usually happen in the CBD. Consequently, the Inner Metropolitan Region Commander is an appropriate regional representative on that committee.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

1. New *Major Incident Management System* incorporating the deployment of specialised Command Teams to assume command of major incidents

NSW Police currently maintain a group of elite senior officers trained and experienced in the management of large scale prescribed major incidents. These skilled officers form an integrated command team drawing on their established expertise in the management of major incidents and well-practiced response. The team is currently available to be deployed to assume command of prescribed incidents.

The new Major Incident Management System will expand the existing integrated command and control system to respond to further major incidents where the deployment of the team would be appropriate, such as large-scale public order incidents. This will ensure that where such a major incident occurs, highly trained incident management specialists will be deployed to resolve the situation.

2. New and Improved Equipment

The majority of this additional equipment has been purchased and will be delivered by the end of June:

- 502 riot helmets with increased neck protection (Argus brand);
- 267 riot shields;
- 262 pairs of leg protection (leggins);
- 70 sets of reinforced hand protection (gauntlets);
- 700 hydration packs for frontline officers;
- Equipment graphics to facilitate coordination whilst engaged in deployments;
- 45 in helmet communication systems, and;
- 50 complete sets of lightweight protective riot equipment (including leggins, thigh protectors, groin protector, torso protector, and arm protectors).

3. Continued and Improved Training Programs

The 2005/06 financial year will see the roll-out of specialist public order education that has been in development with pilot courses already implemented. A component of the program will be an extension of the Minerva training system incorporating a realistic simulation of a public order incident coordinated from a computerised control centre. Three specifically designed public order courses will commence full operation:

- ***Major Event (Public Order) Commanders Course***
  Designed to provide exposure and training in public order management for Local Area Commanders. All Commanders will be trained during the 05/06 financial year
- ***Operations Support Group Commanders Course***
  Designed to provide specialist training for Operations Support Group Commanders. Forty positions will be dedicated to facilitate the training of sufficient officers to provide a statewide response capacity
- ***Operations Support Group Tactical Advisors Course***
  Nominated experienced officers will undertake training in tactical options training to enable advisors to provide tactical advice on public order tactics to Commanders. Forty positions will be dedicated to facilitate the training of sufficient officers to provide a statewide response capacity

In addition, General Duty police across the state will continue as a priority to receive specialist Public Order Management Protective Equipment Training. This training commenced in October 2004 and over 800 officers are already trained.

Furthermore, all police recruits will continue to receive training in public order management as part of their initial training. This training commenced in December 2004.

Item No.

19

Public Order Management Review Redfern - Final Report - Part A

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NSW Police

Final Report – Part A
Analysis – Redfern Local Area Command
Civil Unrest 15-16 February 2004

Strike Force Coburn

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Senior Constable Scott Richardson
Senior Sergeant Garry Dunn
Inspector Barry Gallagher

5 July 2004

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Strike Force Membership

Assistant Commissioner John Laycock, Strike Force Commander
Detective Inspector Brenton Lee, Stage I & II
Detective Inspector Frank Gilroy, Stage II
Detective Inspector Luke Freudenstein, Stage II
Intelligence Analyst Aimee Attard, Stage I & II
Senior Constable Scott Richardson, Stage II
Inspector Barry Gallagher, Stage 1 & Stage II
Senior Sergeant Garry Dunn, Stage II

Key Terminology Used

ACLO – Aboriginal Community Liaison Officer
IESOPS – Incident and Emergency SOPS
LAC – Local Area Command
OSG – Operations Support Group
OSTTU – Operational Safety and Traffic Training Unit
POC - Police Operations Centre

The 'block'

The area within Redfern Local Area Command bounded by Cleveland, Abercrombie and Vine Streets and includes Eveleigh, Louis and Caroline Streets.

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TERMS OF REFERENCE

Strike Force Coburn was initiated as a operational project on 17 February 2004 following direction from the Commissioner of Police to review a range of issues arising from the civil disobedience at Redfern between 15 -16 February 2003 (Project Register No.000068).

Strike Force Coburn was responsible for considering both micro and macro issues dealing with public order management. Terms of Reference were drawn from two source documents:

1) Micro Issues – Commissioner Moroney – Memorandum dated 17 February 2004

In consultation with relevant stakeholders the Project Team were responsible for reviewing the strategic & tactical capability of the NSW Police to respond to civil disobedience at the Redfern Riot (15 –16 February) including:

- Equipment
- Communications
- Awareness & Preparation
- Staffing
- Command & Control
- Standing Capabilities (SPG, OSG, former TRG)

Report A – This report addresses the specific issues raised by the Commissioner.

An interim report titled 'Preliminary Analysis of the Redfern Civil Disobedience Events: 14 - 16 February 2004' was submitted to the Commissioner of Police on 27 February 2004. This initial report was based on limited information available to the review team. The report sought to provide an executive overview of the incident on 15-16 February 2004 and the initial police response. Material examined and information considered was limited to data collected over a short time frame focusing on the Redfern incident. The initial report provided Strike Force Coburn insight into existing public order management responses used by the NSW Police and provided a basis for considering broader macro issues.

2) Macro Issues – Deputy Commissioner Madden – Memorandum dated 25 February 2004

This final report incorporates a wider range of information and analysis including submissions from a number stakeholders. The review team has been able to consider broader macro issues affecting public order management by the NSW Police including the larger State-wide capacity to respond to any issues of a similar or greater magnitude. The terms of reference extended to considering the following issues:

- People (OSG personnel, training and ability to respond)
- Equipment (OSG personnel, equipment and availability)
- Leadership (preparedness of Commanders, Duty Officers and OSG Commanders to manage public order events)
- Policy (suitability of the Public Order Policing Policy)

Report B – A separate report addresses the broader macro issues raised by the Deputy Commissioner Operations.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INCIDENT OVERVIEW: 15 - 16 FEBRUARY 2004

The Environment

"The block" at Redfern suffers from a high level of social disadvantage flowing into a continual rate of high volume criminal activity, particularly in the area of robbery. Reports indicate a high level of drug activity both in distribution and use. A brief overview of crime indicates crime trends are either steady or trending down. There is a high level of Police pro-activity and it appears Police strategies are relatively effective.

Initial concern at the continued low level of heroin related arrests or Police interception in the drug trade, has been explained by an adverse court decision on drug house legislation and the awaiting of subsequent legal advice and preparation of appropriate strategies in consultation with the Attorney General.

The Riot

On 15 February at 2100hrs and into the early hours of 16 February 2004, a crowd of up to 150 individuals (fluctuating from 30 to 150) staged an organised street battle with Police outside the Redfern Railway Station. During the 6-hour incident close to 250 Police, Ambulance and Fire Brigade personnel were deployed to the scene. Approximately 40 Police were injured during the incident.

The crowd threw rocks, bricks, cement, fireworks and petrol bombs at Police and NSW Fire Brigade personnel. The level of organisation and violence used by the crowd is unprecedented in recent times. The events were fuelled by a perception of Police involvement in the death of a youth the previous day. The hot evening weather and alcohol consumption are also believed to have contributed to the atmosphere on Sunday evening.

First Response

Initially a small number of Police from the Redfern LAC responded to the incident that was believed to have been under control. Confronted by a crowd of up to 70 people throwing bricks police were initially overrun and forced to retreat. Limited riot equipment supplies were distributed amongst Police (between 4 – 8 sets) to deal with the initial threat. Order was initially restored as the crowd move back into Eveleigh Street. With an inability to observe the 'block' area Police believed the situation was under control.

Escalating Violence

Over the next 6 hours crowds of between 30 and 150 people emerged from Eveleigh Street attacking Police. The crowd used the 'block' in Redfern as a staging location throughout the evening. By 2250 hours more riot equipment arrived at the scene where Police were maintaining defensive positions.

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On several occasions Police attempted to move the crowd away from the Redfern Railway Station, which had been set alight. These attempts were met with escalating violence and growing crowd numbers. By 0100 hours up to 60 Police had converged on the scene from across the metropolitan area. Police numbers grew to 230 Police by 0300 hours. Up to 32 OSG personnel were deployed by 0200 hours.

Police Response

The Police strategy and tactics was to maintain a defensive (static & advance) line and keep the crowd away from the Redfern CBD area. On several occasions Police successfully moved the crowd away from the railway station in an attempt to deal with a small fire. On each occasion the crowd responded in greater numbers pushing Police back. To avoid escalating crowd violence, Police refrained from making arrests during the incident.

Superintendent Dennis Smith (Redfern LAC) arrived at the scene at 2200 hrs with the first executive notification occurring around 2228 hours via the DOI. The Region Commander arrived on the scene at 0147 hrs.

The use of chemical agents was discounted as an option as Police were not issued with protective masks. The Police Commander used a fire hose at 0215 hrs in an effort to deflect projectiles and move the crowd back from Police positions.

Review of the Policing response

The Redfern incident has highlighted inadequacies in the first response arrangements for unplanned public order incidents. While NSW Police is well placed to respond to isolated and short riots involving large crowds, prolonged and organised riots place demands beyond the capabilities of Local Area Commands. The events of 15–16 February 2004 were compounded by difficulties in establishing the size of the crowd assembling in Eveleigh Street, Redfern.

Equipment & Deployment

The Redfern incident has highlighted procedural issues with deployment, familiarisation and maintenance of riot equipment. While the type, style and quantity of riot protective equipment utilised by the New South Wales Police was eventually adequate under the circumstances, the Redfern incident has presented an opportunity for a reassessment of equipment types and front line tactics for riots. Access to equipment was an issue with difficulties in locating storeroom keys.

This review found the quality of some riot equipment indicates deficiencies in the storage, maintenance and inspection processes being utilised by the Redfern LAC. This resulted in some damaged equipment being used by Police on the ground. It is unlikely that these deficiencies contributed to the number of injuries by police on the front line.

While the style and type of riot protective equipment used by the NSW Police is considered adequate for OSG trained Police, Police on the ground experienced some difficulties with equipment. These difficulties were generally a result of unfamiliarity with the equipment and riot tactics by general duties police. The introduction of training for recruits, Team Leaders, Duty Officers and Local Area Commanders will serve to address many of the difficulties experienced by police on the front line. Further issues such as distinguishing General Duty protective equipment from OSG protective equipment could improve levels of protection.

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Command & Control

The review found that an absence of a structured command post management process at the scene is likely to have created delays in accessing of riot equipment once it had been transported to the scene. Its absence also created difficulties in the generation of a log to record details of the incident, command decisions and intelligence received.

It's absence also created a number of other problems, which impacted upon the policing of the incident at Redfern. Early activation of the "POC" may have assisted in site control management.

Use of an adequately equipped vehicle as a mobile command post would allow for establishment of a clearly defined forward command post or command post in the future. It's use at Redfern would have assisted in providing for better management of resources and recording of command decisions.

Training & future preparedness

Three quarters of the officers in attendance at Redfern were higher in rank than Probationary Constable. On this basis the review concluded that the experience of the officers present, in terms of years of service was not a contributing factor to the unfolding events or injuries sustained.

Not withstanding this, the Redfern incident has highlighted opportunities to improve the level of training for Local Area Commanders, Duty Officers and Supervisors in site control, command post, management and public order management including riotous tactics and crowd behaviour.

Approximately 70 General Duties personnel stationed at Redfern have received some basic familiarisation training in the use of this riot equipment. However, the contingent of personnel from Redfern LAC at the riot only comprised 13% (29) of the total number of Police who attended. Of the total number of police deployed 16% (37) were trained OSG operatives with 15% (7) of the total number of officers injured were OSG operatives.

Familiarisation training in riots and tactics should be introduced into recruit training, Duty Officer and Commander training initiatives. At a minimum, equipment and basic tactics should be included in yearly DEFTAC training for all personnel likely to be called to riot incidents. The introduction of scenario-based training in riots through Learning Technology Systems should be considered for Supervisors, Duty Officers and Commanders with an emphasis on decision-making and leadership.

Enhancing organisational capability

The NSW Police capacity to respond to prolonged violent riots was enhanced, following the dissolution of the TRG in the 1990's, with the introduction of region based OSG contingents. The role of OSG resources in both unplanned and planned public order events continues to be critical. Call out arrangements for OSG support during the Redfern incident were considered adequate given the assessments of the severity of the incident by the Local Area Commander at the scene. Difficulties experienced were a result of confusion between the Duty Officer at the scene and the Inner Metropolitan Region Operations Manager resulting in a considerable delay in OSG attendance.

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This review has highlighted opportunities to streamline and strengthen the OSG capability within the NSW Police. The review team is of the firm belief that a centralised training, call out and coordination capacity would enhance operational responses to future riots. Whilst the preferred operating model for an enhanced OSG capability should be the subject of executive consideration, the review team does not support the re-establishment of a TRG style unit.

Any strengthened OSG model should include a balance of regional resourcing and statewide co-ordination underpinned by corporate ownership.

The preferred model should incorporate a centralised training, accreditation, equipment auditing, DEFTAC, policy, operational co-ordination and should be supported by a senior executive corporate spokesperson.

Revisiting the philosophy of containment

It is clear that as the situation at Redfern deteriorated, the LAC Commander was faced with limited options for countering the escalating crowd violence. The tactic of containment was shown to be inadequate for the circumstances and unfolding events.

International experience suggests inaction (containment) by Police on many occasions results in an increase in the momentum of group dynamics and the aggression by groups, inevitably against Police. This was shown to be the case in the Redfern incident.

The introduction of a variety of non-lethal offensive equipment for appropriately trained personnel to deploy (following receipt of a predetermined level of approval) would enhance the tactical options available to Police Commanders in dealing with violent public order incidents. The acquisition of such equipment would provide both options for containment and resolution. Revised tactics and supporting equipment could provide Commanders additional tactical options to effect arrests at the time in appropriate situations. This would potentially minimise the duration of incidents, thus preventing violence from escalating rather than only retrospective investigation and arrest.

A review of the use of chemical agents (eg. OC Spray or other agents capable of being projected over 20 metres from the Police line) and other tactics to break up crowds should be considered an organisational priority. Any such options adopted will require corporate sign off and clear levels of authority for deployment. It is strongly recommended that the debate over resolution options (i.e. arrest or containment) needs to be explored.

It is strongly recommended that any change to the police strategy of containment should be reinforced through rewritten corporate guidelines based on solid legal advice. The present philosophy of containment is not entirely consistent with the expectations by the public of an appropriate policing response. As the Redfern incident and other international research suggests, without other tactical options this philosophy of containment can remove control of the incident from Police. Concurrently a review of the Public Order Management Policy should occur to ensure the policy adequately encapsulates violent riots and any changes to the containment philosophy with an emphasis on arrests and legal aggressive tactics as the circumstances would allow.

It is also suggested that greater use of special resources such as mounted police, early activation of Polair and a plan for criminal investigations may have assisted the end result.

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The review team gave careful consideration to the decision to use a fire hose on 16 February 2004. The use of this type of equipment during a riot is NSW is believed to have been unprecedented. The LAC Commander made this decision on the basis that police were left with no options to defend the police position. The NSW Fire Brigade supported this option as a strategy to reduce the risk to Police and NSW Fire Brigade personnel on the ground. However, its use in the absence of corporate guidelines may expose NSW to civil and other liability.

Communications and executive notifications

The role of communications leading up to and during the Redfern riot played a pivotal role in the unfolding action on the night of the 15 February 2004 and into the morning of the 16 February 2004. The Redfern incident highlighted deficiencies in these notification protocols. The review concluded that these protocols were broad and lacked specific criteria to determine issues or incidents that should be notified to the executive. These protocols were open to arbitrary interpretation by Duty Operations Inspectors and personnel at VKG. Following the Redfern incident, the communication protocols used by VKG have been revised with proposed endorsement by the Commissioner.

The review concluded the delay in notification to the executive of the unfolding events is likely to have been a result of an under appreciation of the seriousness of the riot by the Local Area Commander. It is acknowledged that the frequent assessments from the scene that the incident was under control were based on limited observations of the size of the crowd assembling in Eveleigh Street. This is likely to have precluded further upward transmission of the unfolding events to the executive. The assistance of POLAIR at the scene earlier would have greatly enhanced the NSW Police response to the incident. This aerial reconnaissance ability and the back to the Police Operations Centre aerial picture capability, would have provided OSG line commanders with confirmation that there were over two hundred people barricaded in Eveleigh St. Police were only able to confirm these number by advancing across the Lawson St rail bridge and being subjected to a barrage of flying bricks.

PART 'B' of this report, as a separate document, centres on a discussion of the current Public Order Management Policy, Strategic issues, the Lupton Report as well as the role of the former TRG. The involvement of the SPG and OSG are also discussed, together with a number of recommendations as to proposed models for consideration by CET.

Appreciation

This review has been conducted in a constructive manner and is grateful for the numerous submissions made from across the NSW Police containing valuable contributions and suggestions. Strike Force Coburn acknowledges the excellent work performed by all Police at the scene and recognises "we were not there" and refrained from judgement calls relying invariably on a clinical assessment of the facts.

The future environment

Numerous submissions have been received proposing many models for a future 24/7 State-wide OSG response. Each of these submissions have been carefully analysed and several selected for consideration by CET. It is hoped the selection and implementation of the most appropriate model will ensure (with other recommendations) in the words of Commissioner Moroney, *"that Redfern will never happen again"*.

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SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

After reviewing the events of 15-16 February 2004 and the submissions provided to Strike Force Coburn the following recommendations are made to improve the NSW Police's capacity to respond to and manage unplanned events of this nature.

EQUIPMENT

FINDINGS	RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Access to additional riot equipment from the SPC during the Redfern riot was not timely.	1. An urgent review is conducted at all Regions to determine the adequacy of riot equipment available. Such review to include quality and quantity of assets.
2.The Scott Aspen brand helmets on issue to Redfern LAC are operationally inappropriate (suitable only for training).	2. Redfern LAC's protective riot equipment requires upgrading to Operational quality.
3. No communication equipment was taken from the SPC for use at the Redfern riot for the use of OSG.	3. OSTTU to be tasked to assess equipment currently utilised by the OSG and alternatives held by NSW Police for officers wearing helmets to communicate. 3a. Call Out process of all Regions relating to protective equipment should be reviewed to ensure *ALL* available equipment is accessed in a timely manner
4. Protective equipment available for General Duties personnel during the Redfern riot was inadequate given lack of training and the equipments used in a static line.	4. OSTTU should be tasked to research options re alternative protective equipment suitable for General Duties personnel, such as Long Shields, Fire Retardant overalls, and Riot specific vests.
5. The Redfern incident identified concerns in relation to ill-fitting equipment issued to Local Area Commands, such as bullet resistant vests being all of the one size.	5. LACs should review equipment on hand re sizing implications for officers attached to the LAC.
6. Equipment needs to be identifiable to allow for accountability in it's issue, recertification as operationally effective after use in incidents or training, and evidentiary considerations.	6. An assessment is required by OSTTU as to the need for uniquely identifiable reference markings on all equipment.
7. NSW Police does not possess 'Less than Lethal Force' equipment as tactical options for Commanders.	7. OSTTU should be tasked to research 'Less than Lethal Force' options, including modifications to the SPG's Bearcat armoured rescue vehicle.
8. An adequately equipped vehicle as a mobile command post would allow for better management of necessary command post functions.	8. Options re availability of adequately equipped vehicles for use, as forward command posts should be explored by each Region and LAC.

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FINDINGS	RECOMMENDATIONS
9. There were a lack of storage and accountability protocols relating to riot equipment on issue to Redfern LAC. This has been revised and improved since the riot.	9. All Local Area Commands issued with protective riot equipment should design a system of accountability for the quality, storage and access arrangements. Accountability for this can be managed through Command Management Framework (CMF).
10. There is a lack of process to regularly examine the standard and currency of protective riot equipment being used by NSW Police.	10. OSTTU is tasked with implementing a process to regularly examine the standard of riot equipment used by NSW Police, giving consideration to the establishment of an Australian Quality Standard.
11. Prison vans were not be utilised during the incident	11. The availability of prison vans should be explored by all Regions for use during public order incidents.
12. There are numerous other locations within NSW with holdings of protective riot equipment. It appears these holdings are either unknown by the Region OSG Co-ordinators, or unreported by them to Strike Force Coburn.	12. Each Region needs to audit ALL LACs to identify all equipment to account for it and ensure its quality and availability. .

COMMUNICATIONS

FINDINGS	RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Information supplied to Assistant Commissioner Waites was based on the belief the situation was under control. This assessment did not facilitate the upward movement of the information, causing unsatisfactory timeliness of notifications to the Executive.	1. Commander training to include reference to ensuring clarity in communications during management of high-risk operations.
2. In relation to the 'Glock incident' on February 12, Strike Force Coburn found that there were no radio 'black spots' in Redfern and the transmission related to the stress and misunderstanding of the content of the transmission by the VKG Operator.	2. Consideration be given to using the 'Glock incident' tape recording by Education Services for training purposes to emphasizes the importance of clarity of communications under stress. As there are no 'black spots', no further action re that issue.
3. There is a lack of understanding by operational Police of the roles and capabilities of the DOI.	3. VKG should market the role of Duty Operations Inspector (DOIs) more effectively to Duty Officers and Commanders, to ensure a fuller understanding of the role of the Duty Operations Inspector and the associated responsibilities of the position. Similarly LACs should provide adequate information and training to personnel relating to the operations of DOIs at VKG.

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FINDINGS	RECOMMENDATIONS
4. The lack of activation of Polair earlier precluded a greatly enhanced NSW Police response to the incident. The decision by Inspector Chambers to call out POLAIR was a correct decision, though consultation with relevant field commanders could have occurred prior to the callout.	4. Duty Operations Inspectors should be further educated as to their roles by VKG, with encouragement to consult regularly with operational Commanders at scenes of high risk incidents, to co-ordinate available resources.
5. The absence of a command post log from the event to refer to has caused Strike Force Coburn to experience difficulties in collecting accurate information relating to the incident and appropriate accountability for the operation. There was a further significant impact on other investigations and enquiries as well the provision of an audit trail for important decisions.	5. The requirement to use command logs to record times, decisions and resources should be reinforced in future Commander training activities.
6. There is no operational checklist relevant to riots and other serious incidents developed for Crime Managers or Local Area Commanders. The Duty Officer's Manual allows for statewide standards and consistency in having records of field communications, checklists and a prompt for riots and serious incidents.	6. That the issue of the Duty Officer's Manual be revisited for use by all Crime Managers and Commanders to record, in consistent formats, the key communications and decision making during high-risk incidents such as riots.
7. The lack of a dedicated radio channel precluded the 'low key' response desired by Superintendent Smith.	7. The availability of additional radio channels should be made aware to Commanders by VKG during high-risk incidents when frequent communication is predicted, or a request for 'low-key' communications is preferred.
8. There was a failure to satisfactorily escalate information to senior management of the Police Media Unit. There was growing media interest on Sunday the 15 February 2004 and senior media unit officers were not appraised in a timely fashion. This additionally caused for the Police Ministry's media officers to also not be appraised.	8. The Media Unit has improved its protocol for internal notifications re major incidents. No further action required
9. There was confusion in the conversation that occurred between Inspector Snel and Inspector Emery at 9.30pm. The outcome of this miscommunication was that there was recurrent belief for almost four hours that 20 OSG personnel were being called out. This precluded appropriate OSG response times.	9. Education Services to consider training implications relating to communications. On-going assessment and decision making training should be provided by education services in commanding civil unrest situations for Commanders, Duty Officers, Region Staff Officers and Supervisors.
10.There could have been operational advantages if the POC had been opened during the incident. Strike Force Coburn concluded that the existing activation	10. The availability and benefits of using the POC should be re-enforced to operational Commanders by communication from the Executive.

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FINDINGS	RECOMMENDATIONS
protocols for the POC are adequate, however, all Commanders need to be aware of the existence and the importance of the POC. and its associated protocols.	

AWARENESS AND PREPARATION

FINDINGS	RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Failing in the Redfern Intelligence System to strategically identify cultural, seasonal or environmental issues, which may lead to unrest or civil disorder in the 'block' area.	1. Implementation of intelligence gathering operations for vulnerable locations within Local Area Commands eg. 'the block' at Redfern. Such operations to proactively collect information of crime, occurrences of unrest, environmental, seasonal and cultural trends for the vulnerable location.
2. Greater use of the source system to enhance the informant network at the Redfern Local Area Command.	2. Redfern Local Area Command to enlist the assistance of Source Management for increasing informant numbers. Assistance should also be sought in the professional management of their informants. (Senior Sergeant Tracey Chapman has facilitated this recommendation)
3. Failure of support units to acknowledge the urgency of requests and lack of follow up upon those requests.	3. Region Commanders and the Commander of Communications design training for support units, e.g. VKG – DOI and Operations Manager to appreciate difficulties experienced by those in the field at an unplanned civil disorder event. DOI and Operations Managers should work from a checklist, similar to that in the Duty Officers manual, providing information of what resources may be needed at the site.
4. Communication breakdown in the call out of Operation Support Group.	4. The Duty Officer's check- list and running sheet matrix, maintained in the Duty Officer's manual, be adopted by the Operations Managers and DOI to record what is requested is received. Regular checks should be made to action any request that may have been forgotten or misunderstood.
5. Inability of Aboriginal Community Liaison Officers at Redfern Local Area Command to identify unrest in the 'block'.	5. The State Co-ordinator for Aboriginal Community Liaison Officers to liaise with the Redfern Local Area Commander to upgrade the performance and direction of Aboriginal Community Liaison Officers.

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FINDINGS	RECOMMENDATIONS
6. Breakdown in the relationship between Redfern Police and the Aboriginal Community Liaison Officer.	6. The Redfern Local Area Commander to devise strategies for the most effective use of Aboriginal Community Liaison Officers in forging community links to ensure they complete their duties in compliance with Standard Operating Procedures for Management of Aboriginal Incidents and promote a productive relationship with police.
7. Failure of police to acknowledge the tactical warning signs of unrest leading to civil disorder at Redfern on Sunday, 15 February 2004 eg. Wanted posters of senior Police, continual throwing of rocks and the closing of Redfern Railway Station.	7. Education Services to design training programs for police, at all ranks, for Unplanned Civil Disorder.
8. Re-enforcement of cultural awareness for Redfern Police and continuation of partnerships with local aboriginal community is essential.	8. Local Cultural Awareness programs, including issues associated with the Traditional Grievance process, to be continued with the assistance of Doreen Peters, State Co-ordinator for Aboriginal Community Liaison Officers.

STAFFING

FINDINGS	RECOMMENDATIONS
1. The proportion of Probationary Constables to the total staffing of Redfern Local Area Command is consistent with other Commands in the Region.	1.No action is necessary in relation to the staffing levels of Redfern Local Area Command.
2. The level of staffing at The Redfern LAC on the evening of 15 February 2004 was consistent with the demands for service upon the Command.	2. A review of the 1st Response Agreement should be conducted by the Redfern Local Area Command.
3. Over three quarters of the officers in attendance at Redfern were higher in rank than Probationary Constable. The experience of the officers present in terms of years of service in the NSW Police cannot be considered an issue.	3. No action is necessary in relation to the number of Probationary Constables that attended the riot.
4. Delays in the arrival of additional OSG personnel followed an alleged misunderstanding between the Inner Metropolitan Region Operations Manager and a Redfern Duty Officer.	4. A preferred option for OSG structure is implemented to ensure adequate availability of appropriately trained Police.
5. Despite the lack of timeliness in their mobilisation, sufficient OSG trained personnel were eventually present at Redfern.	5. Training is required for all operational personnel in public order management/riot control tactics.

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FINDINGS	RECOMMENDATIONS
5a. Other than some personnel from Redfern LAC, other general Duties Police who responded to the Redfern riot have had no public order/riot training.	
6. It was necessary to obtain OSG officers from personnel on duty throughout Sydney that night when it was established the 20 OSG officers requested by the Duty Officer had not been arranged by the Region Operations Manager.	6. Region Operations Managers to utilise the Duty Officer Manual's Checklist, to allow them to provide appropriate resource management of an incident, by evaluating matters in the same terms as officers at the scene.
7. The insufficient use of the support services listed, such as Welfare, SSG, Mounted Unit, Negotiators and others highlights the need for the capabilities of those units to be marketed to Commanders.	7. The nature of the roles of the support units available should be marketed and reinforced to LAC Commander's, Duty Officers and Supervisors.
8. No Prison Vans or Transport Unit personnel were available to facilitate transport for multiple arrests	8. Within Metropolitan Regions adequately staffed prison vans be available to be deployed to a scene of unplanned as well as planned operations. Rural regions need to reassess their needs and develop appropriate arrangements accordingly
9. Following discussion between the Crime Manager at the scene and the DOI at VKG at 1015 hours, the DOI failed to adequately communicate options available re call-out of POLAIR at that time, equally the request could have been pursued by Inspector Bennett.	9. As per 7.
10. Actions undertaken concerning the welfare of injured personnel could improve by initiating call outs to Counsellors, Chaplains or both.	10. DOI's, Commanders, Duty Officers, and Supervisors need to be reminded of the welfare services available for personnel.
11.Crime Management Units need to conduct thorough environmental analysis of their LACs to identify the risks to their Command.	11. Crime Management Units of all Commands prepare strategic plans for employment of predetermined tactical options and investigate response plans in the event of identified possible incidents occurring.
12. Injuries to the legs of officers accounted for the injuries to Police at a ratio of 2:1, highlighting the need to assess the type of protective equipment required by General Duties police such as Long Shields pending deployment of OSG.	12. The type of protective equipment (eg. Long shields) available for use by General Duties police should be reviewed by the OSTTU.

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FINDINGS	RECOMMENDATIONS
13. The current protective equipment on issue to the Mounted Unit requires review, from an OH & S and operational effectiveness perspective, to ensure its adequacy to protect officers and horses and maintain their capacity to respond and assist in incidents such as Redfern.	13. Commander of the Mounted Unit review the adequacy of the Unit's protective equipment and the need for additional and possible alternative protective riot equipment.
14. Insufficient training is provided to NSW Police in relation to public order management in relation to unplanned incidents.	14. Training to be provided in the following areas: a) In basic public order policing and use of protective equipment commencing at recruit level for all operational personnel, similar to that provided to Redfern officers. b) For DOIs in relation to communication of available options for field commanders. c) For Supervisors, Duty Officers and Commanders in relation to public order management, tactics and incident command and control
15. The attendance of an OSG advisor of Commissioned Officer rank at the riot could have been of assistance to the forward commander.	15. An experienced OSG trained officer, of Commissioned Officer rank should be called out/deployed to the scene. This officer to provide advice to the Commander regarding OSG capabilities and tactical options.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

FINDINGS	RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Inadequate training at Command, Supervisor and Constable level for Unplanned Civil Disorder resulted in the following – • The Command Post was inappropriately positioned to be operationally effective. • The forward command post was inadequate. • Site coordination was inadequate and badly positioned. • Poor records and very few logs were kept. • Tactical and strategic options such as OSG, Mounted Police and Polair were not utilised appropriately. • Command and Control focused mainly on the police line where Commanders were situated.	1. Redfern SOPs to be updated re the flexibility of the location of Command Post during the 'block' incidents. 1.a Education Services and OSTTU to consider current and future training requirements for all levels of NSW Police in relation to public order incidents, particularly in relation to command responsibilities, command post management, log keeping and utilisation of specialist units.

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FINDINGS	RECOMMENDATIONS
• Requests and follow up inquiries for OSG were not actioned in a timely fashion.	
2. Lack of options for arrest, charging and evidence gathering.	2. The Public Order Policy be reviewed to encourage evidence gathering, arrest and charging tactics.
3. Lack of trained investigators deployed to the scene.	3. Detectives to be included in the police response to unplanned civil disorder.
4. IESOPS do not cater for a police response to unplanned civil disorder or public order incidents.	4. IESOPS to include information for the police response to unplanned civil disorder or public order incidents.

STRATEGIC PLANNING

FINDINGS	RECOMMENDATIONS
1. There is a need for standardised "descriptors" to indicate the level of seriousness to assist requests for resources.	1. Local Area Commands need to develop a specific response matrix, addressing primary risks to that specific Command. Such strategic planning can assist the pre-planning of responses, and the consideration of mobilisation of support units, or requesting authority for specific tactics or equipment sooner as developed for the Rugby World Cup.
2. Use of an execution matrix that defines "triggers" can determine a pre arranged response, such as call out of resources, tactics, or resources to be deployed at that stage, for example a level two or three incident would have assisted. A good example of this is the risk assessment matrix utilised by the Rugby World Cup.	2. Use of the checklist in the Duty Officer's Manual should be reinforced in managing and responding to an incident to develop uniformity in communication of needs.

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IMMEDIATE AVAILABILITY – EQUIPMENT AND PERSONNEL

FINDINGS	RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Response times for equipment and OSG personnel is dependent upon the system utilised by individual Regions.	1. Regions capacity for expeditious deployment of equipment to an unplanned incident could be enhanced if contingencies were in place for emergency access to it and not only through OSG personnel.
2. The current capacity to deploy sufficient OSG personnel to an unplanned incident needs to be enhanced by all Regions to ensure it can be achieved in a timely manner.	2. Systems are required by Regions to ensure sufficient OSG personnel are contactable and deployed urgently to an unplanned incident in support of on duty OSG and General Duties officers.

POLICY

FINDINGS	RECOMMENDATIONS
1. The current public order management policy is inadequate in providing direction for Commanders in determining Police Responses to unplanned violent public disorder.	1. There needs to be a change in the corporate philosophy, reflected in a re-written Public Order Management Policy encompassing more forceful Police action to unlawful behaviour rather than just containment as a goal.
2. The Policy should be reviewed urgently to reflect the recommended necessary change to NSW Police corporate philosophy on Public Order Management.	2. Alternative tactical options are developed by a working party to be utilised in Public Order Management by NSW Police, reflecting the corporate philosophy shift and public expectations.
4. Modules in the proposed Counter Terrorist Commanders Course (before CET) could provide Command level Public Order Management training.	3. Recommended Public Order Management training include instruction in the execution of new tactics.

LUPTON REPORT REVIEW

FINDINGS	RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Redfern has been shown to have highlighted the need for adequate and ongoing training in incident command and control.	1. There is a need for the development of specific tactics relative to the varied environments in which NSW Police operates.
2. The tactics recommended by the Lupton report were developed for use in London and throughout the United Kingdom.	2. Training is extended relevant to the roles of Commander, Duty Officer and Supervisors, as well as basic training for recruit and General Duties personnel, in relation to incident management and resolution tactics.

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FINDINGS	RECOMMENDATIONS
3. There is a need for the development of specific tactics relative to the varied environments in which NSW Police operates.	
4. It is not considered necessary or viable for all Duty Officers to undertake the entire OSG Basic Operators Course, given the appropriate role specific education this Strike Force suggests.	

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METHODOLOGY

The Project was sponsored by Deputy Commissioner (Operations) Dave Madden and managed by Assistant Commissioner John Laycock.

A small Project Team working under the command of Assistant Commissioner John Laycock reviewed operational documentation and sought submissions from operational police, specialists and stakeholders.

The Project Team called for written submissions from interested stakeholders and held a number of debriefing sessions with officers involved in the initial incident on 15-16 February 2004. By way of summary information considered in this report consisted of:

- Briefings from key commanders;
- Consultation Review Committee Meeting held on 23 February 2004;
- Debriefing session facilitated by the Project Management Unit with key stakeholders on 5 April 2004;
- Submissions from interested parties including operational commanders, Executive and Police across New South Wales;
- Historical data including information sources from COPS, CIDS or submissions & reports dealing with public order management within the NSW Police; and
- Open Source Information (OSI), research from other Australian Jurisdictions, United Kingdom, Canada and United States of America.
- Submissions from the NSW Police Association.

A number of conflicting times were provided by key participants involved in the incidents on 15–16 February 2004. Strike Force Coburn experienced difficulties in reconstructing event timings and the extent of resource requests during the incident. The timings contained are based on officer recollections and VKG logs.

Four separate timelines have been prepared in addition to the master timeline held with Strike Force Coburn. These timelines are for the following areas:

1. Summary of significant events
2. General timeline of events
3. OSG personnel and equipment
4. Executive involvement/communications.

Data under the various subheadings has been duplicated to ensure information is kept in context, albeit, at the expense of some duplication.

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GENERAL TIMELINE OF EVENTS

Thursday 12 February 2004

14:20 Redfern LAC police officers FUCHS & BAILEY took Steven Michael HALL @ "Nugget" into custody in Eveleigh Lane, Redfern; these police were surrounded by numerous people who eventually attacked police and attempted to remove HALL from their custody as well as remove the glocks from police; they successfully removed the glock of D/S/Cst BAILEY for a short time; BAILEY called a **SIGNAL ONE** but radio transmissions were confused; police lost a pair of sunglasses and the police hat being worn by BAILEY which belonged to D/S/Cst PACE [distorted radio communication by police under stress at the scene].

Saturday 14 February 2004

11:15 Thomas HICKEY impaled on a fence in Phillip Street, Redfern, after an incident on his pushbike; he was conveyed to Prince of Wales Hospital.

During the afternoon of 14th February a number of phone calls were received at Redfern Police Station blaming Detective PACE *[(part aboriginal NSW Police Officer) for the Thomas HICKEY incident]*

Sunday 15 February 2004

01:10 Thomas HICKEY died at Prince of Wales Hospital.

08:30 Thomas HICKEY's mother attended Redfern Police Station with another female (possibly Gail CARGILL); Insp EMERY showed Thomas HICKEY's mother the bike with no damage to the wheel but faulty brakes.

15:00 Media briefing held outside Redfern LAC Police Station with Insp EMERY.

16:30 Group of youths commenced throwing bricks etc at Redfern Railway Station; City Rail commenced calling for police assistance.

16:49 Police attended Redfern Railway Station.

16:59 Lawson Street entrance to Redfern Railway Station closed.

17:00 From 5pm stories commenced on the news concerning the death of Thomas HICKEY and there was media presence in Redfern.

17:30 Side window of a police vehicle was broken in Eveleigh Street, Redfern; Insp EMERY arrived at Redfern Railway Station; police remained and patrolled the vicinity of the railway station from this time; posters titled "Wanted – Child Murderers" with photos of D/COPs SCIPIONE & MADDEN & COP MORONEY were being taped to telegraph poles out the front of Redfern Railway Station.

17:42 Insp EMERY told DOI a large group was congregating near Redfern Railway Station who had ammunition and were intoxicated; Insp EMERY had been trying to get hold of Supt SMITH (some time between this call and 6:00pm, someone, presumably Insp EMERY, made contact with Supt SMITH and appraised him of the situation).

18:00 Police "supervisor" [probably Insp EMERY] left Redfern Railway Station; City Rail closed platform 1; a white car parked in Eveleigh Street was hit by rocks; A/C WAITES contacted at approximately this hour by Supt SMITH to inform him that aboriginals around the 'block' had been drinking, becoming aggressive and trying to bait police.

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18:12 Insp EMERY asked DOI if any OSG, Vikings etc police were available.

19:00 Briefing held at Redfern LAC with day & night shift Duty Officers and police of both shifts.

19:22 Booking Office at Redfern Railway Station closed due to a barrage of bricks and bottles.

19:26 Briefing at Redfern LAC concluded; DOI advised Insp SMITH that a large group of youths was congregating in Lawson Street.

19:38 Redfern 17 called that a brick was thrown through the window of Redfern 16.

19:45 Police closed off Lawson Street, Redfern [vicinity of railway station].

19:46 Video camera to the area organised by Redfern LAC.

19:47 Platforms 1-7 at Redfern Railway Station closed down, platforms 8-12 near Gibbons Street continued to operate as did the underground.

20:05 Redfern 36 called that an aboriginal male approached and said the 'block' was about to start a riot.

20:26 All appeared quiet *[according to Insp SMITH]*.

20:55 Insp EMERY asked DOI the best way to get extra police to assist; Supt SMITH wanted to keep the situation low key.

21:02 Insp SMITH requested riot gear from Redfern 14.

21:03 large group of 60-70 ran out of Eveleigh Street, Redfern towards police throwing bricks and bottles; police ran onto the concourse of Redfern Railway Station.

21:04 Redfern 45 called **SIGNAL ONE** to Gibbons/Lawson Streets, Redfern.

21:05 Crowd retreated back to Eveleigh Street; police were given permission to wear riot gear.

21:06 Supt SMITH updated on the situation in Redfern; Insp EMERY spoke with DOI re arranging further police and equipment to assist.

21:15 Crowd attempted to break through Redfern Railway Station barriers which had been closed.

21:18 Police requested that no trains at all stop at Redfern Railway Station.

21:28 Crowd attempted to set fire to railway station; Fire Brigade called; Insp EMERY called DOI asking for Vikings or OSG; DOI gave Insp EMERY mobile contact number for Inner Metropolitan Region Operations Manager [Insp SNEL acting in this role at this time].

21:30 Insp SNEL contacted by Insp EMERY who requested OSG equipment personnel. (There is unresolved confusion over the content of this conversation as Insp SNEL understood the request was for OSG equipment only).

21:35 Insp SNEL called A/C WAITES re the riot and requested approval for OSG equipment.

21:40 Police in riot gear escorted Fire Brigade towards a fire at the railway station but soon retreated due to an attack by the crowd; fire at railway station deemed safe to allow to burn by the Fire Brigade; Insp SNEL called Sgt WADE and requested 20 sets of riot equipment for Redfern.

21:42 Insp SNEL called DOI for a sitrep.

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21:45 Ambulance Service called for a number of police injured at the entrance to Redfern Railway Station.

22:05 Crowd advanced and police granted permission to advance their front line; crowd retreated to Eveleigh Street; a number of police were injured and removed.

22:11 First police dogs arrived (Lawson/Abercrombie Streets, Redfern).

22:14 Insp BENNETT called DOI and asked if there was a helicopter on; DOI responded that there wasn't one on.

22:19 Supt ADNEY contacted by DOI and provided with a sitrep.

22:30 Supt ADNEY sent an SMS to A/DCOP PARSONS to notify him of the incident at Redfern; approximate arrival time of Supt SMITH at the scene of the riot.

22:34 A/DCOP PARSONS called Supt ADNEY back *[from her SMS of 22:19]*.

22:41 IME60 called that they were on the way with OSG equipment.

22:48 IME60 called off at the command post with equipment.

23:00 All OSG personnel requested to attend the command post and requests were made for more OSG and any other police, by Supt SMITH and Insp Garth SMITH.

23:30 Supt SMITH called A/C WAITES and informed him that the situation was under control.

23:36 DOI contacted the SPG.

23:45 A/C WAITES received a call from A/DCOP PARSONS enquiring as to the situation at Redfern.

Monday 16 February 2004

00:57 Insp EMERY called DOI and described the situation as not far off a signal one.

01:15 Supt SMITH called A/C WAITES requesting additional police at the scene; it was after this call that A/C WAITES prepared to leave home and attend the riot.

01:32 Crowd increased; Supt SMITH requested 20 more police to the location.

01:34 Crowd consisted of over 100; petrol bombs/molotov cocktails were being thrown.

01:39 DOG54 suffered a foot injury and DOG11 was hit by a brick.

01:47 Arrival time of A/C WAITES; A/C WAITES called DOI and asked about the availability of tactical gear (because molotov cocktails were being thrown) and asked who has responsibility for the SPG.

01:50 OSG operative Sgt O'RIORDAN loaded a further 50 sets of riot equipment into vehicles.

02:05 DOI told A/C WAITES he was calling the helicopter and Video Unit [this was the approximate call out time for Polair].

02:14 Supt SMITH had command of the Fire Brigade hose and was using it in an attempt to control the crowd.

02:30 OSG operatives Sgts O'RIORDAN & STOKES arrived at the scene of the riot with additional riot equipment.

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03:00 OSG Team Leaders held a briefing at the scene.

03:02 Fire hose used to break up crowd *[according to Insp SMITH]*

03:03 Polair airborne and overhead.

03:26 All lines advanced *[according to Insp SMITH]*

03:30 OSG made a tactical approach and moved in 3 sections of 12 each.

03:35 Supt SMITH called DOI and asked if Polair could light up Eveleigh Lane just in front of the police line.

03:40 [between 3:40am & 4:20am] 5 POI's were arrested (at Lawson Street and the intersection of Lawson & Eveleigh Streets) and conveyed to the Sydney Police Centre where they were entered into custody; 2 of the POIs were charged on 160204 with outstanding warrants and 3 released without charge; 4 of these 5 were charged with matters relating to the riot at later dates and the remaining one was not charged at all.

03:51 Redfern 10 called that no further police were required and the area was under control.

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SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS TIMELINE

Thursday 12 February 2004

14:20 Offenders attempted to remove glocks from 2 Redfern LAC police officers at the 'block' Redfern.

Saturday 14 February 2004

11:15 Thomas HICKEY impaled on fence in Phillip Street, Redfern after an incident involving his pushbike; conveyed to Prince of Wales Hospital.

Sunday 15 February 2004

01:10 Thomas HICKEY died at Prince of Wales Hospital.

16:30 Group of youths commenced throwing bricks etc at Redfern Railway Station; City Rail commenced calling for police assistance.

16:59 Lawson Street entrance to Redfern Railway Station closed.

17:30 Side window of police vehicle broken in Eveleigh Street, Redfern; Insp EMERY arrived at Redfern Railway Station; posters titled "Wanted – Child Murderers" with photos of DCOPs SCIPIONE & MADDEN & COP MORONEY were being taped to telegraph poles out the front of Redfern Railway Station.

17:42 Insp EMERY told DOI a large group was congregating near Redfern Railway Station with ammunition and alcohol.

18:00 City Rail closed platform 1; A/C WAITES contacted by Supt SMITH to inform him that the aboriginals around the 'block' had been drinking, becoming aggressive and trying to bait police.

18:12 Insp EMERY asked DOI if any OSG, Vikings etc police were available.

19:00 Briefing held at Redfern LAC with day & night shift Duty Officers and police of both shifts.

21:02 Insp SMITH requested riot gear from Redfern 14.

21:04 Redfern 45 called **SIGNAL ONE** to Gibbons/Lawson Streets, Redfern.

21:06 Supt SMITH updated on the situation in Redfern; Insp EMERY spoke with DOI re arranging further police and equipment to assist.

21:28 Crowd attempted to set fire to railway station; Fire Brigade called; Insp EMERY called DOI asking for Vikings or OSG; DOI gave Insp EMERY contact number for Inner Metropolitan Region Operations Manager.

21:30 Insp SNEL contacted by Insp EMERY who requested OSG equipment personnel. (there is unresolved confusion over the content of this conversation as Insp SNEL understood the request was for OSG equipment only).

22:05 Crowd advanced and police granted permission to advance their front line; crowd retreated to Eveleigh Street; a number of police injured and removed.

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22:14 Insp BENNETT called DOI and asked if there is a helicopter on; DOI responded that there wasn't one on.

22:41 IME60 called to say they were on the way to get OSG equipment.

22:48 IME60 called off at the command post with equipment.

23:00 All OSG personnel requested to attend the command post and requests made for more OSG and any other police by Supt SMITH and Insp Garth SMITH.

23:30 Supt SMITH called A/C WAITES and informed him that the situation was under control.

23:45 A/C WAITES received a call from A/DCOP PARSONS enquiring as to the situation at Redfern.

Monday 16 February 2004

01:15 Supt SMITH called A/C WAITES requesting additional police at the scene; it was after this call that A/C WAITES prepared to leave home and attend the riot.

01:34 Crowd consisted of over 100; petrol bombs/molotov cocktails being thrown.

01:47 Arrival time of A/C WAITES; A/C WAITES called DOI and asked about availability of tactical gear (because molotov cocktails were being thrown) and asked who has responsibility for the SPG.

02:14 Supt SMITH had command of Fire Brigade hose and was using it in an attempt to control the crowd.

02:30 OSG operatives Sgts O'RIORDAN & STOKES arrived at the scene with additional riot equipment.

03:02 Fire hose used to break up crowd *[according to Insp SMITH]*

03:30 OSG made a tactical approach and moved in 3 sections of 12 each.

03:35 Supt SMITH called DOI and asked if Polair could light up Eveleigh Lane just in front of the police line.

03:51 Redfern 10 called that no further police were required and the area was under control.

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EXECUTIVE INVOLVEMENT/COMMUNICATIONS TIMELINE

Saturday 14 February 2004

12:30 Supt SMITH and Insp EMERY held a full briefing at Redfern Police Station including Insp BENNETT concerning the incident with Thomas HICKEY that morning; Supt SMITH spoke with A/C WAITES and they determined it was not a critical incident.

Sunday 15 February 2004

01:15 Supt SMITH received a call to notify him that Thomas HICKEY had died.

13:30 Joanne ELLIOTT (Police Media) spoke with Supt SMITH as she had been receiving calls from 1:00pm from television stations wanting to interview police re the Thomas HICKEY matter; a decision was made not to conduct an interview at this stage.

15:00 Media briefing held outside Redfern Police Station with Insp EMERY and television and radio media.

16:30 Several calls were made from Redfern Railway Station (security etc) for help re stone throwing and aggression by youths at and in the vicinity of the Railway Station before police arrived at 4:50pm.

17:30 Insp EMERY first arrived at Redfern Railway Station.

17:42 Supt SMITH was appraised of the situation at Redfern *[probably by Insp EMERY who told DOI at 5:42pm that he had been trying to contact Supt SMITH];* in his 5:42pm conversation with DOI, Insp EMERY also said that the aborigines were full of hate without knowing the facts of what happened with Thomas HICKEY and they were congregating, equipped and intoxicated – this was the first call to DOI concerning the situation at Redfern which developed into the riot.

18:00 Supt SMITH contacted A/C WAITES to inform him that the aboriginal community around the 'block' had been drinking and were becoming aggressive and trying to bait police [as discussed between Insp EMERY and DOI at 5:42pm]; this was simply a notification by Supt SMITH as no further assistance required *[according to A/C WAITES]*; Insp EMERY left Redfern Railway Station at approximately 6:00pm.

19:00 Briefing held at Redfern Police Station with day and night shift police including Duty Officers EMERY & SMITH.

20:51 Insp EMERY told DOI that Supt SMITH wanted to keep a low key presence.

21:28 DOI provided Insp EMERY with a contact number for Inner Metropolitan Region Operations Manager [Insp SNEL] to arrange an OSG response.

21:30 Insp EMERY called Insp SNEL; Insp EMERY stated that he requested OSG equipment and personnel [in his submission]; Insp SNEL stated that Insp EMERY requested 20 sets of OSG equipment; Insp SNEL contacted by Insp EMERY who requested OSG equipment personnel. (there is unresolved confusion over the content of this conversation as Insp SNEL understood the request was for OSG equipment only).

21:35 Insp SNEL called A/C WAITES following her call from Insp EMERY re OSG equipment and A/C WAITES agreed re the provision of OSG equipment and stated that on arrival Supt SMITH could assess the need for OSG personnel. *[according to Insp SNEL]*

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21:42 Insp SNEL told DOI that A/C WAITES was not aware that the railway station had been closed; just prior to or after this call, Insp SNEL called Supt SMITH who was getting ready to leave home to attend the scene and they discussed OSG equipment being provided and Insp SNEL stated that she told him to contact her if OSG is required. *[according to Insp SNEL]*

22:14 DOI told Insp SMITH he needed to call the Commissioner's Staff Officer to provide an update on the situation.

22:19 DOI first contacted Supt ADNEY; immediately after this Supt ADNEY sent an SMS to A/DCOP PARSONS and DCOP MADDEN *[Supt ADNEY estimates the time she sent the SMS as 10:30pm but it may have been earlier].*

22:20 Supt SMITH picked up Joanne ELLIOTT (Police Media) at Redfern Police Station to head to the scene of the riot, therefore his approximate arrival time is 10:30pm.

22:34 A/DCOP PARSONS contacted Supt ADNEY to check with DOI that the Region Commander had been notified.

22:36 Supt ADNEY sent an SMS to DCOP MADDEN.

23:30 A/C WAITES received a call from Supt SMITH who was at the scene and stated that there were approximately only 30 people involved in some rowdy behaviour in Lawson Street and the situation was in hand. *[according to A/C WAITES]*

23:45 A/C WAITES received a call from A/DCOP PARSONS enquiring what was happening at Redfern; A/C WAITES appraised A/DCOP PARSONS with the information provided to him by Supt SMITH; A/DCOP PARSONS asked A/C WAITES if he was going to attend; A/C WAITES said he had considered attending but Supt SMITH insisted the situation was under control.

Monday 16 February 2004

01:15 Supt SMITH called A/C WAITES indicating that he needed more police and there were approximately 100 more rioters and police were being attacked with rocks, bricks and bottles; it was after this call that A/C WAITES prepared to leave home and attend the riot.

01:37 A/C WAITES called DOI on his way to the riot stating that Supt SMITH was in urgent need of more assistance, another 30-50 police; A/C WAITES advised he was on his way and would arrive in approximately 10-15 minutes.

01:47 Arrival time of A/C WAITES; A/C WAITES called DOI and said something was required by means of a circuit breaker because molotov cocktails were being thrown at police; A/C WAITES asked DOI about the prospect of using/contacting the SPG and protocols for doing so; after this call A/C WAITES spoke with Ch/Insp Craig JENNINGS (Tactical, SPG).

01:51 Redfern Duty Officer called DOI asking for all available police across Sydney as a matter of urgency.

02:00 A/C WAITES called Sgt WADE re the availability of chemical munitions; Sgt WADE informed A/C WAITES that nothing was available at that time which could be used.

02:05 DOI called A/C WAITES and advised him that he had called the helicopter and asked if he also wanted the Video Unit and A/C WAITES confirmed he did.

02:14 DOI called Supt SMITH stating that the helicopter and Video Unit were on the way; Supt SMITH said that he had shields on the way and he had taken hoses from the Fire Brigade and was hosing the crowd.

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02:17 DOI called Supt ADNEY to appraise her of the latest developments and they discussed staffing levels at the riot, closure of police stations, helicopter and Video Unit attendance arranged, A/C WAITES' attendance, use of the fire hose, media, molotov cocktails, SPG and Supt ADNEY suggested the use of negotiators.

02:22 DCOP SCIPIONE called DOI; DOI explained how the riot had progressed (as per the above call with Supt ADNEY); DCOP SCIPIONE said he had had a call from the Fire Brigade (Greg MULLINS); DOI explained the staffing levels, Supt SMITH & A/C WAITES' presence and the closure of police stations etc, they discussed the police dogs and injuries to police, dogs and damage to the cars, SPG; DCOP SCIPIONE asked DOI if there had been any arrests but DOI was unaware.

02:37 A/C WAITES called DOI and explained there were enough police but not enough protective equipment; they discussed trailers on the way with further equipment.

02:43 "Alan" from the Minister of Transport's Office called DOI to enquire what was occurring at Redfern; "Alan" had received a call from State Rail wanting to know when they could run trains again; DOI told "Alan" he would arrange a senior officer at the scene to contact him.

02:46 DOI called Supt SMITH as a result of the call from the Minister of Transport's Office; Supt SMITH told DOI that the trains had been recommenced; DOI and Supt SMITH also discussed equipment coming from Wetherill Park [one of the trailers discussed in the call between DOI and A/C WAITES at 2:37am].

02:58 DOI called A/C WAITES and told him the van was on its way and the helicopter crew should have made contact by that time with a location; A/C WAITES said the helicopter hadn't contacted him but perhaps they had contacted Supt SMITH.

03:02 Fire hose used to break up crowd *[according to Insp Garth SMITH]*

03:35 Supt SMITH called DOI and asked if Polair could light up Eveleigh Lane just in front of the police line.

03:51 Redfern 10 called that no further police were required and the area was under control.

04:45 A/C WAITES gave a media interview at the scene of the riot.

05:00 COP called DOI to enquire on the situation at Redfern; DOI explained the progression of events, numbers, arrivals, injuries, damage and presence of A/C WAITES.

05:30 Ross NEILSON [Public Affairs] was contacted by the Police Minister's Office displeased that they had not been notified earlier of the scale of the problem; they heard early morning media reports only.

06:46 Supt ADNEY called DOI [FITZGERALD] for an update but he had not at that stage been briefed.

06:54 DOI [FITZGERALD] called Supt ADNEY and advised her that Supt SMITH would call her with an update.

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OSG, PERSONNEL & EQUIPMENT TIMELINE

Sunday 15 February 2004

18:12 Insp EMERY asked DOI if there was any OSG, Vikings etc working; DOI responded that there was no Vikings that he was aware of and the only OSG he was aware of was their own [ie Redfern's OSG].

18:14 Redfern Duty Officer [probably Insp EMERY] told VKG he had kept back the day shift troops at the police station, and that they would keep a small contingent at the railway station until they got more staff.

19:45 Insp EMERY VKG that he was trying to arrange enough staff to contain the situation.

21:00 Supt SMITH was of the understanding that equipment and OSG personnel were on the way. *[according to Supt SMITH]*

21:00-21:59 1 OSG operative arrived at the scene of the riot.

21:05 Personnel given permission to wear riot equipment. *[according to Insp SMITH]*

21:06 Enquiries continued by Insp EMERY for further staff and equipment. *[according to Insp SMITH]*

21:28 Insp EMERY called DOI and said they didn't have any emergency response or OSG; DOI explained that the Operations Manager is responsible for organising them; DOI provided Insp EMERY with the Operations Manager's [Insp SNEL relieving] contact number.

21:29 Additional equipment arrived from Redfern with personnel. *[according to Insp SMITH]*

21:29 Insp EMERY called Insp SNEL and requested personnel and equipment. *[according to Insp EMERY]*

21:30 Insp EMERY called Insp SNEL and said they had little OSG equipment, DOI was co-ordinating OSG personnel on duty to attend and asked Insp SNEL if additional OSG equipment could be made available. *[according to Insp SNEL]*

21:35 Insp SNEL called A/C WAITES following her call from Insp EMERY; A/C WAITES agreed re the provision of OSG equipment and they discussed personnel to which A/C WAITES added that once Supt SMITH arrived at the scene he could assess the need for OSG personnel. *[according to Insp SNEL]*

21:42 Insp SNEL called DOI as a result of Insp EMERY having called her for OSG equipment; DOI said he wasn't sure how many OSG personnel she would be able to get in the area on a Sunday night.

21:45 Insp SNEL called Sgt WADE requesting that he arrange OSG equipment for the situation at Redfern; Sgt WADE told Insp SNEL he would arrange an OSG operative to go in and arrange equipment; Insp SNEL told Sgt WADE that A/C WAITES said Supt SMITH will assess the need for OSG staff when he arrives at the scene.

22:00-22:59 4 OSG operatives arrived at the scene of the riot.

22:03 A/Insp SHEARER [on duty as Duty Officer at Waverley on the night] called VKG after Sgt WADE had called him re-arranging equipment for Redfern; A/Insp SHEARER was provided with a sitrep and provided his contact details to be passed on to Redfern Duty Officer to call him.

22:19 DOI called Supt ADNEY and told her that he thought the Inner Metropolitan Region Operations Manager had been called to arrange OSG.

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22:23 IME60 [first called on police radio] asked about the situation at Redfern [this is the call sign used by the first OSG operatives who arrived at the scene with equipment].

22:41 Insp SMITH called again for more OSG personnel and equipment; IME60 called over the air that they were on the way with OSG equipment.

22:46 IME60 called to ask for the location of the Command Post and stated an estimated arrival time of one minute.

22:48 IME60 called off at the command post with equipment.

22:49 Insp SMITH recorded that the OSG van arrived with additional equipment at 9:49pm and he attempted to identify OSG personnel and those identified were kitted out. (this time is presumed to be mixed up with 10:49pm).

23:00 Insp SMITH asked for all OSG to attend the Command Post and also requested that some attend Abercrombie/Lawson Streets; "OSG50" [S/Cst SNOWDEN (& CROWE) *according to S/Cst SNOWDEN*] called for all OSG police to attend the Command Post, 20 on duty required from Inner Metro Region [channel A, C, D, etc]; Supt SMITH called DOI and stated that 20 OSG were on the way/on call and asked for 20 more police [GDs]; DOI told Supt SMITH he had as many police as possible; Supt SMITH asked for police to be called from anywhere [not just IMR]; Supt SMITH said that once the OSG police arrived the other police could be relieved.

23:00-23:59 4 OSG operatives arrived at the scene of the riot.

23:04 RF10 called that there were no OSG personnel at Abercrombie/Lawson Streets.

23:06 RF10 called that 1 OSG person was on the way.

23:09 Supt ADNEY called DOI and said she had spoken with Supt SMITH at the scene who said he wanted 20 OSG and 20 more police [he had 20 OSG on the way but wanted 20 additional police; Supt ADNEY said that ES10 (A/Insp SHEARER) said only 20 OSG trained were wanted; DOI said Supt SMITH has as many police as he can get there now [ie. all police available in the city area]; DOI said he will try and get 20 police for Supt SMITH.

23:20 Insp EMERY called DOI and DOI said ES10 said they didn't want untrained men, only OSG; DOI asked Insp EMERY what they wanted; Insp EMERY said they needed 20 more, preferably OSG and Insp SMITH had confirmed 20 OSG were on the way; DOI confirmed that Supt SMITH told him that too and they wouldn't get any more OSG but VKG would go to channels D & E.

23:25 Insp SNEL called Supt SMITH to see if OSG personnel were required but he was unable to talk at the time and she spoke with Insp EMERY instead [according to SNEL no request for OSG personnel was made at this time].

23:34 DOI called Supt SMITH regarding extra personnel; DOI said that all he could get from going to channels C, E, F & D was 5 people; DOI asked Supt SMITH if he had 20 OSG on the way; Supt SMITH spoke with someone else *[possibly "Darren" (BENNETT?)]* and said that he couldn't confirm numbers but that he was expecting more; DOI asked Supt SMITH if anyone had thought to contact the SPG and Supt SMITH said yes but he didn't think they'd "come to this"; DOI said he would call the SPG and give them a contact number at the scene.

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23:36 DOI called S/Cst COMPTON [SPG, Tactical] re using SPG; S/Cst COMPTON and DOI discussed equipment and personnel; DOI asked COMPTON to call Supt SMITH; S/Cst COMPTON said some OSG guys had been there and SPG started the truck for them and Surry Hills had asked SPG for some gear which he gave them; S/Cst COMPTON said the OSG truck took off over an hour ago kitted up for Redfern; S/Cst COMPTON said Surry Hills Duty Officer said they had 20-30 OSG trained at Redfern and they just wanted equipment; *S/Cst COMPTON agreed to call Supt SMITH and "put his mind at ease".*

23:40 Insp SNEL and DOI discussed prison trucks/vans, DOI mentioned that having gone to channels C, E, F & D he could only get an additional 5 staff.

23:46 Channel A called channel E and asked if any OSG were amongst those coming over [it appeared they were only GDs].

23:52 Channel G called channel A and said that Flemington 10 probably had 4 OSG and asked if they were wanted; channel A says only if they are Inner Metropolitan Region [said he is only going on what he's been told].

23:58 Ch/Insp ASHTON of Flemington LAC called DOI and said he was OSG and he had 2 other OSG trained but they were called off by the radio operator [if they were from Greater Metropolitan Region]; DOI checked and then said that they only wanted Inner Met Region [but they'd keep them in mind]; Ch/Insp ASHTON said they would be on all night; another channel called channel A and said that he had Campsie on the phone, they didn't have any OSG on and asked if they should be called out; channel A said OSG60 would make that decision, but to keep them on standby.

Monday 16 February 2004

00:16 VKG told City Rail that the OSG was assembling and if they had enough troops they would move in soon if they were going to do it.

00:56 DOG37 called that they had been split from the OSG.

01:00-01:59 8 OSG operatives arrived at the scene of the riot.

01:02 Supt SMITH called DOI saying that they needed OSG kits and asked if they could do a call out, the SPG was sending 5 or 6; the Duty Officer said there were about 40 kits; DOI said that he didn't have the list for the OSG call out, then Supt SMITH discovered that Sgt WADE would do a call around; after this call Sgt WADE received a call from Insp SMITH requesting 20 OSG personnel to be called out to Redfern; Insp SNEL received a call from Sgt WADE stating that OSG had been requested and he was requesting approval to deploy OSG personnel; Insp SNEL approved; Sgt WADE commenced calling out IMR OSG staff from home.

01:04 DOI called S/Cst COMPTON who reiterated it wasn't a job for Tactical; S/Cst COMPTON said OSG should have been there by then.

01:05 Sgt O'RIORDAN received a call from Sgt WADE directing him to attend Regent/Lawson Streets, Redfern.

01:14 RF45 called for RF46 to go to the Command Post with the keys to the OSG truck.

01:17 OSG60 called for all vehicles coming to Redfern to be wearing bullet resistant vests.

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01:19 Supt SMITH called DOI to check how the numbers of police were going, Supt SMITH explained the situation at the scene and that they will have to replace police on the line because some had been there for 18 hours and asked that they go outside the Inner Metro Region area; Supt SMITH said he had OSG on the way and asked DOI how many police were coming and DOI said he didn't know exact numbers, but that they would identify themselves on arrival; Supt SMITH said he would get on to A/C WAITES to arrange a call out.

01:47 A/C WAITES called DOI re the throwing of Molotov cocktails and the possibility of some kind of "circuit breaker"; A/C WAITES asked who called the SPG and what equipment they have; DOI agreed to call the SPG and get them to call A/C WAITES [which DOI did at 1:48].

01:50 Sgt O'RIORDAN commenced loading a further 50 sets of riot equipment into vehicles.

01:51 Liverpool Duty Officer (Insp GAMOSH) called DOI saying he believed DOI said OSG would be paid overtime from the OSG budget, and he said he had OSG trained and a car crew but their budget was restricted.

02:14 Supt SMITH told DOI they were getting shields etc and he had taken the fire hose from the Fire Brigade and was hosing people and he had enough staff.

02:37 A/C WAITES told DOI that they had plenty of police but no protective equipment, A/C WAITES said that there was a trailer on the way from Hornsby (which only had 15 sets of riot equipment) and he believed there was a store at Wetherill Park; A/C WAITES asked DOI to contact Supt Daryl DONNELLEY or the Duty Officer at Fairfield to see if they could get their trailer on the way.

02:00-02:59 15 OSG operatives arrived at the scene of the riot.

02:30 Sgts O'RIORDAN & STOKES arrived at the scene of the riot with OSG equipment which they commenced handing out.

02:55 Fairfield LAC Supervisor asked that DOI be informed that the OSG trailer from Fairfield would be on the way in 10 minutes.

03:00 Sgt O'RIORDAN conducted a briefing with OSG Team Leaders [CIBULKA, CROWE, SHEARER, VLACHOS, DUNLOP & STOKES].

03:02 Fire hose used to break up crowd *[according to Insp SMITH]*

03:14 Sgt Dean SMITH of Fairfield LAC called DOI re a request to supply equipment for the Redfern incident; Sgt SMITH called to confirm what was required [riot gear or vests]; DOI said full gear; Sgt SMITH said there wasn't anything in the truck as it wasn't kitted up; DOI thought the truck was ready to go; SMITH said he would arrange 10 sets of riot gear and 10 additional vests to send in.

03:15 Truck with trailer arrived *[according to Insp SMITH]*; City Central 15 called for the truck with trailer to meet at the intersection of Regent and Lawson Streets.

03:00-03:59 2 OSG operatives arrived at the scene of the riot.

03:30 Tactical advance commenced [according to Sgt O'RIORDAN] with 3 sections of OSG personnel, each of which consisted of 12.

03:35 Supt SMITH called DOI and asked if Polair could light up Eveleigh Lane just in front of the police line.

03:51 Redfern 10 called that no further police were required and the area was under control.

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TIMELINE DEFINITIONS

A/C	Assistant Commissioner
A/DCOP	Acting Deputy Commissioner of Police
Channel A	City Central, The Rocks, Kings Cross, Redfern, Surry Hills
Channel C	Eastern Suburbs, Rose Bay, Eastern Beaches, Botany Bay
Channel D	North Shore, Ku-ring-gai, Manly-Davidson, Harbourside, Northern Beaches
Channel E	Burwood, Leichhardt, Eastwood, Gladesville
Channel F	Ashfield, Marrickville, Newtown, Campsie
Channel G	Bankstown, Flemington
City Central 15	City Central 15 General Duties call sign
COP	Commissioner of Police
DCOP	Deputy Commissioner of Police
DOG11	Police Dog 11 = Anja (Sgt MAYER)
DOG54	Police Dog 54 = Duke (S/Cst SMITH)
DOI	Duty Operations Inspector (VKG)
ES10	Eastern Suburbs 10 = Eastern Suburbs Duty Officer's vehicle
Flemington 10	Flemington LAC Duty Officer's call sign
GDs	general duties
IME60	Inner Metropolitan [Region] 60 = call sign used by OSG operatives
OSG	Operational Support Group
OSG60	Operational Support Group Commander's call sign
Redfern 10	Redfern LAC Duty Officer's call sign
Redfern 14	Redfern LAC Mobile Supervisor's call sign
Redfern 16	Redfern LAC General Duties call sign
Redfern 17	Redfern LAC General Duties call sign
Redfern 36	Redfern LAC General Duties call sign
Redfern 45	Redfern LAC Beats
SPG	State Protection Group
VKG	NSW Police Communications/Radio

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EQUIPMENT

PHYSICAL ASSETS ON HAND AT REDFERN

Inquiries by Strike Force Coburn confirm the following physical assets were authorised to be on hand at the Redfern Local Area Command on the evening of 15 February 2004:

- 10 riot shields (Arnold A/C4 model - Standard)
- 10 helmets (Scott Aspen brand)
- 10 sets of leg protectors (Reliance brand)

Since 15–16 February 2004 the number of physical assets on hand at Redfern has not changed.

At a Region level, physical assets on hand on 15-16 February 2004 are summarised below:

Region	Shields	Helmets	Leg Protectors
Inner Metropolitan (+ Redfern)	120 (10)	240 (10)	240[1] (10)
Greater Metropolitan	78	78	78
Southern	46	46	46
Northern	45	45	45
Western	56	56	56
Totals	**355**	**475**	**475**

ASSET STORAGE AND ACCESS ARRANGEMENTS

Inquiries by Strike Force Coburn indicate difficulties arose when attempts were made to access protective riot equipment on 15 February 2004. These difficulties are summarised in chronological order below.

21:05 Initial difficulties in access to sufficient riot equipment at the scene:

A decision was made to issue Redfern's riot equipment following the "Signal One Call at 2103hrs. Of the 10 sets of equipment available, 8 sets are supposed to be carried in the Redfern Supervisors Vehicle (Redfern 14). This is to allow the quick deployment of 8 sets of equipment at the scene of incidents. Inspector Smith the Duty Officer on the evening of 15 February 2004 reports that Redfern 14 attended Lawson Street, Redfern, yet only four complete sets of equipment and seven other shields are reported to have been immediately available. Other reports vary from only 2–4 sets of equipment being available.

1 An additional 60 sets of training quality full kits are held by Inner Metropolitan Region and 30 sets at Southern Region.

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21:30 Confusion over access to resources (equipment vs OSG resources): 20 Operations Support Group (OSG) personnel and riot equipment were requested. This request was made by mobile telephone by Redfern Duty Officer Inspector Emery to Inspector Snel, who was relieving as the Region Operations Manager. Inspector Snel later states she understood it was equipment only which was requested.

It has been reported difficulties were experienced in accessing the OSG equipment at the SPC as the relevant keys could not be obtained. As a result Rescue Squad personnel were dispatched to the SPC and were required to force access to the equipment.

22:50 At 2250hrs 20 additional sets of OSG equipment + 2 OSG officers arrived at the scene.

01:05 Further equipment requested: Additional equipment was requested with Inspector Smith calling Sgt Wade at 0105hrs. By 0150hrs Sgt O'Riordon loaded further sets of equipment from the SPC, arriving at Redfern at 0230hrs. Prior to its arrival requests were made for additional equipment resulting in a trailer from Fairfield also being deployed to the scene.

There appears to have been no effective auditing process at Redfern LAC for checking specific items or quantities, despite the existence of a signed Supervisors Checklist on a weekly basis including the date of the riot. Since the incident the processes adopted for checking equipment by Supervisors at Redfern has been revised to include the protective riot equipment.

Once the appropriate personnel were contacted, sufficient protective equipment was subsequently provided to Police at the scene, however the time delay is an issue. Presently the majority of the OSG protective equipment is stored at the Sydney Police Centre, as 90% of public order incidents take place within the Sydney Metropolitan Area.

All Regions need to re-assess their current equipment storage processes, the locations and quantities held to ensure the capability for the urgent access to this equipment. Additionally, given the present terrorism risk storing the bulk of these assets in one location such as the Sydney Police Centre (SPC) may no longer be prudent.

ADEQUACY OF EQUIPMENT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES

The Redfern incident has highlighted procedural issues relating to deployment, training, familiarisation with and maintenance of equipment. It has also provided a catalyst to review the appropriateness of evaluating alternative equipment.

Processes were in place to deploy required equipment, and once followed were found to be effective in ensuring its delivery albeit not a timely response. The quality of certain equipment deployed was found to be of a poor standard. Scott Aspen brand helmets, which are generally only used for training purposes were deployed during the incident. These helmets were found to have scratched visors, reducing visibility for officers.

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The evening heat during the incident reportedly resulted in some helmet visors fogging up. It cannot be identified which helmets did so, however the helmets on issue to Redfern are Scott Aspen Brand, whereas the ones held at the Sydney Police Centre (SPC) are Argus Brand. Argus helmet visors are treated with Anti Fogging chemicals and tend to resist fogging more than the Scott Aspen Helmets. This issue highlights the possible need for alternative helmets more suited to Australian climatic conditions.

Strike Force Coburn believes the physical state of the equipment on hand at Redfern during the incident was poor. Inquiries suggest deficiencies in storage arrangements resulted in some damaged equipment being used by Police on the ground.

In addition to the protective equipment held at the SPC, the OSG possess equipment that allows communication between the OSG line and others. It was not deployed to Redfern, though it generally would accompany all other OSG equipment to an incident.

Similarly the non-issue of water bottles to police on the front line, from those held with the OSG equipment at the SPC, could have greatly assisted police during the incident. It was found that the provision of refreshments to officers was poor.

Police in attendance at the Redfern riot were wearing their General Duties issue Ballistic resistant vests, which contain ceramic plates within the vests. They were worn for protection from the impact of missiles being thrown at officers, yet they are not designed for this purpose. The ceramic plates in the vest make them considerably heavier than riot-specific vests. They were worn because it was all that was made available.

Any of these vests which were struck by a brick or similar object can be considered to have had the ceramic plate compromised which has adversely affected the bullet resistant integrity of the vest. Inner Metropolitan Region were advised of this fact in order to communicate it to all Local Area Commands which had officers respond to the Redfern riot to evaluate the integrity of their vests on hand.

This highlights the need for more riot specific protective vests to be obtained rather than utilising the bullet resistant vests for a function for which they are not designed.

ONE SIZE FITS ALL

The Strike Force received information that a female officer who attended Redfern had extreme difficulties with the equipment available to her at the scene. The difficulties stemmed from the officer's stature, with a total body weight being 55kgs, and the issuing of a large bullet resistant vest and helmet to her.

The officer reported that due to her size, anytime she wears the current issue bullet resistant vests they are too long for her, preventing her from reaching her appointments if so required. Additionally the vests slip forward every time the officer bends over, providing her with ineffective protection. The current bullet resistant vests utilised by General Duties are the ADA brand, model D98 containing ceramic plates, and of a total weight of 8 kilogram's.

Redfern was the first time the officer had utilised a helmet and found it was too large, with a damaged chinstrap. Each time the officer looked down, the helmet would either cover her face or completely fall off.

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The officer further stated her LAC is in the process of obtaining Small and Medium size ADA vests, to be issued by Supervisors at the beginning of shifts to officers requiring smaller sizes, to alleviate the difficulties the current issue size creates for her and officers of similar stature.

RECOGNISED STANDARDS

Shields and the Argus Helmets were the subject of an evaluation between all Australasian Law Enforcement Agencies in 2002. An evaluation by the Australian Centre for Policing Research (ACPR) of the equipment used by NSW Police revealed its quality and type equalled that utilised by all other states in Australia and that of the New Zealand Police. No States surpassed NSW in regard to the results of the evaluation undertaken.

Inquiries by Strike Force Coburn failed to locate any published standards relating to riot shields other than 'drafts' developed by the British Standards Institution (BSI). All Australasian agencies are reported to have adopted these BSI standards.

The results of the ACPR studies, and the compliance of NSW Police in terms of the equipment used and its maintenance was as follows:

- ACPR identified procedures to be adopted for the storage and upkeep of riot equipment. NSW Police standard operating procedures comply with the ACPR recommendations.

- The condition of some items of equipment at Redfern has revealed that storage of some equipment does not comply with the ACPR recommendations, specifically the keeping of shields in their protective bags, and storing helmets where they cannot fall to the ground causing scratching to the visor or damaging the protective strength of the helmet.

- ACPR indicated no single shape or design of shield is necessarily perfect for every situation. The NSW Police OSG units utilise the current shields due to their compatibility with present tactical capabilities.

- The ACPR test shields based upon Impact resistance, Transparency, Inert Coatings and Secondary Operations during manufacture. NSW Police shields comply in all these areas.

- NSW Police shields also comply in terms of protection afforded and Portability.

- The helmets currently utilised by NSW Police are the most commonly used style worldwide, and were chosen after consideration was given to British standards. Those standards are reviewed every 5 years, and include protocols for storage, however the condition of the equipment is only as good as the level of compliance with those protocols.

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EQUIPMENT DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED ON THE GROUND

Equipment designed for use with other OSG equipment in the form of earpieces and mouthpieces were not included in the equipment that arrived from the Sydney Police Centre. This led to complaints relating to the lack of communication between the Police front line and other personnel. This lack of communication was exacerbated by the decision of the OSG Team Leader at Redfern to relieve the front line personnel of their portable radios. All Region OSG need to adopt a process to ensure all its relevant equipment is provided when it is requested.

When OSG are deployed in a defensive line, one hand is occupied holding a shield, the other linking officers together in either a loop or double loop formation, making it impossible to utilize a portable radio when in the police line. Include the noise levels of public order incidents, the extended handpiece to portable radios are also ineffective in such situations.

Once the OSG equipment had been transported to Redfern in its trailer, it was reported that for a time access could not be gained to the trailer to issue the equipment. There was no process for management of any vehicle keys at the scene and the officer with the keys to the trailer became involved in other duties after his arrival. The officer had to be located to obtain the keys before the equipment was distributed.

The absence of a Command Post management process at the scene created a number of problems including delays in accessing the riot equipment once it had been transported to the scene. Once the appropriate officer was contacted, the equipment was obtained.

Strike Force Coburn reviewed a number of submissions, reports and open source documents dealing with other forms of equipment available to law enforcement agencies in relation to public order incidents. This process has identified several options included in the recommendations of this report to improve the type of equipment available to police responding to violent unplanned riots.

OPTIONS TO IMPROVE EQUIPMENT IN THE FUTURE

As the riot at Redfern deteriorated, the LAC Commander had limited options for countering escalating crowd violence, and decided that the use of water hoses was the best available option to defend police positions in the situation at that time.

Current training levels for General Duties Police in the use of equipment for riot control is either non-existent or minimal. Various sources have provided suggestions relating to the use of long shields[2] by General Duties Police to combat these situations. Many of the injuries sustained during the riot were to the knees and lower legs of officers, highlighting the benefits that long shields could have provided. In addition to affording greater protection, the shields would allow for a wider range of tactical options to be adopted. These options could include General Duties Police being able to form a defensible barrier pending the arrival of OSG and other specialist units.

2 Refer Operational Safety & Tactics, Public Order Training Centre, London. – Report on activities by Chief Inspector LUPTON. *September 1998*

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The protective equipment on issue to Redfern is the same as that utilised by the OSG. OSG personnel are trained to resolve incidents such as Redfern, forming into arrest teams to take action against offenders, and the equipment used is designed with those tactics in mind.

General Duties officers are generally not trained in such tactics, and subsequently have the need for different protective equipment, rather than a "One size fits all" approach. Consideration must be given to obtaining general duties specific protective equipment. A quantity of long shields and sets of fire retardant overalls available for use by non OSG personnel would afford greater protection and potentially reduce injuries. Education Services have also suggested consideration of obtaining a quantity of smaller round style shields, for use by Mounted Police, Commanders and Team Leaders.

LESS THAN LETHAL FORCE - EQUIPMENT

In obtaining legal advice regarding possible options for utilisation of equipment which was less protective in it's nature, the phrase 'Less than Lethal Equipment' has been used to describe equipment which by it's nature, is a use of force at a level less than lethal force. Given that it remains the duty of NSW Police to keep the peace, regardless the level of violence utilised in breaching that peace, it has been suggested to give consideration to the use of offensive as well as defensive equipment.

The use of this type of equipment will allow Police to break up groups of offenders into smaller congregations, hampering the development of group dynamics, usurping leaders within the groups, and facilitating arrest tactics. At the same time officer safety is improved since it allows for Commanders to increase the distance between offenders and Police, reducing the chance of injury from objects thrown at officers while demonstrating to observers such as the general community, and offenders, a clear use of force to regain control of the situation.

Its use when necessary also clearly demonstrates the intent of Police to control the situation and intolerance of unlawful behaviour while reducing the resolve of the less committed and deterring uninvolved bystanders from joining in.

Tactical options can be developed in relation to any equipment to provide processes through which it could be deployed when circumstances warrant. A variety of " Less than Lethal " or offensive equipment exists.

This category of equipment includes:

- Items capable of delivering OC Spray over distances up to 20 metres from a Police Line.

- Vehicles similar to the SPG Armoured Rescue Vehicle also known as the "Bear Cat", are available with specific modifications for use in a Public Order Management role. Such vehicles are utilised by the Police Service of Northern Ireland and a number of Police Forces within North America, the United Kingdom and Asia.

- Modifications to such a vehicle includes capabilities such as chemically treating windows to make them fire retardant, fitting protective cages to windows, fitting of fire extinguishing devices to the exterior of the vehicle, and the capacity to deliver " Less than Lethal" devices including gas, OC or other irritants as well as being equipped with water cannons. Such vehicles are constructed in South Australia by a Sydney based company.

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- Given that NSW Police possess a "Bear Cat", although not at this time adapted for public order incidents, it's use should be considered as an available tool, subject to the needs of the Counter Terrorist Command. It has also been noted that Victoria Police have recently purchased two similar vehicles.

- A variety of equipment for delivering other irritant liquids and gases by grenade and other means. These items however are accompanied by the need for Police to access appropriate breathing apparatus, and there is the risk of these items being thrown back behind Police lines by offenders.

- Mobilised Water Cannons and the use of Fire Hoses.

- Use of other non-lethal, but potentially so, impact projectiles (also known as baton rounds/rubber bullets).

The use of Impact projectiles for example as researched by Strike Force Coburn can provide alternative tactical options, although filling a void in the NSW Police use of force options, it does so in an extremely dramatic and violent use of force:

> *It (use of impact projectiles) provides the capability to overcome an offender's resistance from a safe distance through the use of only impact energy. This extended range engagement reduces the potential for death or serious injury to officers and suspects alike when compared to more confrontational tactics.*
>
> *Currently officers have few options that effectively bridge the gap between verbal challenges and physical intervention including deadly force. Closing the distance between suspects and officers to enable the use of batons or OC Spray in some circumstances is not an option as such action brings the officer within the range of the offenders weapon/s.*

Advice has been sought from Legal Services' Operational Legal Advice Unit regarding the use / proposed use of such devices as a tactic in circumstances such as the Redfern incident. The advice received states,

> *"In effecting any arrest or attempting to prevent a breach of the peace and implementing options to extinguish a breach of the peace, police officers may use reasonable force in order to prevent an apprehension or an actual breach of the peace. The use and extent of force...will vary according to the situation.*
>
> *Police should, without fear or favour be able to exercise their common law duty to prevent a breach of the peace, and exercise their statutory powers of arrest, however, the decision to prefer the use of force utilising a tactical option without established guidelines or protocol when there are other readily available options exposes the State (NSW Police) to criticism and possible Legal Liability".*

The advice received recommends against the use of such technology or tactics under the current circumstances as NSW Police is unable to mitigate its liability. This is because currently there are no guidelines, instructions, or standard operating procedures in place that NSW Police can rely upon that confirm the safe operation and appropriate deployment of these ' less than lethal' devices.

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Any new offensive or defensive equipment will need to be accompanied by the establishment of training and operating regimes. Organisational approval will also be necessary for specific items to be added to the NSW Police available resources, and the development of protocols regarding authority to utilise such tactics.

The introduction of a variety of equipment and tactics involving the use of less than lethal force by appropriate trained personnel would enhance the tactical options available to Police Commanders in dealing with violent public order incidents. Research revealed studies showing inaction by Police on many occasions results in an increase in the momentum of group dynamics and the aggression by groups, inevitably against Police.

Such equipment does not impinge upon the ability to contain an incident, it will however enhance capabilities to more effectively disperse mobs when required, and provide Commanders additional tactical options.

These options include the potential to minimise the duration of incidents, preventing violence from escalating rather than prolonging the potential for Police injuries through a policy of containment being the only option available. Enhanced tactical options can also provide a greater possibility for arrests at the time of the incident rather than retrospective investigation and arrest.

Prior to adoption of any new equipment it will require corporate sign off and protocols to be established relating to training, standard operating procedures and authority to deploy. OSTTU, the Firearms Standing Committee and Legal Services would be the appropriate sections to evaluate and provide advice re the implementation of any new equipment, taking into consideration any impact on external stakeholders.

Given the legal ramifications, individual LACs and/or Regions should not obtain equipment the use of which would be considered the utilisation of 'less than lethal' force without corporate approval of its type, to ensure standardisation of equipment, tactics and authority to deploy.

COMMAND EQUIPMENT

The absence of a purpose built Command Vehicle created difficulties relating to the generation of a log to record details of the incident, Command decisions and intelligence processing. The absence also left a Region Commander, Local Area Commander, and numerous Duty Officers and Team Leaders exposed while attempting to command the operation, making NSW Police appear unprepared, under resourced and unprofessional, not only to external witnesses but to our own personnel.

From the inquiries conducted by Strike Force Coburn, consideration could have been given to an offer made by the Director, Advanced Technology, Special Services Group (SSG) who indicated the SSG response capability includes a vehicle ideally suited as a forward command post. However the vehicle is extremely large and generally best suited for Major Incident responses. Therefore the need for a smaller vehicle still needs to be explored.

A submission by the Inner Metropolitan Region Commander and others identified the need to obtain a purpose designed OSG/Incident Command Post Vehicle to be staffed and maintained by dedicated Region OSG officers who are available under most of the suggested models to respond to a request from Region management.

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The primary purpose of this vehicle would be to assist in providing conditions and a resource for better management in terms of resource assembly, deployment, retrieval and stand down, other equipment issues such as dispersal and retrieval, and the planning and communication of command decisions.

PRISON VANS & ARREST PROCEDURES

The Redfern riot highlighted opportunities to improve the arrest procedures at public order events. Evaluation of the current effectiveness of the Public Order Management Policy must include strategies to enhance arrest, charging and custody management procedures for public order incidents, with recognition that there will be significant differences in processes required by Metropolitan Regions compared to rural locations.

Although arrest processes for public order incidents are relatively well known, they are rarely seen to be adopted. Consequently, arrests have now tended to be avoided, or when undertaken without adopting Public Order arrest processes which results in a rapid depletion of available Police personnel from the incident. This has severely diminished the tactical options available to Commanders in the management of planned incidents let alone unplanned ones.

Within Metropolitan Regions adequately staffed prison vans should be available to be deployed to a scene to be managed, and assembled under the direction of a nominated individual (Duty Officer/Team Leader) from the command post. This is in order to provide adequate prisoner security and transportation without reducing the tactical options available to Police in dealing with the incident.

Consideration should also be given to the availability of sufficient custody management facilities at processing locations, and appropriate digital cameras and videos to deal with the possibility of a large number of offenders to be processed, as these issues are regularly not considered when operations are planned.

In rural locations, access to Corrective Services vehicles at short notice or securing charge locations in combination with revised prisoner processing practices could be considered.

Evaluation of the current effectiveness of the Public Order Management Policy must include strategies to enhance arrest, charging and custody management procedures for public order incidents.

LOGISTICS PLANNING IN PLACE FOR DISTRIBUTION OF RIOT EQUIPMENT

Redfern LAC riot equipment is held at both the Redfern Police Station and within Redfern 14 (outside supervisor). Other riot equipment is stored at the SPC in trailers prepared for deployment. In the case of a call out, personnel are directed by the Region OSG Co-ordinator to collect equipment and attend a scene where it is met by OSG personnel deployed to the incident. This is the planned process to be undertaken, and it is what took place at Redfern, except the personnel were not called out due to confusion over the request.

Strike Force Coburn reviewed the response time of OSG equipment to the scene. Whilst some confusion appeared to exist between the scene and the Inner Metropolitan Region Operations Manager the deployment response time for OSG equipment at a region level to the scene was not considered adequate. That is, 1hr 20 minutes elapsed between the initial request and its arrival at the scene. The key timings on 15 February 2004 were as follows:

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21:29 Equipment requested by Inner Metropolitan A/Region Operations Manager of the OSG Co-ordinator.

22:50 First OSG equipment trailer arrives at the scene.

02:30 Second delivery of OSG equipment arrives at the scene.

The current process regarding Inner Metropolitan Region OSG call out, including the deployment of equipment, requires Region Operations Manager to contact the OSG Co-Ordinator, or the officer acting in his position.

This officer then either responds personally or contacts another member of the OSG to attend the Sydney Police Centre, access the relevant keys, obtain the equipment and deploy to the required location. There is concern that access to the necessary equipment is dependent upon being able to reach the OSG Co-Ordinator, and the effectiveness of the process.

The first delivery took 1 hour 20 minutes, arriving at 2250hrs, due to the previously discussed access problems requiring officers to force entry to the equipment, followed by a later delivery at 0230hrs. All Regions should evaluate the effectiveness of their current equipment access and call out processes.

LEVEL OF EXPERIENCE OF POLICE AT REDFERN RIOT

The experience levels of Police present on the evening of 15–16 February 2004 is represented in the following table:

Officers	Total deployed at scene
Probationary Constables	57
Constables	101
Senior Constables	48
Sergeants / Team Leaders	18
Duty Officers	14
Superintendents	1
Total	249

LEVEL OF TRAINING IN THE USE OF RIOT EQUIPMENT

Strike Force Coburn believes the level of training in the use of riot equipment by Police deployed at the incident was inadequate. While the number of Redfern LAC staff who have received 1 day introductory riot training is approximately 70 officers of the 152 available. Only 13% (29) of police involved in the riot on 15–16 February 2004 were from that Command. No such training has been provided to surrounding Commands who came to Redfern's assistance. The training level for Redfern and adjoining LACs needs to be 100% as a matter of urgency.

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SUPERVISOR AWARENESS OF ASSETS AND THEIR AVAILABILITY / LOCATION

Strike Force Coburn concluded that Supervisors were aware of the location of riot equipment held by the Redfern LAC and its availability. It was obtained when requested, despite poor systems in place regarding accountability for its condition.

SUPERVISOR AWARENESS OF ADDITIONAL RESERVES OF RIOT EQUIPMENT / LOCATION

The awareness of additional equipment by Supervisors appears to have been limited to the holdings of Redfern LAC. Knowledge of the additional equipment held at the Sydney Police Centre, as well as how to obtain it was not as well known.

The Duty Officers were aware however of whom to contact in order to obtain the additional equipment. It was the Duty Officer's awareness of additional equipment at the Sydney Police Centre which resulted in his conversations with the Region Operations Manager in efforts to obtain it and OSG personnel.

SUPERVISOR AWARENESS OF AUTHORISATION REQUIREMENTS FOR ACCESS TO RIOT EQUIPMENT

Redfern LAC Standard Operating Procedures indicate their riot equipment is to be deployed at the discretion of the Supervisor/Duty Officer, and the processes were adhered to by the relevant personnel, and are appropriate.

FINDINGS - EQUIPMENT

1. Access to additional riot equipment from the SPC during the Redfern riot was not timely.

2. The Scott Aspen brand helmets on issue to Redfern LAC are operationally inappropriate (suitable only for training).

3. No communication equipment was taken from the SPC for use at the Redfern riot.

4. The type of protective equipment available for General Duties personnel during the Redfern riot was inadequate given their training and the equipment's use in a static line.

5. The Redfern incident identified concerns in relation to ill-fitting equipment issued to Local Area Commands, such as bullet resistant vests being all of the one size.

6. Equipment needs to be identifiable to allow for accountability in its issue, its recertification as operationally effective after use in incidents or training, and in relation to evidentiary considerations.

7. NSW Police do not possess 'Less than Lethal Force' equipment as tactical options for Commanders.

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8. An adequately equipped vehicle as a mobile command post for use at Redfern would have allowed for better management of necessary command post functions.

9. There was a lack of storage and accountability protocols relating to riot equipment on issue to Redfern LAC, it has been revised and improved since the riot.

10. There is a lack of process to regularly examine the standard of protective riot equipment being used by NSW Police.

11. Prison vans were not utilised during the incident.

12. There are numerous other locations within NSW with holdings of protective riot equipment. It appears these holdings are either unknown by the Region OSG Co-Ordinators, or unreported by them to Strike Force Coburn.

RECOMMENDATIONS - EQUIPMENT

1. An urgent review is conducted at all Regions to determine riot equipment availability for deployment to unplanned incidents, as well as its quantity and the quality of equipment held.

2. Redfern LAC's protective riot equipment requires upgrading to Operational quality.

3. OSTTU be tasked to assess equipment currently utilised by the OSG and alternatives held by NSW Police for officers wearing helmets to communicate.

3a. Call Out processes of all Regions relating to protective equipment should be reviewed to ensure *ALL* available equipment can be accessed in a timely manner.

4. OSTTU should be tasked to research options re alternative protective equipment suitable for General Duties personnel, such as Long Shields, Fire Retardant overalls, and Riot specific vests.

5. LACs should review equipment on hand re sizing implications for officers attached to the LAC.

6. An assessment is required by OSTTU as to the need for uniquely identifiable reference markings on all equipment.

7. OSTTU should be tasked to research 'Less than Lethal Force' options, including modifications to the SPG's Bearcat armoured rescue vehicle.

8. Options re availability of adequately equipped vehicles for use as forward command posts should be explored by each Region and LAC.

9. All Local Area Commands issued with protective riot equipment should design a system of accountability for the quality, storage and access arrangements. Accountability for this can be managed through Command Management Framework (CMF).

10. OSTTU be tasked with implementing a process to regularly examine the standard of riot equipment being used by NSW Police, giving consideration to the establishment of an Australian Quality Standard.

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11. The availability of prison vans should be explored by all Regions for use during public order incidents.

12. Each Region needs to audit ALL its LAC's to identify all equipment held, to account for it and ensure its quality and availability.

COMMUNICATIONS

The role of communications leading up to and during the Redfern riots played a pivotal role in the unfolding events on the night of 15 February 2004 into the morning of 16 February 2004. The following discussion indicates notification activities during the incident inclusive of the role individuals played in Executive notifications.

Adequacy of communication protocols for executive notification

On 15–16 February 2004, VKG used the protocols of 'Serious, Unusual or Newsworthy' (S.U.N.) for determining executive notifications for a broad range of significant incidents. When incidents meet this criteria, VKG are expected to contact the 'on call' Executive Staff Officer (Operational Response Unit). The occurrence of a 'notification' relies on the judgement of the Duty Operations Inspector. Incidents of riots or civil unrest were not specifically mentioned in the S.U.N. protocol at the time of the Redfern incident.

The Redfern incident highlighted deficiencies in these S.U.N. notification protocols. Strike Force Coburn concluded that these protocols were broad and lacked specific criteria to determine issues or incidents that should be notified to the executive. These protocols were open to arbitrary interpretation by Duty Operations Inspectors and personnel at VKG.

The Commissioner's Staff Officer, Chief Superintendent Aust, was advised of the riot about 5am on Monday, 16 February 2004. The Commissioners Chief of Staff has the delegated responsibility to communicate issues of significance to the Commissioner, and the Commissioners Office. In general, the Commissioner or his Staff Officer advises the Minister's Chief of Staff and the Ministry.

Following the Redfern incident the communication protocols used by VKG have been revised with endorsement by the Commissioner. The communication protocols have been enhanced to include specific examples of significant issues including riotous behaviour and civil unrest. Strike Force Coburn believes these revised protocols will assist in the upward notification of significant events to the executive.

Strike Force Coburn reviewed the timings and extent of executive notifications on 14, 15 and 16 February 2004 to determine the sequence of notifications by key individuals during the incident. An itemised summary of notifications and timings are included below to assist in understanding the role individuals played.

Strike Force Coburn concluded the delay in notification to the executive of the unfolding events is likely to have been a result of an under appreciation of the seriousness of the riot by the Local Area Commander, based on a belief the situation was under control.

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NOTIFICATIONS RELEVANT TO THE DEATH OF THOMAS HICKEY

Saturday 14 February 2004

11.15 Thomas Hickey was impaled about 11.15am on Saturday the 14 February 2004 At 11.39am, a request for Crime Scene Unit to attend occurred from Redfern 14, the outside supervisor. Acting Inspector Dave Neal of the Sydney Crime Scene Unit provided advice to the Duty Operations Inspector - Inspector Dunn, that Police were not looking for Thomas Hickey at the time and there were 'heaps of witnesses to corroborate' same.

13:03 Discussions occurred between Redfern Duty Officer - Inspector Emery and Inspector Dunn, as to whether the event was a critical incident. There was no connection seen between Police and the impaling event. The conversation then led to a suggestion that the Local Area Commander, Superintendent Smith and Inner Metropolitan Region Commander - Assistant Commissioner Waites be advised.

13:53 In a phone conversation Inspector Emery informs Inspector Dunn that he has spoken to Assistant Commissioner Waites (and Superintendent Smith) and it is their view that it is not a critical incident. Inspector Emery, suggests that Mr Thomas Hickey may die, resulting in advice from Inspector Dunn to call the 'on call' State Crime Command Officer. Detective Inspector Willingham was then advised of incident.

Sunday 15 February 2004

01:10 Thomas Hickey dies. The Nursing Unit Manager from Prince of Wales Hospital advised Maroubra Police at 1.40am and Redfern Police, at 2am. A Sitrep was sent to the Duty Operations Inspector. A Sitrep was faxed, along with other faxes to the residence of the Deputy Commissioners Operational Response Unit 'on call' officer, Superintendent Adney at 6.40am. Subsequently, Superintendent Adney called the acting Deputy Commissioner of Police (Operations), Assistant Commissioner Parsons and they conferred over this and other matters.

08:30 Mrs Gail Hickey attends Redfern Police Station and with Inspector Emery views the pushbike and suggests Police may have been involved in her son's death. Inspector Emery invites her to produce witnesses. When Mrs Hickey left the station, Inspector Emery felt she was not happy, but was not blaming the Police for her son's death.

18:00 The Commissioner of Police learnt about Thomas Hickey's death. For this type of incident, protocols existing at the time did not compel urgent executive notifications.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS – UNFOLDING RIOT

Sunday 15 February 2004

17:33 Inspector Emery rings VKG from Redfern Railway Station, attempting to speak to Inspector Chambers (DOI) to provide a Sitrep regarding incidents occurring since the death of Thomas Hickey. Inspector Emery advises Inspector Chambers he has been trying unsuccessfully to call Superintendent Smith. Inspector Emery had been in contact with Superintendent Smith earlier in the day.

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17:55 Inspector Emery contacts Superintendent Smith and advises him of the Redfern situation.

18:00 Superintendent Smith telephones Assistant Commissioner Waites, and advises him of the Redfern situation. Assistant Commissioner Waites was advised by Superintendent Smith that there were problems in Lawson St with Aboriginals under the influence of alcohol and 'trying to goad Police'. Superintendent Smith stated it was under control, with no further assistance required, 'just advising' Assistant Commissioner Waites.

18:15 Inspector Emery and Redfern Duty Officer - Inspector Garth Smith were gathering personnel together to re-open the railway station after having spoken to Superintendent Smith. At this time, Inspector Emery and Smith confer and discuss tactical options for the civil unrest.

18:18 Inspector Emery makes inquiries with Inspector Chambers regarding availability of Vikings or OSG. Inspector Chambers indicates there were none on duty to his knowledge.

19:26 Inspector Smith informed Inspector Chambers that Redfern police were briefed and 'will stay away from the block'. Both morning and afternoon shifts were available and they were policing the Redfern area but keeping out of the 'block'. Inspector Emery indicates he has received information that those congregating in the 'block' want confrontation.

20:51 Inspector Emery advises Inspector Chambers that Superintendent Smith wants to keep a low-key presence.

21:04 A large crowd emerged from Eveleigh Street and charged at police. 'Signal 1 called'. Police tactically withdraw into Redfern Rail Station.

21:28 Inspector Emery contacts Inspector Chambers and indicates 'a couple of hundred have just charged', causing police to retreat. Inspector Emery thinks they are gearing up to go again. Insp Emery says he has no emergency or OSG response available. Inspector Chambers provides a phone number for the Region Operations Manager, Inspector Snel.

21:30 Inspector Emery rings Inspector Snel for OSG equipment and OSG Staff. The verbal message Inspector Snel recalls was for 20 sets of equipment only. Inspector Snel then contacts Assistant Commissioner Waites and advises him that Inspector Emery was after equipment but not OSG staff. Assistant Commissioner Waites enquires as to whether Superintendent Smith was on the scene and if not, to be asked to consider attending Redfern.

21:42 At 9.42pm Inspector Snel calls Inspector Chambers and indicates that Inspector Emery called her for OSG equipment. She asks Inspector Chambers for a Situation Report, which he does, inclusive of the Redfern Rail Station being shut down. Inspector Snel says that Assistant Commissioner Waites was not aware the Railway Station had been closed. Inspector Chambers says the Redfern Rail Station had only just 'then' been completely closed. Inspector Snel asks how many people are at the railway station, Inspector Chambers indicates that he doesn't know, as minimal information is being broadcast over VKG.

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21:50 About 9.50pm Inspector Snel contacts Superintendent Smith. He is at home but getting ready to go to the site.

22:14 Redfern's Crime Manager, Detective Inspector Darren Bennett, who is at the riot scene, calls Inspector Chambers re the situation at the 'block', and inquires about Polair support. Inspector Chambers advises that the helicopter is not available. Inspector Chambers then speaks to Inspector Smith and tells him he has to call Superintendent Adney to update her on the situation regarding the injured police and riot. Inspector Smith says he is just containing it (the riot) now. Inspector Chambers asks how many rioters there are and Inspector Smith says numbers vary.

22:19 Inspector Chambers phones Superintendent Adney. Inspector Chambers provides a situation report to Superintendent Adney, indicating 'things flared up thirty to forty five minutes ago, stating police are kitted up and escorting Fire Brigade personnel into the area - but are in no danger'. Superintendent Adney asks for a definition of what "kitted up" means, with Inspector Chambers indicating that he assumes police are using riot gear they've had [at Redfern] for some time. Inspector Chambers indicates that he thinks Redfern Inspectors have contacted Inspector Snel and arranged for OSG. Inspector Chambers tells Superintendent Adney everything is OK at the railway station, with fifty rioters still around causing trouble. Inspector Chambers informs Superintendent Adney that Police Media are at the scene.

22:22 Superintendent Smith arrived at Redfern. His intent was containment and negotiation pending further resources arriving.

22:30 Superintendent Adney 'Short Message Services' (SMSs) Acting Deputy Commissioner Parsons and Deputy Commissioner Madden apprising them of the situation. It is understood Acting Deputy Commissioner Parsons then conferred with Superintendent Adney at 10.34pm. Acting Deputy Commissioner Parsons then undertook to advise Commissioner Moroney.

22:37 Superintendent Adney rings Inspector Chambers. Superintendent Adney says she has called Acting Deputy Commissioner Parsons and he wants to know if Assistant Commissioner Waites and Superintendent Smith have been informed. Superintendent Adney asks if Superintendent Smith is at the scene?

22:50 Acting Deputy Commissioner Parsons and Superintendent Adney confer.

23:30 Assistant Commissioner Waites receives a phone call from Superintendent Smith who advises him that the people were still 'playing up', but that it is 'in hand'.

23:45 Acting Deputy Commissioner Parsons rang Assistant Commissioner Waites inquiring as to the situation. Assistant Commissioner Waites answered the inquiry providing information he had received from Superintendent Smith. Acting Deputy Commissioner Parsons inquired if Assistant Commissioner Waites should go to Redfern. Assistant Commissioner Waites advised that he had considered it, however, Superintendent Smith had been insistent that the situation was under control.

23:50 Acting Deputy Commissioner Parsons contacted Commissioner Moroney to advise him of the Redfern situation. The information received by Mr Waites was not of a nature that properly described the gravity of the situation. This was presumably based on a belief that 20 OSG were en route and the situation was under control, so there was no cause for an alarm which would trigger a notification upward to Mr Parsons.

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Sunday 16 February 2004

01:15 Superintendent Smith rings Assistant Commissioner Waites requesting more Police, though still indicating that he sees no need for Assistant Commissioner Waites to attend the scene. At this point, Assistant Commissioner Waites decides to attend.

01:37 Assistant Commissioner Waites rings Insp Chambers and advises he is attending the scene with an expected time of arrival at Redfern in 10 minutes. He requests an 'all channels' call for 30-50 extra Police. Inspector Chambers advises Assistant Commissioner Waites that rioters are coming up behind Police.

01:47 Assistant Commissioner Waites arrives at scene and advises Inspector Chambers that molotov cocktails are being thrown and wants a circuit breaker by way of State Protection Group (SPG).

01:50 Assistant Commissioner Waites confers with Chief Inspector Jennings of the Tactical Operations Unit (TOU) of the SPG re tactical options. None suitable from SPG. Contact then with Inspector Snel for Inner Metropolitan Region OSG Co-ordinator Senior Sergeant Mark Wade's phone number.

02:00 Assistant Commissioner Waites phoned Senior Sergeant Wade for chemical options. No suitable chemically based tactical options were available.

02:00 Inspector Chambers, on own initiative, contacts 'on call' air wing officer, on the basis that all Police were in position. Air Wing's first contact with DOI in this event.

02:05 Assistant Commissioner Waites contacted by Inspector Chambers and advised that Polair has been called out and did he want Video Unit to attend the riot site? Assistant Commissioner Waites indicates he does want Video Unit called out.

02:17 Inspector Chambers calls Superintendent Adney who advises that the matter is still escalating, with Inspector Chambers having called cars from all Metropolitan areas to attend scene. Inspector Chambers further advises that SPG resisting attending as not their job but providing advice. Adney advises that SPG should send negotiators at minimum.

02:20 Superintendent Smith takes possession of the fire hoses and turns them on the rioters.

02:22 Deputy Commissioner Support Scipione calls Inspector Chambers having been advised by the Commissioner of New South Wales Fire Brigade (NSWFB) re New South Wales Police (NSWP) have taken over their fire hoses as a tactical option. Sitrep by Inspector Chambers re fire at railway station and inquiries by Deputy Commissioner Scipione re numbers of staff, dogs, SPG role, arrests and if Assistant Commissioner Waites is present.

02:30 Senior Constable Jeffree of Police Video Unit arrives at riot.

02:30 Sergeant O'Riordan arrives with extra riot equipment.

02:37 Assistant Commissioner Waites contacts Inspector Chambers who says that plenty of Police on site but not enough protective equipment. Assistant Commissioner Waites tells Inspector Chambers there is an OSG trailer coming from Hornsby and to contact Fairfield Duty Officer for their OSG trailer.

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02:46 Inspector Chambers calls Superintendent Smith re State Rail inquiry re trains and advises they are 'running'.

02:58 Inspector Chambers calls Assistant Commissioner Waites to advise that the Fairfield trailer is on the way and the Polair crew should have contacted someone at the riot site, possibly Superintendent Smith. Assistant Commissioner Waites finds Polair is overhead and calls them down to put their 'night sun' into Eveleigh St. Assistant Commissioner Waites advised re Transport Ministry inquiry and says that the trains will run unless there are bricks thrown at the trains.

03:30 Assistant Commissioner Waites memo: 'Rioters start to disperse into the darkness of the 'block'. Police advance and the rioters have completely drifted away'.

05:00 Commissioner calls DOI and receives Sitrep of events. Informed status of incident now quiet and Assistant Commissioner Waites present at scene.

06:46 Supt Adney calls new DOI Fitzgerald for Sitrep.

The Ministry and the Minister were not informed of the Redfern Riot until the morning of 16th February. The notification of the Ministry and the Minister is the responsibility of the Commissioner's Office.

The matter had been described properly enough by Inspector Chambers to Superintendent Adney for her to be concerned enough to contact Acting Deputy Commissioner Parsons. Acting Deputy Commissioner Parsons inquired if Assistant Commissioner Waites was attending. Assistant Commissioner Waites informed Acting Deputy Commissioner Parsons that he had considered attending however Superintendent Smith had been insistent that the matter was under control.

Superintendent Smith's assessment of the scenario that matters were under control were then relayed to Assistant Commissioner Waites. This is likely to have precluded further upward transmission of the information to the Acting Deputy Commissioner Parsons. However, it should be noted that Superintendent Smith believed there were 20 OSG en route to the scene.

The estimation of the event by Inspector Emery in concurrence with Inspector Smith as the event unfolded appears to be a correct assessment.

The Duty Operations Inspector, in general, relies on the relevant Duty Officer to contact the Local Area Commander who would contact the Region Commander on a needs basis.

The inquiry by Detective Inspector Bennett of Inspector Chambers as to the availability of the Polair was properly answered by Mr Chambers that Polair was not available. However there would have been value added by Inspector Chambers advising Inspector Bennett of a 'call out' protocol that existed for Polair. About 2am, Polair was called out by Inspector Chambers. In circumstances where key resources such as Polair are not available the Duty Operations Inspector should offer advice on options to obtain these resources.

Whilst the call out of Polair by Inspector Chambers was a good decision, consultation about the decision with Commanders at the scene may have enabled them to exercise further options.

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At 6.40am Sunday 15 February 2004, VKG faxed a Sitrep note relative to the death of Thomas Hickey to Superintendent Adney. The same morning, Superintendent Adney discussed it, amongst other matters, with Acting Deputy Commissioner Parsons. The death of Thomas Hickey as described in the Sitrep did not trigger a need by Acting Deputy Commissioner Parsons to advise Commissioner Moroney.

Strike Force Coburn understands that in any usual circumstance the death of a person in hospital after impalement would not have caused any notification to be sent to the Commissioner via the Deputy Commissioner (Operations).

The Commissioners Office has reviewed and updated the categories in which information is now received. The Commissioner's Staff Officer is now contacted by the Duty Operations Inspector in circumstances of 'Other arrests or incidents that would attract significant media interest...' The death of Thomas Hickey would now be included within this category as are riots and civil unrests.

Following the Redfern incident changes have also been made to the Sitrep protocols including:

- *Sitreps are still the responsibility of the Local Area Command* (normally the Duty Officer). A state-wide memo under the hand of the Commissioner will be distributed in the near future followed by a Police Weekly article relating to Sitreps and notifications. The article will be developed by Inspector O'Reilly of the Operations Response Unit.

- *Reporting through the command structure will be reinforced.* The Duty Operations Inspector will be a 'through' point of information from the field to the Executive. This has no effect on notifications to the Regional Commander from within their own Commands. There are two relevant protocols for notification, these being the Commissioner and the Operational Response Unit protocols. There is a further protocol for the Commissioners Office to contact the Minister.

ROLE OF THE DOI, AND ANY SUBSEQUENT BREAKDOWN IN NOTIFICATIONS

As discussed previously, Strike Force Coburn believes there was a breakdown in the role of the Duty Operations Inspector (VKG) in communication to the executive in the first instance via the On Call Executive Staff Officer, due to the inadequacy of the S.U.N notification protocol.

Subsequent notifications, once the severity of the incident was appreciated, were considered adequate. The delay in the initial notification to Superintendent Adney by the Duty Operations Inspector was a break down in notification protocols of S.U.N procedures. Changes to these protocols following 15- 16 February 2004 will improve the timeliness of future notifications.

However the role and functions of the Duty Operations Inspector are perhaps not fully appreciated in the field and require further marketing. Superintendent Corboy has advised that marketing of the role of the Duty Operations Inspector will be an ongoing activity by V.K.G.

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Acting Deputy Commissioner Parsons had to ring Assistant Commissioner Waites on the night of the riot. Deputy Commissioner Parsons advises that this downward inquiry from the Deputy Commissioner to the Regional Commander was a concern that he and Commissioner Moroney had discussed on the night.

Documents submitted to Strike Force Coburn identified the following observations:

- The information given by Inspector Emery to Superintendent Smith and Inspector Chambers was accurate.

- The information passed onto Superintendent Adney by Inspector Chambers was accurate but not initially timely as the call occurred at 10.19pm.

- The information passed by Superintendent Adney to Acting Deputy Commissioner Parsons was accurate but not timely due to the delay in initially getting the notification from Inspector Chambers.

- Contact at 9.40pm between Inspector Snel and Superintendent Smith was timely and Inspector Snel advises in this conversation she indicated to Superintendent Smith that he should contact her if OSG are required.

At 10.15pm Detective Inspector Bennett contacted Inspector Chambers to determine the availability of Polair. Inspector Chambers advised Detective Inspector Bennett that Polair was unavailable. Inspector Chambers did not advise Detective Inspector Bennett of an availability of call out procedures for Polair. The absence of aerial surveillance or lighting seriously inhibited Superintendent Smith's appreciation of the seriousness of the event. It should be noted Police were unaware of the size of the riot crowd and their collection of missiles, which were assembled in Eveleigh Street. Once Polair was activated and arrived overhead, the seriousness of the event was fully appreciated. By this time, however, the riot was in its final stages.

In a report from VKG, it was indicated that the DOI has no role in the line management or decision-making process relating to field operations. The report indicated that VKG goes to great efforts to inform personnel of this fact, so that the DOI does not interfere in operational decision making. However, on this occasion, the decision by Inspector Chambers to call out Polair was appropriate.

Coburn has received from Chief Superintendent Jeffries of the Special Services Group a 'business case' submission from Mr Sydney Griffiths, Director of their Advanced Technology Centre, to upgrade the Polair airborne video transmission and reception system. Mr Griffiths has described the 'outcomes' to be inter alia - include a reliable and much more useful system for Police in this state to provide essential and otherwise unavailable material in the management of crowd control, especially where potentially hostile demonstrators are anticipated.

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ADEQUACY OF POLICE RADIO COMMUNICATIONS AT THE TIME OF THE CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE

Radio communications on 12 February 2004: The "Glock" Event: involving an allegation of a 'VKG radio blackspot' at the 'block'.

On Thursday 12 February 2004, there was an event at the 'block' involving two officers following a wanted person into the area. These two officers did not, as per Redfern SOPS, call VKG prior entering the 'block'. The two officers were involved in a violent incident with 12 to 14 persons attacking them. During this incident, attempts were made by the offenders to remove both officer's firearms. One of the officers lost possession of his glock for a short period of time, with the firearm pointed at his stomach by an offender prior to being regained. During this incident one of the Officers indicated he called a 'signal one'. This message was not picked up by VKG and as result a question of the effectiveness of the coverage of Police radio occurred, with the inference that VKG has a radio 'blackspot' in the 'block'.

The term a radio 'blackspot' indicates an area without police radio coverage. This was initially suspected as the cause of this 'signal one' not being picked up by VKG. After this issue was raised, a number of electronic tests were conducted by VKG in the following days, with no 'blackspots' located within the Redfern area including Eveleigh St. An additional check of all portable radios on hand at Redfern found none that were operationally defective. A review of the voice tape from the 12 February 2004, provided evidence that the Police were under incredible stress at the time of the incident, causing for very poor quality voice transmissions. The 'signal one' transmission was not picked up by the VKG Operator. However, a replaying of the tape recording of the transmission confirms the 'signal one' transmission is audible.

RADIO TRAFFIC VOLUME ISSUES ON THE 15-16 FEBRUARY 2004

There was a desire by Superintendent Smith to keep the Redfern incident 'low key'. In order to do this he sought agreement with Inspector Chambers to keep VKG transmissions relative to the Redfern incident to a minimum. The result was a minimum amount of information being conveyed by Police radio deliberately and conversations between Inspector Chambers and senior officers at the scene being conducted by mobile phone. This in turn did not overload VKG to a point of congestion.

COMMUNICATIONS ISSUES WITH EQUIPMENT ON THE FRONT LINE DURING RIOT

Police on the front line experienced difficulties hearing orders due to the helmets issued at the scene. The portable radios issued to the front line police were removed by the OSG Supervisor at the scene. This needs to be subject to assessment by OSTTU as to the appropriateness of this tactic as it caused concern amongst Police losing their communication devices.

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Information from Assistant Commissioner Waites was that the sound of the rioters combined with the fire truck pumps running was so loud and intense that he had to tap Superintendent Smith on the shoulder to get his attention and then put his mouth to his ear in order to verbally communicate. This shows the difficulty of oral communications at the scene.

Current options during these type of incidents include megaphones, yelling, written messages or hand signals. Specific hand signals are taught in OSG training, however, not in general duties training.

ON SITE RECORDS

A major factor of any serious or major event is a recording of occurrence times and command decision making for further evidentiary matters or management review purposes. There have been no contemporaneous command logs presented to Strike Force Coburn relative to the riot site. Much of Strike Force Coburn's information has been collated via CIDS, various VKG records, submitted documents and logs developed at a later time. This has caused Strike Force Coburn to occasionally identify time corrections on submissions but that did not affect content.

Strike Force Coburn notes the existence of the Duty Officers Manual. This portfolio holds documents which include various scenarios including 'Public Order'. It as 'Incident Entry / Exit log', a 'Running Sheet / Operation Log', a prompt sheet relating to resource availability and a 'Major Incident / Emergency General Action check sheet'.

It would have been advantageous to Strike Force Coburn had the various operational field record documents located within the Duty Officers Manual been contemporaneously used during the event at the riot site. If would have been a further advantage if these documents were used by support elements to assist in consistency in decision making and recording the same.

ROLE & ADEQUACY OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS BRANCH (MEDIA UNIT)

The Media Unit provides a 24-hour media advisory service to all police, ranging from over-the-phone advice to attending major crime scenes and managing critical issues. Products include Daily Briefings and Media Releases. The role of the Media Unit on 14, 15 and 16 February 2004 is summarised in date order below.

Media Unit – 14 February 2004

11:20 Thomas Hickey became impaled on the fence at Redfern.

11:28 VKG's Duty Operations Inspector Dunn informed the Police Media Unit (PMU) of the incident.

12:11 On-duty media officer Joanne Elliott posted a holding statement in regard to the Thomas Hickey collision. Very little media interest relating to the event during that afternoon reported by PMU.

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20:30 Ms Elliott receives a call from an ABC Radio representative stating he has been contacted by someone from the aboriginal community indicating Thomas Hickey was being chased by Police when the incident occurred.

23:00 Handover to night shift by Ms Elliott indicating that the oncoming media officer should maintain awareness of the Thomas Hickey matter and expect contact from external media outlets.

Media Unit – 15 February 2004

01:10 Thomas Hickey dies at 1.10am at the Prince of Wales Hospital. Maroubra Police were advised of the death by the Nurse Unit Manager at 1.40am and Redfern Police are advised by the Nursing Unit Manager at 2am. At 3.02am, Sgt Hancock of Redfern contacts PMU to advise of Thomas Hickey's death. At 9.10am Sergeant Rose of PMU speaks as usual to radio station 2GBs' Mr Luke Bonner regarding overnight matters prior to 'live to air' interview. During 'live to air' interview, Sergeant Rose was 'ambushed' when Mr Bonner puts forward the proposition that Police had been chasing Thomas Hickey prior to his impalement.

Throughout the morning, Sydney radio stations are building interest with the PMU over Thomas Hickey's death.

12:10 A 'holding statement' was made by the Media Unit for news services and at 1pm Ms Elliott arrives and commences duty.

15:00 Inspector Emery holds a press conference relating to the death of Thomas Hickey.

In a memo from Mr Ross Neilson, Manager of the PMU, advises that commercial media were in the Redfern area from early on Sunday morning with some anticipating a possible 'story'. Those anticipating a story managed to accommodate themselves in excellent vantage points from which they filmed though-out the day and night.

Mr Neilsen states the Public Affairs Branch had a breakdown in communication within the unit relating to sending notifications of the escalating size of the problem up the management line. Mr Neilson received a report late on Sunday evening indicating that the trouble had subsided. He assumed he would be told of any change in status and understood that Ministers Office would be similarly kept informed. In this event these communications did not occur.

The PMU maintain a media officer on nightshift, but when the riotous behaviour escalated, Mr Neilson was not informed. This was likely to have been due to combination of inexperienced staff, intense pressure from media inquiries at the PMU that night and hesitation to ring senior staff so late.

Mr Neilson learnt of the full scale of the incident when he was rung by Deputy Commissioner Scipione between 2.30am and 3.30am on 16 February 2004. Deputy Commissioner Scipione had just heard from the Commissioner of the NSW Fire Brigade (NSWFB) regarding Police use of the fire hoses to manage the violent crowd. Mr Neilson contacted the PMU and the media liaison officer at the scene. Mr Neilson then attended Redfern, arriving after the incident had been resolved. Mr Neilson then spoke with Assistant Commissioner Waites regarding the 'news conference' which was shortly to commence. Mr Neilson then attended his office.

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05:30 Mr Neilson was contacted by the Minister's Office, whom were displeased at not having been informed of this event causing Mr Neilson to apologise. Mr Neilson then attempts to contact the Commissioners media adviser unsuccessfully as the advisor was in Tamworth for an expected visit by Commissioner Moroney on Monday 16 February 2004.

The matter of upward notification was dealt with in the debrief with senior PMU supervisors so as to ensure that future notifications of major media issues are progressed appropriately. Due to a number of enhancements in call-out procedures, Mr Neilson will be notified personally much earlier and for such advice to be given to the Commissioner's and the Minister's media officers.

OPERATIONS SUPPORT GROUP CALL OUT

21:04 There was a group of rioters exiting from Eveleigh St into Lawson St east over the rail bridge. These rioters were throwing bricks and bottles, causing approximately 10 Police to tactically withdraw into Redfern Railway Station. Police cars parked nearby were damaged and a baton stolen from the interior of an unsecured vehicle. A rioter then set the Redfern Railway Station on fire.

21:28 Inspector Emery informs Inspector Chambers that a couple of hundred people have just charged and caused police to retreat and he thinks they are gearing up to go again. Inspector Emery responds by stating there is no emergency or OSG response at Redfern. Inspector Chambers then provides the phone number for Inspector Snel.

21:29 Inspector Emery rings Inspector Snel to request 20 Operations Support Group (OSG) personnel and 20 sets of riot equipment for them. Inspector Snel indicates that she was of the understanding she was requested to organise for the delivery of 20 OSG riot outfits from the Sydney Police Centre to the Redfern site, with no request for personnel.

21:45 Inspector Snel called Senior Sergeant Wade, the Inner Metropolitan Region OSG Co-Ordinator who was off duty.

21:50 Senior Sergeant Wade then called out two OSG supervisors, who attended the Sydney Police Centre and after difficulties accessing the equipment resulting in Rescue Squad personnel being sent to the SPC to assist, picked up the OSG truck and conveyed it to Redfern, arriving about 10.50pm.

There was a belief at the scene that OSG had been called out at 9.29pm, the reality was the call out did not commence until almost 4hrs later at 1.15am. Strike Force Coburn understands Police at the scene were expecting 20 OSG personnel and equipment to arrive at the scene. This belief is reinforced by the following:

22:15 There was a telephone conversation between Inspector Chambers and Inspector Garth Smith, who says he has OSG on the way.

22:20 Superintendent Adney asks Inspector Chambers if Redfern need more OSG, and he says no because Inspector Emery is calling around and so is Inspector Snel.

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23:00 Superintendent Smith calls Inspector Chambers. Superintendent Smith says 'they are gearing up for another strike at us now' and that the he was expecting 20 OSG to arrive after being called out.

01:10 There was a realisation that there was no callout of OSG in progress. That caused further contact to be made with Sergeant Wade by Inspector Garth Smith. Senior Sergeant Wade then rang Inspector Snel for authorisation for call out of 20 OSG. Authorisation was given and 15 OSG staff arrived at the scene within the next 90 minutes.

ACTIVATION OF THE POLICE OPERATIONS CENTRE

The Police Operations Centre (POC) is a facility which operates within the Sydney Police Centre from which an appointed Police Commander commands & co-ordinates the Police response during certain operations.

The POC has a defined 'Level of Activation' with three specific levels of operation:

Monitoring Role (Part Day - 24 hour)
Fully Operational
Terrorist incident

The POC is opened at a level 1 to monitor an incident locally or overseas with the ability to proceed to the next level within 30 minutes.

Triggers that are likely to cause the POC to be opened include intelligence or an actual event to suggest that NSW Police may require a significant and co-ordinated response.

Tasks of the Police Operations Centre include:

- The management of operations including maintenance of records
- Development of contingency plans
- Maintain a log of significant events
- Gather, analyse and disseminate intelligence
- Provide Situation reports.

Authority for activation of the POC can come from the following officers:

- Commander, Inner Metropolitan Region
- Deputy Commissioner Operations
- Commissioner.

At 1.15am during the riot, Superintendent Smith and Assistant Commissioner Waites spoke on the phone. During this conversation Superintendent Smith indicated that the option of opening the POC was discussed, but it was decided that it was not required.

If the POC had been activated at Level 1, that is 'monitoring', at an earlier point in time, this may have assisted in better coordinating resources, however, such an activation was not considered until later in the incident, which precluded its effective use.

The P.O.C. has an electronic log which is used by operators within its confines. 'Highly protected' information is not recorded in that log.

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In response to incidents outside the Inner Metropolitan Region there are options available to activate and utilise the Police Operations Centre. Region Commanders are able to either deploy their own personnel into the P.O.C. during an incident / operation, or alternatively the trained Inner Metropolitan Region personnel can be utilised, providing all the functions undertaken by the POC in support of the incident / operation on behalf of the other Region.

FINDINGS - COMMUNICATIONS

1. Information supplied to Assistant Commissioner Waites was based on the belief the situation was under control. This assessment did not facilitate the upward movement of the information, causing unsatisfactory timeliness of notifications to the Executive.

2. In relation to the 'Glock incident' on February 12, Strike Force Coburn found that there were no radio 'black spots' in Redfern and the poor transmission related to misunderstanding of the content of the transmission by the VKG Operator.

3. There is a lack of understanding by operational Police of the roles and capabilities of the DOI.

4. The lack of activation of Polair earlier precluded a greatly enhanced NSW Police response to the incident. The decision by Inspector Chambers to call-out the Polair was a correct decision, though consultation with relevant field commanders should have occurred prior to the call-out

5. The absence of a command post log from the event to refer to has caused Strike Force Coburn to experience difficulties in collecting accurate information relating to the incident and appropriate accountability for the operation. There was a further significant impact on other investigations and enquiries as well the provision of an audit trail for important decisions.

6. There is no operational checklist relevant to riots and other serious incidents developed for Crime Managers or Local Area Commanders. The Duty Officer's Manual allows for statewide standards and consistency in having record of field communications, checklists and prompt for riots and serious incidents.

7. The lack of a dedicated radio channel precluded the 'low key' response desired by Superintendent Smith.

8. There was a failure to satisfactorily escalate information to senior management of the Police Media Unit. There was growing media interest on Sunday the 15 February 2004 and senior media unit officers were not appraised in a timely fashion. This additionally caused for the Police Ministry's media officers to also not be appraised.

9. There was confusion in the conversation that occurred between Inspector Snel and Inspector Emery at 9.30pm. The outcome of this miscommunication was that there was recurrent belief for almost four hours that 20 OSG personnel were being called out. This precluded appropriate OSG response times.

10. There could have been operational advantages if the P.O.C. had been opened during the incident. Strike Force Coburn concluded that the existing activation protocols for the POC are adequate, however, all Commanders need to be aware of the existence and the importance of the P.O.C. and its associated protocols.

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RECOMMENDATIONS - COMMUNICATIONS

1. Commander training to include reference to ensuring clarity in communications during management of high-risk operations.

2. Consideration be given to using the 'Glock incident' tape recording by Education Services for training purposes to emphasize the important of clarity of communications under stress. As there are no 'black spots', no further action re that issue.

3. VKG should market the role of Duty Operations Inspector (DOIs) more effectively to Duty Officers and Commanders, to ensure a fuller understanding of the role of the Duty Operations Inspector and the associated responsibilities of the position. Similarly LACs should provide adequate information and training to personnel relating to the operations of DOIs at VKG.

4. Duty Operations Inspectors should be further educated as to their roles by VKG, with encouragement to consult regularly with operational Commanders at scenes of high risk incidents, to co-ordinate available resources.

5. The requirement to use command logs to record times, decisions and resources should be reinforced in future Commander training activities.

6. That the issue of the Duty Officers Manual be revisited for use by all Crime Managers and Commanders, to record, in consistent formats, the key communications and decision making during high-risk incidents such as riots.

7. The availability of additional radio channels should be made aware to Commanders by VKG during high-risk incidents when frequent communication is predicted, or a request for 'low-key' communications is preferred.

8. The Media Unit has improved its protocol for internal notifications re major incidents. No further action required.

9. Education Services to consider training implications relating to communications. On-going assessment and decision making training should be provided by Education Services in commanding civil unrest situations for Commanders, Duty Officers and Supervisors.

10. The availability and benefits of using the POC should be re-enforced to operational Commanders by communication from the Executive.

AWARENESS AND PREPARATION

The intentions of this section are to provide information relating to the Policing environment within the Redfern LAC prior to 15 February 2004. The section will highlight crime trends and Policing responses across the LAC in an endeavour to identify any obvious signs of civil unrest.

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INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS AND INFORMANT NETWORK

- Statistics from the Redfern Operations and Crime Review (OCR) dated 25 February 2004, reveal most categories of crime are **steady** remaining near the control chart average and **trending down**. This would indicate the Command's crime reduction strategies are effective.

- Whilst this Command is rated number one in the state for robberies, overall Redfern is rated 27th in the combined crime categories of Assault, Break Enter and Steal, Robbery, Stealing and Stolen Vehicle/Vessel.

- Pro-activity, being drug detection, use of move on legislation and the use of person search legislation are relatively high along with the submission of information reports. This pro-activity is not considered to be obtrusive to the community, however, there were 74 reports of police being hurt on duty between 15 February 2003, and 15 February 2004. The majority of these injuries were occasioned during arresting of offenders, domestic violence or civil unrest incidents.

- In January 2004, there were 53 drug detections, which is well above the Control Chart average of 29. The majority of these drug detections were for possession of cannabis, **with seven legal actions for supply heroin, one legal action for use heroin and five for possession of heroin.**

- The 'Drug House' legislation has had minimal use within the Redfern LAC during the last two years. Following adverse court findings based upon legal technicalities involving possession and knowledge.

- In her evidence at the Redfern Parliamentary inquiry on 8 June, 2004, Karen Becker – Director of Drug Health Services, Central City Health Services, Roselle – stated 15 to 30 thousand needles were dispensed from the Redfern Van monthly. Becker agreed, when questioned, that 43 daily users would use 500 to 1,000 needles per day.

- The intelligence systems at Redfern did not activate any warnings that a riot may be imminent on the 15/16 February 2004.

- The informant network at Redfern did not alert Redfern LAC of any pending civil disorder.

- The Aboriginal Community Liaison Officers, one of which was sent to the 'block' three times on Saturday 14 February 2004, did not report any behaviour that may have indicated that a riot was imminent.


- The Redfern Local Area Commander, Superintendent Smith, enjoys the support of Aboriginal Elders and Leaders within Redfern and has been the driving force behind police programs assisting aboriginal children.

DRUG DETECTION

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REDFERN LAC

January 2003 – February 2004



Current Period	Current CC Avg	Previous Period	Previous CC Avg	CC Avg Change	Status	BP Target	Target Change
2004-04	29	2003-01	26	3	Up	50	-21

- Redfern Local Area Command is rated as the 20th best LAC in the state for drug detections, with possession of prohibited drug in the top ten charges.

- The control chart average of 29 drug detections per month has been constant for over a year. In January 2004, 53 detections were made, and the LAC reports conducting 6 operations targeting middle level suppliers.

- 394 drug detections were made between January 2003 and February 2004 with 316 legal actions initiated.

- The legal action rate is 80.20%.

- 213 individuals received legal actions of which 47 were Aboriginal/Torres Straight Islanders (ATSI). Juveniles accounted for 9 of the 47.

- Drug arrests appear to be dependant on operations, but are increasing.

- 116 individuals received legal actions from September 2003 to February 2004 of which 25 were ATSI. Juveniles accounted for 3 of the 25.


  There has been a gradual increase in needle distribution since early 2003 (Ramsay, Parliamentary inquiry)+

ROBBERY

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REDFERN LAC

January 2003 – February 2004



Current Period	Current CC Avg	Previous Period	Previous CC Avg	CC Avg Change	Status	BP Target	Target Change
2004-04	44	2003-06	51	-7	Down	40	4


- Redfern LAC is rated number 1 in the state for Robbery. The offences are predominantly bag snatches and assault and robberies, which are on the lower scale of robbery offences.
- The control chart average of 44 has been constant since July 2003, with slight rises in actual robbery incidents in November 2003, January 2004 and February 2004.
- From January 2003 to February 2004, 695 incidents of robbery occurred with 63 legal actions preferred.
- The legal action is 9.10% down on the target of 13%.
- 47 persons received legal actions from January 2003 to February 2004 of which 31 were ATSI. Juveniles accounted for 16 of the 31.
- 20 individuals received legal actions from September 2003 to February 2004 of which 12 were ATSI. Juveniles accounted for 5 of the 12.

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ASSAULT

REDFERN LAC

January 2003 – February 2004



Current Period	Current CC Avg	Previous Period	Previous CC Avg	CC Avg Change	Status	BP Target	Target Change
2004-04	67	2003-07	56	11	Up 3B	50	17


- Assault at Redfern is rated 42 in the state with common assault prevalent.
- 67 assaults per month is the control chart average since August 2003.
- From 1-2003, to 2-2004, there were 906 incidents of assault, of which 224 were domestic related, with 79 assaults upon police. 200 legal actions were instituted.
- The legal action rate is 22.10% is down on the target of 25.00%.
- 177 individuals received legal actions of which 49 were ATSI. Juveniles accounted for 11 of the 49.
- 83 individuals received legal actions in the lead up months to the riot from September 2003, to February 2004, of which 22 were ATSI. Juveniles accounted for 7 of the 22.

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BREAK & ENTER

REDFERN LAC

January 2003 – February 2004



Current Period	Current CC Avg	Previous Period	Previous CC Avg	CC Avg Change	Status	BP Target	Target Change
2004-04	118	2003-08	135	-17	Down 2A	100	18


- Break and Enter offences at Redfern rated 29th in the state and occur mainly in the suburbs of Alexandria and Redfern.
- The control chart average of 118 has been steady since September 2003.
- From 1-2003 to 2-2004 there were 1685 incidents of which 53 legal actions were instituted.
- The legal action rate is 3.10% is down on the target of 10.00%.
- 71 individuals received legal actions of which 26 were ATSI. Juveniles accounted for 13 of the 71.
- 19 individuals received legal actions in the months of September 2003 to February 2004 of which 7 were ATSI. Juveniles accounted for 2 of the 7.
- Since August 2003, the control chart average for Break, Enter and Steal offences are down for the Redfern Local Area Command.

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STEALING

REDFERN LAC

January 2003 – February 2004



Current Period	Current CC Avg	Previous Period	Previous CC Avg	CC Avg Change	Status	BP Target	Target Change
2004-04	253	2003-08	353	-100	Down	280	-27

- Redfern LAC is rated 18th in the state for stealing. The most common offence is 'steal from motor vehicle/vessel' from the suburb of Redfern.

- The control chart average of 253 was set in September 2003 and prior to that was 353. In the months leading up to the riot, November and December 2003, along with February 2004, actual stealing offences were above the control chart average.

- From January 2003 to February 2004, there were 4092 incidents of stealing within the LAC with 174 legal actions being instituted.

- The legal action rate is 4.30% is down on the target of 7.00%.

- 171 individuals received legal actions between January 2003 and February 2004 of which 49 were ATSI. Juveniles accounted for 11 of the 49.


- 77 individuals received legal actions from September 2003 to February 2004 of which 23 were ATSI. Juveniles accounted for 3 of the 23.

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STOLEN VEHICLE/VESSEL

REDFERN LAC

January 2003 – February 2004



Current Period	Current CC Avg	Previous Period	Previous CC Avg	CC Avg Change	Status	BP Target	Target Change
2004-04	43	2003-04	53	-10	Down 4A	40	3


- Redfern LAC is rated 36th in the state with most thefts occurring in the suburbs of Alexandria and Redfern.
- The control chart average of 43 has been constant since April 2003. In November 2003, January 2004 and February 2004, the actual offences were above the control chart average.
- From January 2003 to February 2004, 615 vehicles were stolen from within the Redfern LAC with 38 charges being preferred.
- The legal action rate of 6.20% is down on the target of 10.00%.
- 27 individuals received legal actions between January 2003 and February 2004 of which 17 were ATSI. Juveniles accounted for 10 of the 17.
- 4 individuals received legal actions from September 2003 to February 2004 of which 3 were ATSI. Juveniles accounted for 2 of the 3.

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MALICIOUS DAMAGE

REDFERN LAC

January 2003 – February 2004



Current Period	Current CC Avg	Previous Period	Previous CC Avg	CC Avg Change	Status	BP Target	Target Change
2004-04	79	2002-08	90	-11	Down	70	9


- Redfern LAC is ranked 52nd in the state for Malicious Damage and the suburb of Redfern experiences most of these incidents.
- 79 incidents per month is the control chart average since September 2002.
- Between January 2003 and February 2004, 1104 incidents of Malicious Damage have occurred with 102 legal actions instituted.
- The legal action rate is 9.20%.
- 90 individuals received legal actions of which 29 were ATSI. Juveniles accounted for 10 of the 29.
- 50 individuals received legal actions from September 2003 to February 2004 of which 16 were ATSI. Juveniles accounted for 8 of the 16.

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MOVE ON

REDFERN LAC

January 2003 – February 2004



Current Period	Current CC Avg	Previous Period	Previous CC Avg	CC Avg Change	Status	BP Target	Target Change
2004-04	34	2003-10	27	7	Up 3B		


- Redfern is rated as the 21st LAC in the state for the proactive use of the move along legislation, which occurs mostly in the suburb of Redfern.
- The control chart average of 27 has increased to 34 from November 2003. In the month of December 2003 there were 72 move along directions issued which is a significant increase.
- From July 2003 to February 2004, the Move on legislation was used a total of 364 times with 3 legal actions taken.
- The legal action rate is 0.80%.
- 3 individuals received legal actions between July 2003 and February 2004 of which 1 was ATSI. Nil juveniles.
- 1 individual received legal actions from September 2003 to February 2004. That person was an ATSI. Nil juveniles.

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PERSON SEARCH

REDFERN LAC

January 2003 – February 2004



Current Period	Current CC Avg	Previous Period	Previous CC Avg	CC Avg Change	Status	BP Target	Target Change
2004-04	24	2003-06	0	24	Up		

- Redfern LAC was rated 25th in the state for proactive measure of person searches. These searches took place predominantly in the suburb of Redfern on Wednesdays and Thursdays.

- The control chart average of 24 has remained steady since July 2003. In the months of October, November and December 2003, actual person searches were higher than the average.

- From July 2003 to February 2004, there were 245 persons searched and 8 legal actions.

- 8 individuals received legal actions between July 2003, and February 2004. 2 were ATSI. Nil juveniles.

- 5 individuals received legal actions from September 2003 to February 2004. 2 were ATSI. Nil juveniles.

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THE INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM AT REDFERN LAC

Redfern LAC implemented SOPS for response to incidents at the 'block' originally dated March 1998, subsequently updated during March 2004. The LAC does not have Risk/Threat Assessment Planning whereby increases in civil disorder and community unrest can be immediately identified.

Superintendent Smith provided information relating to planning and intelligence gathering for the 'block'. He indicated difficulties experienced by the LAC Intelligence Office due to data capture methods in COPS restricting the ease of extraction of specific data for the 'block' area.

The Redfern Intelligence Office produced statistics of 'violence towards police' identified through COPS. During the period 8 October 2002 to 12 February 2004, 43 reported incidents of missiles thrown at police were identified with the majority reported during May 2003. From 15 February 2003 to 15 February 2004, 74 police have been hurt on duty in the Redfern LAC, the great majority of these injuries occurred during arrests and violent disorder incidents. 67 of these police joined the NSW Police after April 1988.

It appears intelligence is acted upon tactically after events have occurred, rather than using analysis of trends and patterns of incidents to pro-actively respond to community behaviour and activities. There is a need for a more strategic approach for intelligence collection at the LAC with the Field Intelligence Officer in the ideal position to do this. A perceived hindrance to this previously occurring may have been identified via information provided by Inspector Hooper of the Crime Management Faculty. Inspector Hooper provided information that Redfern LAC Intelligence Analyst and Field Intelligence Officer are often away from the Command, seconded to other duties.

On 20 May 2003, whilst police were trying to arrest Thomas Hickey, his mother, Mrs Gail Hickey, and others attempted to free him from police. They were amongst 9 persons involved in a civil disorder incident at this time. Thomas was charged with attempt steal from person, resist arrest and possess cannabis and Gail was charged with Assault Police, Hinder Police and throw missile.

During the period 1 January 2000 to 1 January 2004, there were 31 incidents of 'Riot and Affray' within Redfern LAC with most events occurring during May 2003. These incidents range from 'Pub Brawls' to 'Signal One' incidents at the 'block'.

During the period 1 January 2000 to 1 January 2004, there were 6 incidents of Protest/Demonstration/Violent Disorder within Redfern LAC with most events occurring in May 2003.

Operation Concertinas is one local operation targeting juvenile male offenders in the Redfern Railway Station area. The operation focuses on incidents of Robbery, Stealing and Assaults, with results indicating a decline in incidents since December 2002.

Redfern Local Area Command is currently conducting three controlled operations specifically relating to drug activity. There are seven other combined operations dealing with robbery and drug activity also being conducted.

During period 1 January 2004 to 15 February 2004 there were 18 reports of malicious damage to Police vehicles by missiles being thrown.

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THE INFORMANT NETWORK AT REDFERN LAC

Prior to 15 February 2004, Redfern LAC had 3 registered informants on Source providing material relating to drug activity. This was below the state average, which in February 2004, was 6. Senior Sergeant Tracey Chapman from the Operational Information Agency (OIA) has been working with Redfern LAC to improve this area and as of 6 April 2004, the total has increased to 5.

Information reports submitted by Redfern Police average 237 per month during the period January 2003 to mid February 2004.

SIGNALS OF IMPENDING PROBLEMS

The 'Glock' Incident

On Thursday 12 February 2004, there was an event at the 'block' involving two officers following a wanted person into the area. The two officers were attacked by 12 to 14 persons. During this incident, attempts were made by the POIs to remove both officer's firearms. One of the officers lost possession of his Glock for a short period of time, with the firearm pointed at his stomach prior to it being regained. The POI pointing the firearm at Police was arrested and charged.

It has been suggested this incident was sign of tension building in the 'block' area, but there is no evidence identified linking this incident to the riot.

Some Redfern Police spoken to have reported an attitude amongst police that the violence and abuse directed towards them is a tolerated part of policing in the area. Isolated incidents of rocks being thrown at Police and abuse directed towards officers does not seem to be anything out of the ordinary. It has been perceived that this could alleviate the sense of any warning of an impending riot.

Incidents between 12 and 14 February, 2004.

The only reported incident occurring during the period between the 'Glock ' Incident and the impalement of Thomas Hickey is a partial collapse of premises at 78 Eveleigh Street, Redfern on 12 February 2004. Superintendent Smith indicated that the demolition or collapsing of building structures in the 'block' is not uncommon. This incident necessitated the Fire Brigade to knock down a brick wall during the afternoon of 12 February 2004. Redfern's Commander, Crime Manager, Duty Officer, Supervisor and a car crew attended the scene of this incident.

Mr Michael Ramsay, Project Director of Redfern/Waterloo Partnership Project, outlined his knowledge of a large brick wall collapsing in the 'block' on 12 February 2004. Mr Ramsay stated the area was cleaned up by placing the bricks in wheelie bins. Mr. Ramsay was at Redfern during the riot and claimed the bricks used against Police were the bricks placed in the wheelie bins.

Death of Thomas Hickey

On Saturday morning 14 February 2004, a briefing was held at Redfern Police Station in relation to robbery offences in the vicinity of Redfern Railway Station. Mr Chris Carr was nominated during the briefing as a POI in relation to the offences.

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Later that morning, Redfern 16 observed an unknown male (Thomas Hickey) riding a bicycle at speed near Botany Road. Police did not pursue Thomas Hickey as he did not fit the description of Carr.

A short time later Redfern 17 saw Thomas Hickey impaled on a fence. Redfern 16 then arrived and assisted Redfern 17. Police commenced first aid. Thomas Hickey is then taken to the Prince of Wales Hospital by ambulance.

Approximately 7pm that evening a 30 to 40 year old male delivered an envelope to Redfern Police Station. The envelope contained Police crime scene tape and a note criticising police for not cleaning up the blood where Thomas Hickey had been impaled.

Approximately 1.10pm on Sunday 15 February 2004 Thomas Hickey died. About 45 minutes later a brick was thrown at Redfern 143 near the 'block'.

Later that afternoon, Redfern Duty Officer Inspector Emery, spoke with the Mrs Gail Hickey, the mother of Thomas Hickey, at Redfern Police Station. She was shown the bicycle Thomas Hickey was riding at the time of his impalement. Inspector Emery indicated that when Mrs Hickey left the police station, she was not happy, but did not blame police for the death of her son.

Inspector Emery stated that during the rest of the day patrolling police were subject to abuse and had received information the Media were in the area, 'trying to stir things up'.

Events between 4.00pm to 7.00pm on Sunday 15 February 2004

16:30 The Station Master at Redfern Railway Station, Mr Barry Hall, reports youths throwing rocks and bottles at the station and passengers. Mr Hall also reported adults drinking 'long necks' on the corner of Eveleigh Street watching youths throw rocks and bottles at cars and pedestrians in Lawson Street. Mr Hall closes the Lawson Street entrance/exit after being approached by an unknown adult aboriginal male and being told to 'get out of there' as something is going to happen tonight.

16:50 Mr Hall reports youths in Eveleigh Street breaking up bricks to make smaller projectiles. Police arrive at the Station a short time later and speaks to the Station Master.

17:30 Mr Hall notices a young aboriginal girl placing a poster on a front window of the Station. The poster is headed, 'Wanted Child Murderers' depicting photographs of Senior Police.

17:42 Duty Operations Inspector Chambers receives information from the Redfern Duty Officer, Inspector Emery, that although the crowd were intoxicated and well equipped they were not causing trouble at that time.

18:00 Mr Hall closes platform 1 as the level of rock throwing had intensified. He also saw a white car being pelted with rocks. When police leave the Railway Station, the incidence of rock throwing increases.

18:00 Inspectors Emery and Smith keep the Redfern day shift back.

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18:12 Inspector Emery informs Inspector Chambers of information received from a Redfern Aboriginal Community Liaison Officer (ACLO) regarding a 'busload of Aboriginal people coming from Walgett to kill the cop in relation to the death of Thomas Hickey'.

Inspector Emery believes this ACLO is unreliable, however, Inspector Emery asked Inspector Chambers if any police from Operation Vikings or OSG are on duty. Inspector Chambers informs him he does not think so, but there may be some OSG from Redfern LAC working.

18:40 Mr Hall rings Police from Redfern Railway Station requesting police to attend his location as soon as possible as things were escalating.

Events between 19:00 and 21:00 on Sunday 15 February 2004

19:00 A briefing was held at Redfern Police Station for the day and night shifts. The day shift was to be kept back for at least another hour. Inspector Emery also attempts to gain assistance from neighbouring commands.

19:22 Information provided via City Rail informed police the booking office at Redfern Railway Station had been closed as it was being 'pelted with bricks and bottles'.

19:26 Inspector Smith informs Inspector Chambers they will be patrolling Lawson Street and will be staying away from the 'block'. Inspector Smith believed the crowd of youths congregating there were waiting for a confrontation. Inspector Chambers stated he had been watching CCTV for a half an hour and the youths had not moved.

19:42 Whilst travelling in Lawson Street, a Redfern Police Vehicle had a brick thrown at it. Police vehicles from Surry Hills and City Central were requested to leave the area by VKG.

19:45 The windows of the Railway Station were smashed and bricks were landing on the roof. Inspector Emery closes off Lawson Street.

19:47 The Railway Station was closed down to trains stopping or picking up passengers.

20:26 All appeared to be quiet according to Inspector Smith.

20:45 Inspector Smith requests Railway Station Master to close platforms 1 to 7.

20:51 Inspector Emery informs Inspector Chambers of need for replacements of day shift staff. He indicates Superintendent Smith wants police to keep low key. Inspector Emery also states rocks and bricks being thrown, but not landing within 30 feet of police.

20:56 A conversation between Inspector Emery and Inspector Chambers outlines the disorder escalating. Approximately 200 persons have charged at police who had to retreat, and there was no emergency or OSG response available.

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Events between 21:00 and 22:15 on Sunday 15 February 2004

21:00 Mr Hall reports staff are expressing concern things are getting out of hand at the Railway Station. He advises them to close their work- stations and go home. Four staff leave and two remain.

21:02 Redfern 14 requested to attend the location Lawson and Gibbons Streets by Inspector Garth Smith with riot gear.

21:04 **A 'SIGNAL ONE'** was called by Redfern 45 at the intersection of Lawson and Gibbons Street.

21:06 Inspector Smith directs all cars to the Command Post at the corner of Gibbons and Lawson Streets.

21:15 Mr Hall is informed by the Rail Management Centre to evacuate the railway station.

21:28 Petrol bombs being thrown in the direction of police. Bottles and bricks being thrown at police, with attempts to set fire to the railway station. Fire Brigade is summoned. Inspector Emery states they were just charged by 'a couple of hundred' causing police to retreat. Emery reports to Inspector Chambers 'they are gearing up to do it again'. He further states there is no emergency or OSG response. Inspector Chambers looks for the on call officer and OPS Manager phone numbers for Inspector Emery.

21:29 Inspector Emery contacts relieving Operations Manager Inspector Snel requesting OSG equipment and personnel. This request is in adherence with the Redfern Standard Operating Procedures for the 'block' dated March 1998. Inspector Snel later reports being asked for equipment only.

21:31 Fire at Redfern Railway Station. Inspector Chambers has requested no trains to stop at the Station.

21:42 Inspector Snell briefed by Inspector Chambers via phone.

21:45 Ambulance requested to treat four or five injured police.

22:03 Sergeant James Shearer, OSG, had been contacted by Sergeant Wade – OSG Commander – to arrange for equipment to be taken to Redfern. Cannot contact the LAC Commander of Redfern, but is given the location of the Command Post.

22:05 The crowd advanced and Inspector Smith gave permission for the police line to advance. A number of police are hurt and removed.

22:15 Redfern Crime Manager, Detective Inspector Darren Bennett, contacts Inspector Chambers and asks if a helicopter is on duty. He is told no.

Commander's Operational Phase

Sunday 15 February 2004

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22:20 Superintendent Smith arrives at the Command Post. Superintendent Smith gives the reason for additional resources taking so long to arrive as there was a presumption at 9.00pm equipment and 20 OSG were coming. As the night progressed it was evident there was a need for more police.

22:50 The OSG van arrives with protective equipment, Inspector Chambers contacts Police Media Unit (PMU).

23:09 Superintendent Adney, Deputy Commissioners Office, contacts Inspector Chambers indicating she had just spoken to Superintendent Smith, who wants '20 more staff, anyone'. Inspector Chambers states Eastern Suburbs 10 informed him only 20 OSG were wanted. Superintendent Adney states Smith wants as many police as he can get. Inspector Chambers states everyone available from the 'City' is already there, but he will try and get 20 more personnel for Superintendent Smith.

(At this point there was still no apparent realisation that the 20 OSG requested at 9.30pm had not arrived at Redfern, or have not actually been requested.) During his interview with Assistant Commissioner Laycock on 4 March 2004, Superintendent Smith states, 'Contacted Donna Adney two or three times, requesting help. I felt the gravity of the situation wasn't being understood and I contacted Adney to get more help.'

23:10 Superintendent Smith requests 20 OSG and 20 other police from Inspector Chambers through Superintendent Adney. Inspector Chambers states 'every available police officer in the city is there'.

23:25 Inspector Snel rings Superintendent Smith to see if OSG personnel are required, but his mobile is engaged. She speaks to Inspector Emery and states there was no request for OSG personnel.

23:30 Superintendent Smith contacts Assistant Commissioner Waites, stating the situation was under control and there were only 30 people involved in some rowdy behaviour.

This is in conflict with Superintendent Smith's earlier conversation with Superintendent Adney, some 20 minutes earlier. However there were fluctuations in riotous behaviour throughout the night, and this conversation may have occurred during a quiet period.

23:34 Superintendent Smith is informed by Inspector Chambers he can only raise 5 more police and questions whether OSG on the way. Superintendent Smith was not able to confirm this and asked for the assistance of the State Protection Group (SPG).

23:40 Inspector Snel contacts Inspector Chambers requesting prison trucks for Redfern.

Monday 16 February 2004

00:16 City Rail contact VKG to ascertain how long trains will be stopped from going through Redfern.

00:30 Inspector Smith states a large group of persons were gathering at Eveleigh Street and made several advances upon police throwing rocks and bottles.

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00:57 Inspector Chambers receives information that police were going to advance as the railway was being 'trashed'. Inspector Emery states police are out numbered as there are '150 upon them', and 30 to 40 more Police are required.

01:00 Senior Sergeant Wade receives a request from Superintendent Smith by phone for 20 OSG. This request is approved by Inspector Snel.

01:15 Superintendent Smith contacted Assistant Commissioner Waites indicating he required further police as there were now 100 extra rioters and police were being attacked with rocks, bricks and bottles. Assistant Commissioner Waites leaves his home address to attend Redfern.

01:19 Superintendent Smith contacts Inspector Chambers requesting more police stating there are police who have been on duty for 18 hours, and they'll be lucky to 'hold' Redfern Police Station. DOI states OSG on the way but can't say how many.

01:37 Assistant Commissioner Waites calls Inspector Chambers requesting 30 to 50 more police, indicating his E.T.A. to Redfern is approximately 10 to 15 minutes.

01:47 Assistant Commissioner Waites informs Inspector Chambers that Molotov cocktails are being thrown and he requires something to deflect them.

01:50 Sergeant O'Riordan loads 50 sets of riot equipment at the SPC for transport to Redfern.

02:00 Lee Wood at Polair is contacted by Inspector Chambers.

02:00 Assistant Commissioner Waites rings Senior Sergeant Wade requesting availability of chemical munitions with a negative result.

02:04 A CIDS message outlines the Fire Brigade have withdrawn due to safety issues and have handed equipment over to police. The Fire Brigade indicated they are of the belief there are not enough police on hand.

02:05 Inspector Chambers informed Assistant Commissioner Waites that a helicopter had been called out, and did he want the video unit?

02:10 Inspector Chambers calls the video unit out.

02:14 Superintendent Smith informed Inspector Chambers he was using NSWFB hose to manage rioters.

02:30 Sergeant O'Riordan arrives and distributes riot equipment.

02:37 Assistant Commissioner Waites informs Inspector Chambers there are sufficient police but insufficient protective equipment and requests more.

02:53 Alan (nfi) from Minister of Transport's Office calls Inspector Chambers to confirm if trains are running.

02:58 Inspector Chambers contacts Assistant Commissioner Waites and informs him the van with protective equipment will be there in 10 minutes, and that he had not had any contact from Polair.

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03:00 Sergeant O'Riordan conducts a briefing with OSG team leaders.

03:03 Lee Wood for Polair indicated to VKG that Polair was airborne and would be overhead within a few minutes.

03:14 Sergeant Dean Smith, Fairfield LAC, contacts Inspector Chambers confirming what type of riot equipment is required, then indicates 10 sets of riot gear and 10 additional vests will be sent to Redfern.

03:26 Inspector Smith indicated that all lines advanced.

03:30 Sergeant O'Riordan states that a tactical approach was commenced at 3.30am. During the approach and whilst holding the perimeter nil rioters were sighted.

03:36 Superintendent Smith requested Polair to light up Eveleigh Street.

03:51 Inspector Smith declares 'Area under Control'.

THE ROLE OF SUPPORT UNITS

- The Duty Operations Inspector, Warren Chambers, was asked about resources on a number of occasions. Units such as OSG, Vikings and Polair were not actually requested but Redfern Police did ask if they were available. Inspector Chambers stated they were not available.

- Knowing the problems being experienced by police at the scene of the riot, Inspector Chambers could have taken a more active role in attempting to obtain more resources and Polair. It is believed obtaining additional police to Redfern should have been facilitated by Inspector Chambers, not Inspector Emery.

- Should the inquiry regarding Polair been acted upon earlier by Inspector Chambers, the Police response to this riot would have been more effective. Perhaps Detective Inspector Bennett could have insisted on the attendance of Polair to the DOI.

- Superintendent Smith felt the gravity of the situation was not being understood. However, neither he nor his Duty Officers were aware of the current situation regarding the OSG call-out.

- Inspector Snel was contacted by Duty Officer Emery at 9.29pm. He states he requested OSG personnel and equipment in accordance with Redfern SOPS for the 'block'. Inspector Snel states only equipment was requested. It was not until 1.00am that Inspector Snel granted approval for OSG personnel.

- The time frame between the first request for OSG personnel by Inspector Emery to Inspector Snel at 9.30pm to the time at which OSG arrived at 1.30am was a significant issue in how police responded to the riot.

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ROLE OF ABORIGINAL COMMUNITY LIAISON OFFICERS IN THE LEAD UP TO THE RIOT

Ms Doreen Peters, the NSWP ACLO State Coordinator provided the following information –

- 'The role of the ACLO is 95% operational. It is expected that ACLOs maintain high visibility as the major part of their duty is to consult and liaise with all sections of the Aboriginal community in the community.'

- 'While performing their duties ACLOs gather information in an informal manner from the Aboriginal Community, such as what is likely to occur in situations such as the death of an Aboriginal person and the following days of the funeral.'

- 'In the Redfern incident the Redfern ACLOs should have been aware of which community members to approach to assist in any situation which is likely to get out of hand. Even when they do not have a good rapport, they would still know that some uproar is likely to happen. Any information gathered should be passed onto the command with appropriate advice.'

- 'Following the death of the young person at Redfern ACLOs should have been either recalled to duty and appropriately tasked by the command or alternatively when ACLOs are not rostered when a situation occurs such as the Redfern incident, they should contact the command and provide the best advice on how these situations are best managed.'

PERFORMANCE OF REDFERN ACLOS AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH POLICE

- Very few of the requirements suggested by Ms Peters were performed by the Redfern ACLOs in response to the death of Thomas Hickey.

- A review by Inspector Hooper of the Crime Management Faculty revealed Redfern LAC having three ACLO's. Due to internal personality conflicts one is seconded to Marrickville on a permanent basis.

- The remaining two are rostered on opposite shifts as they have difficulty working together. Information provided indicates that both state they experience difficulties in performing their roles as they are not briefed daily in relation to operational matters. They also stated they have been embarrassed when asked about certain incidents by members of the Aboriginal community and they have no knowledge of these matters.

- Both ACLOs believe they would be more effective in their role if they were given more clear direction as to what is expected of them on an operational and daily basis.

- Inspector Smith stated that after being briefed by Inspector Emery of the days events he believed both ACLOs were unavailable.

- When interviewed by Assistant Commissioner Laycock, Inspector Emery stated that the ACLO who was called out on Sunday afternoon 15 February 2004 was hopeless, intoxicated and had no drivers licence.

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- Superintendent Smith stated an ACLO attended the 'block' on Saturday afternoon 14 February 2004 and reported there was no indication of trouble. The same ACLO came in on Sunday 15 February 2004 at 5.00pm but was intoxicated and sent home by Inspector Emery. The ACLO left about 1 hour later.

- Superintendent Smith indicated that he considered calling the ACLOs out during the riot, but he believed that the community does not think highly of them. Additionally Superintendent Smith indicated Redfern Police officers were sceptical of the ACLOs.

UNDERSTANDING AND APPRECIATION OF IMPENDING VIOLENCE – INITIAL INCIDENT

- Inspector Emery does not report any issues arising from the Thomas Hickey incident, which would indicate tension or unrest was building at the 'block'.

- Superintendent Smith attended Redfern LAC on Saturday 14 February 2004 and received a full briefing from Inspector Emery. He then spoke with Assistant Commissioner Waites and agreed the injury to Thomas Hickey was not classified as a critical incident as defined by NSWP. An ACLO attended the 'block' three times during the day by direction of Superintendent Smith and reported nothing unusual.

- When asked if the Thomas Hickey incident was a starter to the violence, Superintendent Smith stated that he spoke to Inspector Emery and there was no information indicating impending violence from the 'block. Inspector Emery has been at Redfern LAC for 7 years.

- Mr Michael Ramsay, Project Director of Redfern/Waterloo Partnership Project outlined his knowledge of bricks being stored in bins after a collapse of a brick wall days prior to the riot. Ramsay assisted police communicating with the aboriginal community during the riot, identifying the bins and bricks from the wall collapse were the same being used during the riot.

- Mr. Ramsay stated that during the 12 months since Superintendent Smith has been working at Redfern, there has been a definite improvement in the relationship between the Police and the Redfern Aboriginal Community.

- Ms. Jody Broun, Director General of the New South Wales Department of Aboriginal Affairs informed Assistant Commissioner Laycock on 17 March 2004, 'the riot was going to happen due to the death of 'Hickey', heat and alcohol'.

- Ms. Broun believes an advisory committee should have been set up for operational issues prior to the riot. She stated government and non-government committees have lost direction and needed to look at premises, railway and environmental issues, with a whole of Government approach needed.

- Mr Sol Bellear, Director of Community Relations, Department of Aboriginal Affairs, whilst not present at the time of the riots received information after the event, which he believed was accurate. He stated there was a large number of Koori visitors to the 'block' just prior to the riot, arriving from Saturday 14 February 2004.

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- Mr. Bellear outlined there are a few activists associated with the 'block', with a Mr Lyle Munro who worked to create bad blood on Sunday 15 February 2004. (Detective Inspector Darren Bennett, Crime Manager of Redfern stated they did not see Mr Munro during the riot, though saw him whilst viewing footage of the riot.)

- Mr Bellear also received information there was a stockpile of bricks and bottles which was set up prior to Thomas Hickey's impalement. He believed the Molotov cocktails thrown by kids were 'not put together in five minutes and required some planning'.

- Mr Bellear stated there was nothing the Police would have necessarily seen that would have given them notification of something escalating on the Saturday/Sunday 14/15 February 2004, believing Superintendent Smith was doing a good job.

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WARNING SIGNS

- Ms Doreen Peters indicated 'It is common knowledge among Aboriginal communities when a death of an Aboriginal person occurs, it is most likely that some unrest in the community will happen. ACLOs in most commands are well aware when this situation arises.'

- Ms Jody Broun informed Assistant Commissioner Laycock that after a death of an aborigine there is 'Sorry Time', where violence, rioting and unacceptable behaviour does not usually occur.

- Superintendent Smith stated his understanding of behaviour after a death in the Aboriginal Community is one of grieving and 'Sorry Time' which did not usually involve riotous behaviour.

- Inspector Garth Smith believed there was no breakdown in communication, cultural awareness or sensitivity to issues associated with the traditional grieving process.

- Assistant Commissioner West advises the level of observance of traditional grievance varies according to particular segments of Aboriginal Communities.

- Inspector Garth Smith indicated no knowledge of any particular incident leading police to believe tensions were building between the aboriginal community and police, other than the death of Thomas Hickey.

- After Thomas Hickey's death, police spoke to his aunt Rebecca Hickey who expressed no anger towards Police. A counsellor who was assisting the deceased's mother at the hospital informed Police that Mrs Gail Hickey was blaming police for his death and believed Police were pursuing her son prior to his accident.

- Further information from Ms Broun indicated that Mrs Gail Hickey did not receive 'face to face' counselling from the relevant staff at the Glebe Mortuary, though. Police complied with protocols by supplying a coroners pamphlet regarding counselling. Mrs. Hickey was later observed at the Redfern riot near youths who were throwing missiles at the Redfern Railway Station.

- During the afternoon of Sunday 15 February 2004, Redfern Police Station received a number of calls blaming Detective Pace for Thomas Hickey's death.

- Inspector Garth Smith stated from his perusal of intelligence holdings and events relating to the young persons death there appeared to be no intelligence to suggest a riot had been planned.

Inspector Emery was one who may have an understanding and had an appreciation of the impending violence. He outlines the following occurrences –

- Mrs Gail Hickey wanted to look at the bike that was involved in her son's accident. She attended the Police Station and stated she could get witnesses to suggest police may have been involved in her son's death. Although she was not happy when she left the station, Mrs. Hickey did not blame police for her son's death.

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- Later that day Inspector Emery states patrolling police were subject to verbal abuse.
- Inspector Emery heard that the media – Channel 10 - were trying to 'stir things up at Redfern'.
- In the afternoon stone throwing commenced around the railway station.
- Inspector Emery rang Superintendent Smith to inform him Redfern Railway Station had to be closed.
- Inspector Emery maintained day shift to supplement the night shift.

– Inspector Snel, at 9.29pm, did not request OSG personnel believing Inspector Emery had only asked for equipment.

– Superintendent Smith states after the death of Thomas Hickey he talked to Redfern Police three or four times that day.

– Superintendent Smith stated since May 2003 there were over 40 incidents at the 'block' where bottles and bricks had been thrown at police. If police go there for an unplanned arrest 'they will be surrounded and bricked'.

– Superintendent Smith had not thought of riots after the Thomas Hickey incident as the mother had been with Inspector Emery for over two hours and she had indicated no issues with Police. (

Between 1989 and 2003 Mrs Gail Hickey has been charged with riot, affray, throw missile, resist arrest, assault police and hinder police. Mrs Hickey was also observed during video footage of the February 2004 riot standing in Eveleigh Street observing aboriginal youths throwing missiles.)

– Superintendent Smith has previous experience working with the aboriginal community whilst previously working as Local Area Commander in Griffith.

– Superintendent Smith stated 12 morning shift police were kept back and worked between 6 and 13 hours overtime each.

– The Superintendent stated 'there was no intelligence from the community, family or ACLOs indicating there was going to be an all out war. He stated Inspector Emery felt the media was door knocking and stirring things up. There were no placards, no banners, nothing!' *(BETWEEN 5.25 AND 5.30PM THERE WERE WANTED POSTERS DEPICTING SENIOR POLICE BEING PLACED NEAR THE RAILWAY STATION. THIS WAS REPORTED TO POLICE A SHORT TIME LATER)*

– When asked about opening the Police Operations Centre, Superintendent Smith stated after speaking to Assistant Commissioner Waites he wanted him to come on site so they could show seniority to Police on the ground.

– Superintendent Smith had contact from Inspector Emery on Sunday afternoon indicating this was nothing out of the ordinary happening. Police were getting verbally abused which had happened previously on 40 occasions during the last 12 months.

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- Superintendent Smith stated he was happy with Intelligence reports for the LAC, which are submitted at a rate of approximately 200 per month. Superintendent Smith indicated 'if there was something he could have done better - it was awareness', then asking the rhetorical question, "Should we have picked up on it earlier?"

- Superintendent Smith also stated there needs to be a speedier call out procedure for equipment and staff.

- Assistant Commissioner Waites received five telephone calls between 6.00pm and 1.15am on Sunday 15 February 2004 into Monday 16 February. Assistant Commissioner Waites is provided with information from Superintendent Smith and Inspector Snel and is also contacted by Acting Deputy Commissioner Parsons.

- After the 1.15am telephone call from Superintendent Smith, Assistant Commissioner Waites decides to attend Redfern.

The indicators of tension and warning signs for civil disorder were clear and plentiful. Appreciating Superintendent Smith's comments about 40 incidents of bricking and abuse of police in the past year, these indicators may have seemed to be the norm and somewhat tolerated. Taking into account the social and cultural sensitivity there was a need to balance the operational requirements with the social issues.

Set out in the Constables Education Program, JST 137, Operational Safety and Tactics, are Tension Indicators of Crowds and Mobs. All police should be able to identify signs of unrest, which may lead to civil disorder.

A number of these signs were clearly evident prior to the riot. Research recommended by Education Services provided reference to a simple disorder model set out in the Association of Chief Police Officers on Keeping the Peace.

An appreciation of the various levels of unrest as set out below between 9pm 15 February and 3.30am 16 February may have resulted in an earlier Police response:

Stage	Description or criteria
State of normality	The day-to-day state of order and provision of policing services within a community.
Tension	A level of increased concern or feelings in a community. (Redfern on numerous occasions
Disorder	This represents the stage at which mood is supplemented by action, whether isolated or sustained. It manifests itself in disruption, damage and violence. **(Redfern between 4.00pm and 9.00pm** – not identified by many – only really Emery – due to tolerance to such behaviour)
Unrest	Escalation into violent or disruptive behaviour. This stage may be typified by extreme conflict. (Redfern from 9.00pm to 3.30am. If earlier signs were identified and acted upon this stage may not have been reached).
Unrest	This is the period, sometimes prolonged, when the rebuilding of relationships takes place.

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Educations Services are considering training and exercises for unplanned civil disorder utilising Minerva and Hydra to facilitate this training. Minerva is an operation simulation system where commanders operate with the command teams and are presented realistic issues as they unfold. Currently a number of high risk incidents and one protest march based in the CBD are used as exercises in Minerva. Hydra is a strategic simulator where commanders work as a syndicate to look at the strategic issues surrounding an incident as it develops. It has a variety of exercises from School based scenarios, high risk incidents, through to full counter terrorist incidents.

A Counter Terrorist Commander's Course is before CET for approval. This course appears to be ideal for Commanders and should include training in unplanned civil disorder. Positions on the course should be offered firstly to those in locations where unrest is likely to occur, e.g. Redfern, Dubbo etc.

CULTURAL AWARENESS

In relation to the breakdown in cultural awareness or sensitivity to issues associated with traditional grievance processes Ms Doreen Peters provided the following information:

- 'New South Wales Police deliver an Aboriginal Cultural Awareness Program on a corporate level through the Police College. In addition, some LACs have established partnerships with local Aboriginal communities to deliver local cultural awareness programs'.

- 'Traditional Grievance – Naming and depicting deceased people. In many Aboriginal communities there is a prohibition on naming of people who are deceased, which may last for months or even years, until all the relevant ceremonies have been concluded.'

- 'Generally, faces of people who have died should not be shown in a way that their communities will view them. Always check with the local community before broadcasting names or images of deceased people and they will inform you of the appropriate practice.'

- 'The immediate family (mother/father) are not normally approached. Rather an extended family member is the person to communicate with appropriate authorities e.g. police, funeral directors, medical staff etc. Also respected Elders are the right people to approach while funeral arrangements are made.'

- 'Equally respectful is contact with family members after the funeral and grievance period, and should be held with extended family members or respected elders.'

Some of these points were not respected by the general media, and it should be noted that it was not the NSW Police who broadcasted the name and photograph of the deceased person throughout the media.

If the ACLO system had been working at Redfern, in the manner set out by Doreen Peters, these traditional processes may have been respected and certainly warning signs of impending civil disorder could have been bought to the attention of police.

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Information received from Strike Force Timepiece, reveals 35 persons were arrested in relation to the riot. 19 resided in the area policed by the Redfern Local Area Command. Of those 19 only 2 or 3 actually lived in the 'block'.

FINDINGS - AWARENESS AND PREPARATION

1. Failing in the Redfern Intelligence System to strategically identify cultural, seasonal or environmental issues, which may lead to unrest or civil disorder in the 'block' area.

2. Greater use of the source system to enhance the informant network at the Redfern Local Area Command.

3. Failure of support units to acknowledge the urgency of requests and lack of follow up upon those requests.

4. Communication breakdown in the call out of Operation Support Group.

5. Inability of Aboriginal Community Liaison Officers at Redfern Local Area Command to identify unrest in the 'block'.

6. Breakdown in the relationship between Redfern Police and the Aboriginal Community Liaison Officers.

7. Failure of police to acknowledge the tactical warning signs of unrest leading to civil disorder at Redfern on Sunday, 15 February, 2004 e.g wanted posters of senior police, continual throwing of rocks and the closing of Redfern Railway Station.

8. Re-enforcement of cultural awareness for Redfern Police and continuation of partnerships with local aboriginal community is essential.

RECOMMENDATIONS - AWARENESS AND PREPARATION

1. Implementation of intelligence gathering operations for vulnerable locations within Local Area Commands, e.g, the 'block' at Redfern. Such operations to proactively collect information of crime, occurrences of unrest, environmental, seasonal and cultural trends for the vulnerable location.

2. Redfern Local Area Command to enlist the assistance of Source Management for increasing informant numbers. Assistance should also be sought in the professional management of their informants. (Senior Sergeant Tracey Chapman has commenced such assistance)

3. Region Commanders and the Commander of Communications to design training for support units, e.g. VKG – DOI and Operations Managers to appreciate difficulties experienced by those in the field at an unplanned civil disorder when requiring assistance. DOI and Operations Managers should work from a check list, similar to that in the Duty Officers manual, providing information of what resources may be needed at the site.

4. The Duty Officers check-list and running sheet matrix, maintained in the Duty Officers manual, be adopted by the Operations Managers and DOI to record what is requested is received. Regular checks should be made to action any request that may have been forgotten or misunderstood.

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5. The State Coordinator for Aboriginal Community Liaison Officers to liaise with the Redfern Local Area Commander to upgrade the performance and direction of Aboriginal Community Liaison Officers.

6. The Redfern Local Area Commander to devise strategies for the most effective use of Aboriginal Community Liaison Officers in forging community links to ensure they complete their duties in compliance with Standard Operating Procedures for Management of Aboriginal Incidents and promote a productive relationship with police.

7. Education Services to design training programs for police, at all ranks, for Unplanned Civil Disorder.

8. Local Cultural Awareness programs, including issues associated with the Traditional Grievance process, to be continued with the assistance of Doreen Peters, State Coordinator for Aboriginal Community Liaison Officers.

STAFFING ISSUES

ADEQUACY OF POLICE ROSTERED FOR DUTY ON EVENING OF 15 FEBRUARY 2004

The Redfern rosters for 14 – 16 February 2004 were used to complete the following table. It should be noted that on 15 February 2004 the day shift were retained on duty to supplement the nightshift.

Table: Resource Availability

Classification	14/02/04	15/02/04	16/02/04
No.	No.	No.	No.
On Roster	153	152	152
On loan	10	10	10
Long Term Sick	4	4	4
Maternity Leave	1	1	1
Sick Leave	0	0	2
Restricted Duties	2	2	2
Courses	1	1	9
Court	0	0	1
Recurrent Leave Day	62	57	54
Rest Day	32	39	9
Annual Leave	2	1	6
Additional Leave	1	2	0
Total NOT Available	**115**	**117**	**98**
Total Available	**38**	**35**	**54**
% Available	**33%**	**30%**	**55%**

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The resource capability of Redfern LAC was significantly higher on the Monday (16/02/04) than the Friday (14/02/04) or Saturday (15/02/04).

Table: General Duty Availability

Classification	14/02/04	15/02/04	16/02/04
No.	No.	No.	No.
*GD Total	88	88	88
GD Available	27	28	29
% GD Available	30.7%	31.8%	33.0%

**N.B. includes the LAC, Duty Officers & Crime Manager*

General Duty availability is static across the 3 days at approximately 31%.

Table: General Duty Capability

Classification	14/02/04	15/02/04	16/02/04
No.	No.	No.	No.
Superintendent	0	0	1
Inspectors	2	2	3
Sergeants	3	3	4
S/Const	2	2	4
Const	8	7	9
P/Const	12	14	7
Total	**27**	**28**	**30**
% P/Con	**44.4%**	**50%**	**23.3%**

The percentage of Probationary Constables to total GDs on shift is relatively high particularly on the Saturday (44.4%) and Sunday (50%). NSWP Workforce Planning advise that there is no state-wide benchmark in terms of ratio of Probationary Constables to other Police within LACs. The level for the Redfern LAC is not inconsistent with other LACs within the Inner Metropolitan Region.

Table: Criminal Investigation Capability

Classification	14/02/04	15/02/04	16/02/04
No.	No.	No.	No.
CI Total	13	13	13
CI Available	2	3	7
% Available	**15.4%**	**23.1%**	**53.8%**

Table: Response Team Capability

Classification	14/02/04	15/02/04	16/02/04
No.	No.	No.	No.
Response Team Total	21	21	21
Response Team Avail.	8	4	9
% Available	**38.1%**	**19%**	**42.9%**

Six of the Response Team were assigned to Operation "Concertina" at the time of the riot.

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APPROPRIATENESS OF 1ST RESPONSE AGREEMENT AT REDFERN

The 'current' (as at 16/02/04) Redfern First Response Policing Agreement (FRPA) was endorsed on 11 January 2000 by the then Redfern LAC Commander and relevant Police Association Representative. It outlines:


- 4 mobile units (officers) Sunday – Wednesday 24hrs per day
- 4 mobile units (officers) Thursday – Saturday AM shift
- 6 mobile units (officers) Thursday – Saturday PM shift.

Redfern 45 is a stationary unit located at Redfern Railway Station, and is not included as a mobile unit.

Information provided by Superintendent Smith is that Redfern LAC is traditionally rostered per intelligence with Sunday nights usually quiet, as it is all over the Sydney CBD.

INTELLIGENCE BASED 1ST RESPONSE AGREEMENT VS TRADITIONAL MODEL

All LAC 1st response agreements are based upon total calls for service quantified by timeframes to identify when the demand for Policing services are most necessary. Agreements are the subject of regular review by Local Area Commanders and Region Commanders. The Redfern LAC agreement is illustrated below.



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The level of staffing at The Redfern LAC on the evening of 15 February 2004 was consistent with the demands for service upon the Command. A review of the 1st Response Agreement should be conducted by the Redfern Local Area Command.

The use of intelligence information is relative to the strategic planning and risk identification by Commands in developing a preparedness to adequately provide a policing response to the major issues specific to that LACs environment.

TURNOVER OF PERSONNEL THROUGH REDFERN LOCAL AREA COMMAND

Inquiries conducted include examination of the turnover of personnel through the Redfern LAC since 1 April 2003. Those inquiries reveal the following staff movements.

Transfers IN	Inspector	3
	Sergeant	6
	Constable	6
	Mounted Unit	5
Transfers OUT	Inspector	Nil
	Sergeant	3
	Constable	21
	Mounted Unit	1

With the addition of Probationary Constables during that period the Command currently has 28 personnel in over strength positions.

(Source : Inner Metropolitan Region Human Resources Manager)

DELAY IN ADDITIONAL POLICE RESOURCES BEING CALLED AND ARRIVING AT THE SCENE

Strike Force Coburn found delays in calling additional Police resources occurred on 15 – 16 February 2004. The nature and cause of the delays by way of summary include:


- Delays in the arrival of additional OSG personnel following an alleged misunderstanding by Inspector Snell and Inspector Emery regarding requested equipment and personnel.

- Delays in the call out of POLAIR following discussion between the scene and VKG at 10:15pm. During that call discussion between Inspector Chambers and Detective Inspector Bennett related to the Air Wing was being on duty, call out was neither requested or offered. Inspector Chambers only advised that POLAIR personnel completed duty at 6.00pm.

- Delays in the arrival of additional OSG police from other LACs across Sydney, after it was realised the 20 OSG officers requested by Inspector Emery at the scene had not been mobilised. *(refer 1st point above).*

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POLICE AND EQUIPMENT



	Pre 7pm	8pm	9pm	10pm	11pm	12am	1am	2am	3am	4am	5am
Police	6	16	12	38	18	22	17	48	56	5	15
OSG			1	4	4		8	15	2		
Total Police	6	22	34	72	90	112	129	177	233	238	253
Equipment			8		28			78			

ROLE OF OPERATIONS SUPPORT COMMAND AND OTHER SCARE RESOURCES

The roll and call out arrangements for scarce resources after hours are summarised as follows:

SCARCE RESOURCES

Police Media Unit)
Video Unit)
Mounted Unit)
Police Air Wing)
Dog Unit)
Transport section)
Special Services Group)
Education Services)
Police Chaplains & Welfare)
OIA)
Police Rescue)

Support from these sections is arranged through the DOI during an incident upon the decision being made by the Commander to utilise them.

REGION OFFICE RESOURCES

Operations Manager)
Region Intelligence Co-Ordinators)
OSG Co-Ordinator)

Call outs, Intelligence & Environmental analysis, OSG personnel, equipment and training.

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LOCAL AREA COMMANDS

Commander	)	Preparation & Awareness of the
Crime Manager	)	Command to identified risks.
Crime Co-Ordinator	)	Strategic planning and tactical
Investigations Manager	)	options. Crime Management Unit
Intelligence Analysts & Field Intelligence	)	ongoing analysis, monitoring LAC
Education & Development Officer	)	risks and environment.

CURRENT STATUS AND CALL OUT PROTOCOLS OF SUPPORT UNITS

A number of support units have roles in policing responses to both planned and unplanned incidents of public order & civil unrest.

MEDIA UNIT

The unit was contacted and a member attended Redfern Police Station at 10.20pm, travelling to the scene in the company of the Local Area Commander.

The Media Unit have a Call Out policy managed through the Duty Operations Inspector and if necessary the manager of the Media Unit. It has been reviewed and is now considered appropriate.

No prior warning was received by the unit from any external media sources - this is not surprising as it would be in the interest of external media organisations for an incident to occur.

VIDEO UNIT

A member of the unit was called out through the DOI around 2.00am - arriving at Redfern at 2.30am.

The video unit have call out protocols to provide 24 hour support. It is managed through the DOI and if necessary in consultation with the Manager of the Video Unit.

The Redfern riot confirmed they do not possess suitable equipment for the service they were required to provide in relation to evidence gathering.

The unit's cameras are designed for recording of Crime Scenes and similar roles and don't effectively capture vision of sufficient quality to be utilised for identification of offenders in crowds. (The Special Services Group have the desired capability.)

From 7.46pm a video camera from Redfern LAC was brought to the scene by Sgt Baxter and used to film the incident, it however experienced power difficulties.

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MOUNTED UNIT

Information is that the Unit contacted a supervisor at Redfern Police Station approximately 8.30pm and offered their services to assist in the riot however it was declined. An option of personnel only was also offered to attend and assist as the Unit has the capacity to call out 12 – 18 officers if necessary, however this too was declined.

Discussions with the Commander of the Mounted Unit indicated there were a number of tactical options available to assist the Redfern Commander on this night by the use of horses.

Call out is through the DOI. The Mounted Unit do training incorporating public order and their deployment with OSG.

The unit has been utilised during a number of public order operations. The unit is equipped for incidents similar to the Redfern riot despite not being requested. Superintendent Smith indicated his reluctance to use this unit was due to concerns for potential injuries to intoxicated youth.

The Mounted Unit provided details of a quantity of protective equipment the unit requests in their submission to Strike Force Coburn for use in Public Order incidents. The current protective equipment the unit utilises should be evaluated to ensure it remains appropriate. Possible advantages of round shields and other additional protective equipment should be discussed between the Inner Metropolitan Region Commander and the Commander of the Mounted Unit.

POLICE AIR WING

At 10.15pm the POLAIR was called for by the Duty Officer at Redfern to the DOI who advised POLAIR was not available, having concluded duties at 6.00pm. It was not until 2.05am that the DOI advised Assistant Commissioner Waites that the Air Wing had been contacted and was responding. POLAIR were subsequently above the scene within one hour. The DOI stated he was not requested at that time to call out the Air Wing.

Given the situation that a Signal One had been called an hour earlier and Police were being injured, the DOI in what appears to be efforts to keep Police responses to the situation as " low key", only advised that the Air Wing was not on duty. He failed to advise of the protocols for a call-out regardless of being requested to or not. Conversely requests for Polair should have been pressed by Redfern personnel.

The capacity of the Air Wing to provide support is significantly more than tactical advice to Commanders at the scene. When integrated with the capabilities of the Special Services Group this can provide a powerful investigative tool.

The ability of the unit includes the potential to improve the information / intelligence flow into Command Posts with a significantly effective capacity to identify offenders from video footage when deployed in conjunction with the SSG.

In the near future this capacity can be further enhanced as an investigative tool through the ongoing development of the Phototrac project.

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DOG SQUAD

Call out of Dog Squad support is managed through the DOI and VKG. Five Dog Squad units responded to the Redfern incident with two of the dogs injured.

Advice from the unit confirmed no known equipment anywhere in the world which would prevent the injuries sustained by the animals deployed at Redfern.

The Dog Squad call out policy has been altered. In the future event of a call out to a situation similar to Redfern, a Dog Squad Liaison Officer of Commissioned Rank will also respond, attending the Command Post. This officer will provide advice relating to the capabilities of this resource.

TRANSPORT SECTION

At 11.20pm an option was discussed relating to the use of prison vans to facilitate arrests. This option was dismissed due to the non-availability of drivers on duty or on call.

Issues in relation to the capabilities of this unit need to be considered in conjunction with recommended policy improvements. They relate to arrest procedures and prisoner security, transport and charging options. (Recommendation)

There will be significant differences in processes necessary to address the needs of Metropolitan Regions compared to rural locations.

Presently within the Metropolitan area on occasions where offenders have been arrested at such incidents, despite field arrest processes being relatively well known, they are rarely adopted. Arrest photographs can now be enhanced and simplified through the use of digital photography.

When a field arrest system is not in place arrests have tended to be avoided, since they result in a rapid depletion of available Police personnel when occupied transporting and charging rather than utilising those arrest procedures. This has severely diminished the tactical options available to Commanders in the management of planned incidents let alone unplanned.

Within Metropolitan Regions adequately staffed Prison Vans should be available to be deployed to a scene of unplanned as well as Planned operations.

They should be managed, and assembled under the direction of a nominated individual (Duty Officer/Team Leader).

When obtained as a support capacity they will provide Prisoner security and transportation without reducing the tactical options available to Commanders in resolving an incident.

Other alternatives as a response capacity for unplanned incidents are necessary for non Metropolitan Regions. Options could include access to Corrective Services vehicles at short notice or securing charge locations in combination with revised prisoner processing practices.

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SPECIAL SERVICES GROUP (SSG)

A call out capability exists at present, managed through the DOI and Commander SSG. A maximum response time of 2 hours to any location within the Metropolitan Regions has been indicated.

Discussions have been held with the Director Advanced Technology Centre of SSG, regarding the possibility of utilising the centre's resources in support of the response to a planned public order incident or more importantly to an unplanned incident such as Redfern. Their deployment can provide live, recordable vision of a scene from any location cameras are requested to be placed.

The resource can provide significant support to Commanders and assist in evidence gathering capabilities. Currently these resources are primarily utilised in Counter Terrorist and other High Risk incidents.

Specific details of the capacity are contained within a summary of the discussions had with the Director, and will not be elaborated upon in this document to maintain security and operational effectiveness of the unit.

Primarily there is an awareness shortfall for Commanders regarding the capacities of this unit. Their deployment could significantly improve the evidence gathering capacities of the organisation in relation to incidents similar to the Redfern riot.

POLICE RESCUE SQUAD

At 9.07pm officers from the Rescue Squad were in attendance at the Redfern riot providing support immediately behind the police line, particularly in relation to injured officers.

This unit is available on a 24/7 basis via the DOI and can provide lighting, forms of accommodation and stand down areas for Police.

WELFARE SERVICES

The DOI was not requested to call out any welfare services personnel and consequently none were contacted. There are five full time Chaplains with a network of part time assistants, and three full time psychologists. Call out of these personnel is via the DOI.

NEGOTIATORS UNIT

The unit may have a role in such incidents, with call out being arranged through the DOI, to the Commander Negotiators Unit Det Insp Abel. Contact between Insp Abel and the Commander of an incident allows for evaluation of the situation and if deemed appropriate, call out of a Negotiating team of four officers.

No request was made for negotiators. Some negotiating was undertaken by the Redfern Crime Manager, who by virtue of his rank is no longer accredited as a negotiator, although does have recent experience in the field.

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The Redfern incident has highlighted opportunities for the improvement of skills for Supervisors, Duty Officers and Commanders at the scenes of riots, particularly in the areas of Command and Control, and tactics. It is recommended that Education Services consider enhancing the training for the following officers.

Target Audience	Type of training enhancement
Recruit Training	Familiarisation with riot equipment and basic public order management tactics. Scenario based training as part of officer survival training should be considered.
General Duties Training	Familiarisation with riot equipment and basic public order management tactics. Scenario based training as part of officer survival training should be considered (incorporated into DEFTAC training annually). Introductory emergency management concepts. Training to be rolled out to high risk LAC's in priority order.
Local Area Commanders, Duty Officers and Supervisors Training	Additional Command and Control, Command post establishment and civil unrest management.

WELFARE

The Redfern incident identified opportunities to improve the welfare support services provided to injured police following incidents of this nature. Police Chaplains were not contacted despite a call out process being in place.

Protocols exist in relation to high risk or critical incidents, however it is apparent from a Welfare point of view that a timely response from these services was overlooked. Support was eventually forthcoming albeit not timely, and officers had access to and utilised services of the Police Chaplains and Psychologists counselling.

Leading Senior Constable McGowan received a significant head injury during the incident, and was conveyed to hospital. He provided opinion regarding actions taken in relation to his welfare. Inquiries have established that shortly after his arrival at hospital a Duty Officer from Ashfield Local Area Command visited him, as well as a Constable from Ashfield advising him of his wife's impending arrival.

Later during the day while still in hospital, LSC McGowan was also visited by two representatives of the Police Association, a Police Chaplain and two Sergeants from Ashfield LAC. On the officer's release from hospital he was taken home by his wife.

On the day following his release LSC McGowan received phone calls from Deputy Commissioner Madden and the Premier of NSW Mr Carr. His Local Area Commander Superintendent Graham contacted him daily for the remainder of the week in relation to his welfare.

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REST & REFRESHMENT OF POLICE

There is a combination of reports indicating both sufficient and insufficient levels of water were provided to Police during the riot. Available bottled water at the SPC was not taken to Redfern with OSG equipment to Redfern, but bottled water was however obtained from a local outlet and provided to Police.

It was reported that when a second line of Police had been formed beyond the range of the offenders' missiles, officers were rotated between that line and the front line, providing them the opportunity to drink and rest before being rotated back into the front line.

Arrangements to supply police in the field with appropriate refreshments from organised suppliers are in place and is managed upon activation of the Police Operations Centre for a planned event utilising resources beyond the local level. If the incident remains at LAC level, the responsibility remains with that Command.

The Redfern incident required a response where meals could have been arranged from the POC if requested. As the POC was not activated for the Redfern incident, that assistance was not sourced, and meals were arranged at a local level.

INJURIES

Of the 45 officers and 2 Police Dogs injured, the injuries received were generally either to the head and shoulders or legs and feet. Injuries to legs and feet were recorded at a ratio of 2:1 of all injuries. 80% (40) of Police injuries occurred whilst officers were in the front line, with an unknown number of officers injured whilst attempting to extract already injured officers from this front line. Other officers were injured whilst performing duties as part of arrest teams.

This supports a recommendation for consideration of Long Shields for General Duties officers pending the deployment of OSG officers, since only 7 of the 45 Police injured were OSG personnel.

REGION RESPONSIBILITIES

Regions have been identified as having a significant role not only in the response to public order incidents but also in enhancing the preparedness of Local Area Commands to such incidents, as is the case in relation to Critical Incidents, High Risk incidents or Serious Crime.

REGION OPERATIONS MANAGER

The phone call between Inspector Emery and Inspector Snel at 9.30pm had a significant impact on Police operations relating to the riot. Inspector Snel was relieving in the role of Region Operations Manager and has stated Inspector Emery did not ask for 20 OSG officers, only for equipment. Inspector Emery states he asked for both. There are subsequent references from Command personnel at the scene in conversations demonstrating an expectation by them of the arrival of 20 OSG officers.

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The role of the Operations Manager is pivotal in relation to the effectiveness of Call Out procedures, particularly for Region support resources such as OSG. The position should also be responsible for the management and accountability of such resources, their equipment maintenance and storage including models for their deployment.

The Region Operations Manager must be able to respond to a situation by mobilising resources to a pre-arranged degree, advising the Commander at the scene of what support is being deployed.

Region Commanders rely upon the Operations Manager to ensure the existence of a high level of preparedness to deal with incidents which may arise.

Additionally front line Police rely upon this officer's capabilities to effectively act in concert with the DOI as the central co-ordinating officer for deployment of support resources when incidents occur. Communications confusion possibly contributed to the initial OSG staffing deficiencies experienced at Redfern.

It is also incumbent upon this role to keep the Region Commander appraised by having an effective and accurate knowledge of the potential risks facing Commands. This officer must ensure the capacity of a Command to address identified contingencies is adequate, and develop the Region's capabilities to ensure an adequate capacity to provide timely, appropriate support to those Commands.

REGION INTELLIGENCE CO-ORDINATOR

This role should have sufficiently functional intelligence networks to recognise and alert the Region Commander, Region Operations Manager and Local Area Commands of the indicators of the potential for an incident to take place. The role should provide strategic analysis of identified significant risks to individual commands, and issues impacting across Commands and Regions to assist in the preparedness of the organisation to deal with incidents.

The absence of any such intelligence from the Redfern community or the LAC field intelligence, together with a degree of acceptance of brick throwing at Police in that area hampered the effectiveness of predicting the incident.

OSG ADVICE TO LOCAL AREA COMMANDS (OSG COMMISSIONED OFFICER)

During the riot, the only advice available to the Operation Commander in relation to capabilities and tactics of the OSG was from officers of the rank of Senior Constable and Sergeant. These officers were only trained to the level of OSG Team Leader, usually performing duties as either a Weapons Instructor or a General Duties Team Leader. These officers were unable to effectively discuss tactical options at Command Level with the Operation Commander.

During the riot after Superintendent Smith had requested additional Police to be sent to the scene, this was countermanded by Sergeant Shearer from the OSG who stated only OSG trained officers should attend.

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The presence of an OSG trained Commissioned Officer, experienced in managing teams of OSG in situations such as that riot would have assisted the officers commanding the operation. Such an experienced adviser at the Command Post could assist through the provision of accurate, and achievable tactical options for command personnel to consider, while commanding the OSG officers as a specialist unit on behalf of the operation commander and in accordance with his directions.

LAC CRIME MANAGEMENT UNITS (CMU)

The CMU includes the Crime Co-Ordinator (manager), the Intelligence Supervisor (monitoring environmental awareness), field intelligence officers and various liaison officers. The Education and Development Officer (EDO) has input in terms of preparedness, skills maintenance and induction of new personnel to the Command.

CMUs are required to undertake an analysis of their environment to identify potential planned and unplanned public order management incidents as part of their risk management function. Such analysis should include evaluation of the LAC's capacity to effectively respond to and investigate these public order type incidents. The outcome of the analysis should enhance the collective awareness and preparedness of the LAC to deal with risks identified.

The below table displays the strategic roles and responsibilities of a CMU:

Planning function	**Responsibility**
Risk Identification by Commands	CMU.
Intelligence collection and analysis	CMU / Region Intelligence Strategist.
SOPs – development, implementation and communication	Duty Officers, Command Management Teams and Region Operations Manager.
The skills base and career development of Command personnel.	EDOs / Local Area Commander / Region Human Resource Co-ordinator
Staff induction processes ensuring risk and SOP awareness	EDOs
Planning incorporating an Investigation Plan for responses to such events.	Investigations Managers, Crime Managers and CMU.
Resource Management including equipment.	Selected Duty Officers/Crime Manager and the EDO.


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EXPERIENCE LEVELS AT REDFERN DURING RIOT

Strike Force Coburn identified approximately 250 Police attended the riot, with a summary of these personnel listed below.

All Personnel Present


- 21% (55) of the total of those officers were Probationary Constables.
- 14% (37) of the total of those officers were OSG trained officers.
- 17% (45) of the total officers present were injured.



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
REDFERN LAC

- 11% (29) of the total officers in attendance are stationed at Redfern.
- 44% (13) of personnel from Redfern in attendance were Probationary Constables.
- 17% (16) of personnel from Redfern in attendance were injured.



OSG PERSONNEL

- 77% (28) of total OSG personnel present were from Inner Metropolitan Region
- 23% (9) of total OSG personnel present were from Greater Metropolitan Region
- 16% (6) of total OSG personnel present were injured.




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POLICE INJURIES

Total Injuries 42 officers

Ranks of Officers Injured:		
	Supt.	1
	Insp	1
	Sgt	5
	LSC	2
	S/Con	12
	Consts	11
	P/Con	8



FINDINGS - STAFFING:

1. The proportion of Probationary Constables to the total staffing of Redfern Local Area Command is consistent with other Commands in the Region.

2. The level of staffing at The Redfern LAC on the evening of 15 February 2004 was consistent with the demands for service upon the Command.

3. Over three quarters of the officers in attendance at Redfern were higher in rank than Probationary Constable. The officers present in terms of years of service in the NSW Police cannot be considered an issue.

4. Delays in the arrival of additional OSG personnel followed an alleged misunderstanding between the Inner Metropolitan Region Operations Manager and Duty Officer.

5. Despite the lack of timeliness in their mobilisation, sufficient OSG trained personnel were eventually present at Redfern.

5a. Other than some personnel from Redfern LAC or other General Duties Police who responded to the Redfern riot have had no public order / riot training.

6. It was necessary to obtain OSG officers from those personnel on duty throughout Sydney when it was established the 20 OSG officers requested by the Duty Officer had not been arranged by the Region Operations Manager.

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7. The insufficient use of the support services listed, such as Welfare, SSG, Mounted Unit, Negotiators and others highlights the need for the capabilities of those units to be marketed to Commanders.

8. No Prison Vans or Transport Unit personnel were available to facilitate transport for multiple arrests.

9. Following discussion between the Crime Manager at the scene and the DOI at VKG at 1015 hours the DOI failed to adequately communicate options available re call-out of POLAIR, equally the request should have been pursued by Insp Bennett.

10. Actions undertaken concerning the welfare of injured personnel could have improved by initiating call outs to Counsellors, Chaplains or both.

11. Crime Management Units need to conduct thorough environmental analysis of their LACs to identify the risks to their Command.

12. Injuries to the legs of officers accounted for the injuries to Police at a ratio of 2:1, highlighting the need to assess the type of protective equipment required by General Duties police such as Long Shields pending deployment of OSG.

13. The current protective equipment on issue to the Mounted Unit requires review, from an OH & S and operational effectiveness perspective, to ensure its adequacy to protect officers and horses and maintain their capacity to respond and assist in incidents such as Redfern.

14. Insufficient training is provided to NSWP in relation to public order management in relation to unplanned incidents.

15. The attendance of an OSG advisor of Commissioned Officer rank at the riot could have been of assistance to the forward commander.

RECOMMENDATIONS - STAFFING

1. No action is necessary in relation to the staffing levels of Redfern Local Area Command.

2. A review of the 1st Response Agreement should be conducted by the Redfern Local Area Command.

3. No action is necessary in relation to the amount of Probationary Constables that attended the riot

4. A preferred option for OSG structure be implemented to ensure adequate availability of appropriately trained Police to respond to unplanned events.

5. Training is required for all operational personnel in public order management / riot control tactics.

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6. Region Operations Managers and DOI's utilise the Duty Officer's Manual checklists to allow them to provide adequate resource management of an incident by evaluating matters in the same terms as officers at the scene.

7. The nature of the roles of support units should be marketed and reinforced to DOI's, LAC Commanders, Duty Officers, and Supervisors.

8. Within Metropolitan regions adequately staffed prison vans must be available to be deployed to the scene of unplanned as well as planned operations, together with related arrest plans. Rural regions need to reassess their needs and develop appropriate arrangements accordingly.

9. As per RECOMMENDATION 7

10. DOI's, Commanders, Duty Officers and Supervisors need to be reminded of the welfare services available for personnel.

11. Crime Management Units of all Commands prepare strategic plans for employment of predetermined tactical options and investigative response plans in the event of identified possible incidents occurring.

12. The type of protective equipment (eg. Long shields) available for use by General Duties police should be reviewed by the OSTTU.

13. Commander of the Mounted Unit review the adequacy of the Unit's protective equipment and the need for additional and possible alternative protective riot equipment.

14 Training to be provided in the following areas:

a) In basic public order policing and use of protective equipment commencing at recruit level for all operational personnel, similar to that provided to Redfern officers.

b) For DOIs in relation to communication of available options for field commanders.

c) For Supervisors, Duty Officers and Commanders in relation to public order management, tactics, leadership, decision making and incident command and control, specifically including unplanned incidents.

15. An experienced OSG trained officer of Commissioned rank should be called out/deployed to assist operation commanders.

COMMAND & CONTROL

The overall strategic and tactical management of police was considered poor throughout the whole evening of the riot. There was a lack of direction for police, particularly those attending the scene from LACs other than Redfern. The co-ordination of specialist units and protective equipment was also inadequate and a cause of the poor Police response.

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The Command Post was a police vehicle that was often not manned, and located in an inappropriate position, considering the proximity to the riot scene. Assembly areas were identified and broadcasted, however, there was little direction for the police at these locations.

Outlined below are some of the observations made by police who performed duties at the riot-

> *"Upon arrival a scene of emergency vehicle chaos greeted us. There were police cars parked backwards, forwards, locked, unlocked and blocking roads. The same applied to fire trucks. There would have been 40 to 50 civilians standing around the emergency vehicles. Were they involved in the riot? Who were they? Where do we go now? What do we do?"*
>
> *"We parked our caged truck, walked about 40 metres towards a large crowd of over 100 police. They looked like GD's. They were standing willy, nilly in no order just talking amongst themselves. A quick look of the rank indicated most were probationary constables or had one stripe on their shoulder, (our real front line). I then saw 15 to 20 commissioned officers standing about 15 metres away, in a huddle. Most were on mobile phones."*
>
> *"The only reason we moved into Eveleigh Street was because the offenders went to bed, not any tactical movement or result of any management decision. I know the political implications and criticism that would have been made if we had charged the line and made mass arrests. Sirs 50 police were injured as they were standing in a line being hit by objects. If you didn't want us to move in and adopt a softer approach that's fine, but you should have not left us standing in the line."*
>
> *"Once at this location we attempted to liaise with the LAC and his four commissioned representatives. During this liaison very little information or direction was given. It was clear to not only the GAIN police, but other police, that there was no command or control being asserted over the situation."*
>
> *"On several occasions 'rioters' were allowed to walk past police lines and attend local shops. One of these persons seemed to be one of the main agitators. We took the initiative of sealing off the area with crime scene tape."*
>
> *"Our feelings after the fact are that it was not a great night for the NSW Police Service. We finished the shift with a feeling of disgust and embarrassment."*
>
> *"What was apparent was the lack of leadership and direction on the ground. There appeared to be lots of Police standing around upon my arrival but very few seemed to know what to do. The apparent Command Post for this incident was clearly identifiable, being a marked police sedan. Yet there were few, if any, Commanders at this location upon my arrival. There was no officer in charge, taking names and directing staff to particular locations relevant to their duty type.*
>
> *I would have expected to find a Senior Officer wearing a Site Controller tabard, the next most senior wearing a Forward Commander tabard and numerous Inspectors/Duty Officers performing specific tasks as per IESOPS".*

The last quote finishes off with IESOPS, that is, Incident and Emergency Standing Operating Procedures. These procedures, completed in 2001, are an updated version of Major Incident/Emergency Standing Operating Procedures. (MIESOPS) compiled in 1996.

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IESOPS set out:

- the functions of the various Police Sections/Units and how they can be of assistance;
- information in regard to the availability of resources, not only police resources but also those belonging to other agencies; and
- the emergency management arrangements provided for in the State Emergency and Rescue Management Act, 1989.

Definitions of Command, Control, Command Post, Assembly Areas, amongst others are also outlined, along with checklists and a Guide for Police Commanders at Incidents and Emergencies. From information and submissions received IESOPS were not followed in these areas –

- Command
- Control
- Command Post
- Marshalling area
- Completing of Logs
- Tactics

IESOPS are adequate for emergency management responses, which are usually after the event, however, very little information is available for unplanned civil disorder and responding to confrontation matters. There is no mention of riot, civil disorder or Operation Support Group throughout IESOPS. Crowd control is outlined in these procedures but only relative to sightseers and spectators at planned events.

IESOPS need to be urgently reviewed to assist police in the professional response to unplanned civil disorder.

OUTLINE OF ACTIVITIES RELATING TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COMMAND POST:

20:51 Inspector Emery informs Inspector Chambers of need for replacements of day shift staff. He indicates Superintendent Smith wants police to keep low key. Inspector Emery also states rocks and bricks being thrown, but not landing within 30 feet of police.

20:56 A conversation between Inspector Emery and Inspector Chambers outlines the disorder escalating. Approximately 200 persons have charged at police who had to retreat, and there was no emergency or OSG response available.

Events between 21:00 and 22:15 on Sunday 15 February 2004.

21:00 Mr Hall reports staff are expressing concern things are getting out of hand at the Railway Station. He advises them to close their work- stations and go home. Four staff leave and two remain.

21:02 Redfern 14 requested to attend the location Lawson and Gibbons Streets by Inspector Garth Smith with riot gear.

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21:04 **A 'SIGNAL ONE'** was called by Redfern 45 at the intersection of Lawson and Gibbons Street.

21:06 Inspector Smith directs all cars to the Command Post at the corner of Gibbons and Lawson Streets.

21:15 Mr Hall is informed by the Rail Management Centre to evacuate the railway station.

21:28 Petrol bombs being thrown in the direction of police. Bottles and bricks being thrown at police, with attempts to set fire to the railway station. Fire Brigade is summoned. Inspector Emery states they were just charged by 'a couple of hundred' causing police to retreat. Emery reports to Inspector Chambers 'they are gearing up to do it again'. He further states there is no emergency or OSG response. Inspector Chambers looks for the on call officer and OPS Manager phone numbers for Inspector Emery.

21:29 Inspector Emery contacts relieving Operations Manager Inspector Snel requesting OSG equipment and personnel. This request is in adherence with the Redfern Standard Operating Procedures for the 'block' dated March 1998. Inspector Snel later reports being asked for equipment only.

21:31 Fire at Redfern Railway Station. Inspector Chambers has requested no trains to stop at the Station.

21:42 Inspector Snell briefed by Inspector Chambers via phone.

21:45 Ambulance requested to treat four or five injured police.

22:03 Sergeant James Shearer, OSG, had been contacted by Sergeant Wade – OSG Commander – to arrange for equipment to be taken to Redfern. Cannot contact the LAC Commander of Redfern, but is given the location of the Command Post.

22:05 The crowd advanced and Inspector Smith gave permission for the police line to advance. A number of police are hurt and removed.

22:15 Redfern Crime Manager, Detective Inspector Darren Bennett, contacts Inspector Chambers and asks if a helicopter is on duty. He is told no.

COMMANDERS OPERATIONAL PHASE

Sunday 15 February 2004

22:20 Superintendent Smith arrives at the Command Post. Superintendent Smith gives the reason for additional resources taking so long to arrive as there was a presumption at 9.00pm equipment and 20 OSG were coming. As the night progressed it was evident there was a need for more police.

22:50 The OSG van arrives with protective equipment, Inspector Chambers contacts Police Media Unit (PMU).

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23:09 Superintendent Adney, Deputy Commissioners Office, contacts Inspector Chambers indicating she had just spoken to Superintendent Smith, whom wants '20 more staff, anyone'. Inspector Chambers states Eastern Suburbs 10 informed him only 20 OSG were wanted. Superintendent Adney states Smith wants as many police as he can get. Inspector Chambers states everyone available from the 'City' is already there, but he will try and get 20 more personnel for Superintendent Smith.

(At this point there was still no apparent realisation that the 20 OSG requested at 9.30pm had not arrived at Redfern, or have not actually been requested.) During his interview with Assistant Commissioner Laycock on 4 March 2004, Superintendent Smith states, 'Contacted Donna Adney two or three times, requesting help. I felt the gravity of the situation wasn't being understood and I contacted Adney to get more help.'

23:10 Superintendent Smith requests 20 OSG and 20 other police from Inspector Chambers through Superintendent Adney. Inspector Chambers states 'every available police officer in the city is there'.

23:25 Inspector Snel rings Superintendent Smith to see if OSG personnel are required, but his mobile is engaged. She speaks to Inspector Emery and states there was no request for OSG personnel.

23:30 Superintendent Smith contacts Assistant Commissioner Waites, stating the situation was under control and there were only 30 people involved in some rowdy behaviour.

This is in conflict with Superintendent Smith's earlier conversation with Superintendent Adney, some 20 minutes earlier. However there were fluctuations in riotous behaviour throughout the night, and this conversation may have occurred during a quiet period.

23:34 Superintendent Smith is informed by Inspector Chambers he can only raise 5 more police and questions whether OSG on the way. Superintendent Smith was not able to confirm this and asked for the assistance of the State Protection Group (SPG).

23:40 Inspector Snel contacts Inspector Chambers requesting prison trucks for Redfern.

Monday 16 February 2004

00:16 City Rail contact VKG to ascertain how long trains will be stopped from going through Redfern.

00:30 Inspector Smith states a large group of persons were gathering at Eveleigh Street and made several advances upon police throwing rocks and bottles.

00:57 Inspector Chambers receives information that police were going to advance as the railway was being 'trashed'. Inspector Emery states police are out numbered as there are '150 upon them', and 30 to 40 more Police are required.

01:00 Senior Sergeant Wade receives a request from Superintendent Smith by phone for 20 OSG. This request is approved by Inspector Snel.

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01:15 Superintendent Smith contacted Assistant Commissioner Waites indicating he required further police as there were now 100 extra rioters and police were being attacked with rocks, bricks and bottles. Assistant Commissioner Waites leaves his home address to attend Redfern.

01:19 Superintendent Smith contacts Inspector Chambers requesting more police stating there are police who have been on duty for 18 hours, and they'll be lucky to 'hold' Redfern Police Station. DOI states OSG on the way but can't say how many.

01:37 Sunday 16 February, Assistant Commissioner Waites calls Inspector Chambers requesting 30 to 50 more police, indicating his E.T.A. to Redfern is approximately 10 to 15 minutes.

01:47 Assistant Commissioner Waites informs Inspector Chambers that Molotov cocktails are being thrown and he requires something to deflect them.

01:50 Sergeant O'Riordan loads 50 sets of riot equipment at the SPC for transport to Redfern.

02:00 Lee Wood at Polair is contacted by Inspector Chambers.

02:00 Assistant Commissioner Waites rings Senior Sergeant Wade requesting availability of chemical munitions with a negative result.

02:04 A CIDS message outlines the Fire Brigade have withdrawn due to safety issues and have handed equipment over to police. The Fire Brigade indicated they are of the belief there are not enough police on hand.

02:05 Inspector Chambers informed Assistant Commissioner Waites that a helicopter had been called out, and did he want the video unit?

02:10 Inspector Chambers calls the video unit out.

02:14 Superintendent Smith informed Inspector Chambers he was using NSWFB hose to manage rioters.

02:30 Sergeant O'Riordan arrives and distributes riot equipment.

02:37 Assistant Commissioner Waites informs Inspector Chambers there are sufficient police but insufficient protective equipment and requests more.

02:53 Alan (nfi) from Minister of Transport's Office calls Inspector Chambers to confirm if trains are running.

02:58 Inspector Chambers contacts Assistant Commissioner Waites and informs him the van with protective equipment will be there in 10 minutes, and that he had not had any contact from Polair.

03:00 Sergeant O'Riordan conducts a briefing with OSG team leaders.

03:03 Lee Wood for Polair indicated to VKG that Polair was airborne and would be overhead within a few minutes.

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03:14 Detective Sergeant Dean Smith, Fairfield LAC, contacts Inspector Chambers confirming what type of riot equipment is required, then indicates 10 sets of riot gear and 10 additional vests will be sent to Redfern.

03:26 Inspector Smith indicated that all lines advanced.

03:30 Sergeant O'Riordan states that a tactical approach was commenced at 3.30am. During the approach and whilst holding the perimeter nil rioters were sighted.

03:36 Superintendent Smith requested Polair to light up Eveleigh Street.


03:51 Inspector Smith declares 'Area under Control'.

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COMMAND POST

Shortly before 9.00pm on Sunday 16 February 2004, police were bombarded with missiles at the riot scene. Inspector Garth Smith broadcasted over the police radio the establishment of a Command Post, being a police vehicle on the corner of Gibbons and Lawson Street Redfern.

Location of Command Post:



As there had been considerable unrest from 4.00pm onwards, with the initial attack on police causing for retreat to near the corner of Lawson and Gibbons Street, the setting up of the Command Post at this location was not operationally sound, although in alignment with SOPs for the 'block'.

The police media unit and Superintendent Smith report damage being occasioned to police vehicles whilst in the area of the Command Post, necessitating their removal. Superintendent Smith states the Command Post remained at the intersection, however he was worried about the crowd congregating behind them in Gibbons Street and moved the barriers back to Regent Street. A more appropriate location could have been established for the Command Post.

It would appear the Command Post was in name only, as it reported to have been unmanned at most times. Police at the scene indicated they knew where the Command Post was, but often there was no one to report or receive instructions from.

The forward Command Post is stated to be positioned immediately behind the OSG line. Assistant Commissioner Waites reported finding it difficult to find a location to conduct command when he arrived.

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Visiting police also indicated they were not aware who was in Command. No one was wearing vests which indicate roles of police at such events.

SITE CO-ORDINATION

There was no person in charge of the actual Command Post to direct police to a marshalling area (not established), assembly area (not clearly established), stand down area (not established), first aid area (not established) and direction as to what was requested of Ambulance and Fire Brigade personnel.

Police accounts indicate members of the public were allowed to walk past the police line and into the area where the incidents were occurring.

Superintendent Dennis Smith could have considered the Police Operations Centre (POC) earlier in the night. Later he wanted Assistant Commissioner Waites to come on site so they could 'show seniority'. There was no apparent appreciation of the value of the POC, which could have been set up and managed by police trained for this purpose. The POC could have been opened in the absence of Assistant Commissioner Waites attendance, and staffed by Police trained for this purpose.

OPERATIONAL LOGS

Inspector Garth Smith was the only officer identified as having produced a log relating to requests and decisions, albeit these notes were not contemporaneous. Assistant Commissioner Waites reports nominating two Inspectors as staff officers to record decisions, but they absented themselves as the riot abated.

FOLLOW-UP OF REQUESTS

20 OSG personnel were reported to have been requested at 9.30pm and due to a misunderstanding did not arrive until 1.30am, causing detriment in the ability to respond to the disorder. Minimal follow up was undertaken by the Duty Officer, Commander or DOI to confirm expected times of arrival, additionally hindering Police responsiveness to the riot.

Twenty sets of protective equipment arrived at Redfern at 10.49pm, followed by additional equipment transported to the scene at 1.50am. More equipment arrived at 2.30am.

DECISION MAKING

Submissions received by Strike Force Coburn indicated reports of site chaos, lack of co-ordination and limited briefings by the Duty Officers who set up the Command Post.

Whilst an inquiry made about the availability of Polair brought about a negative result, its non availability should not have been so readily accepted. If Polair had illuminated Eveleigh Street earlier Police may have become aware of the number of those rioting and used more options.

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It was clear the rioters were intending to cause police harm with the sheer volume of bricks, bottles and Molotov cocktails thrown. Support units, such as the Mounted Police were not used as Superintendent Smith indicated he believed 'intoxicated youths may have been injured'. This led to the questionable tactics of police standing in a line attempting to hold their ground whilst being 'pelted' with missiles.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

At one stage Superintendent Smith was in the front line during the use of the fire hose, any decisions made whilst there were purely tactical and only communicated to a few police nearby. Similarly when Assistant Commissioner Waites took Command he was positioned close to the police line, stating he wanted to support the troops who appeared frightened.

Reports submitted to Strike Force Coburn indicate there was a lack of clear direction communicated from the senior Police throughout the evening in relation to tactics and deployment options of Police. This particularly related to Police from LACs other than Redfern. Assistant Commissioner Waites states the riot was prolonged due to the lack of sound tactical decisions.

WHAT ROLE DID (OR SHOULD) THE OPERATIONS SUPPORT GROUP (OSG) PLAY IN THE EVENTS OF 15-16 FEBRUARY 2004?

OSG ROLE:

The role of the OSG is to provide operational support on a 24 hour basis to LAC/Regions in situations falling within the charter of Operations Support Group. They can be utilised in support of any Policing operation where a highly disciplined response team is required. This includes support activities where specialist protective equipment may be utilised but does not include the resolution of high risk situations, involving armed offenders.

CHARTER OF THE OSG:

The OSG can be utilised to support Commanders in the following situations:

- Events where crowds are anticipated
- Protests and demonstrations
- Searches for improvised explosive devices,
- Searched for evidence, persons and property
- Canvassing
- Emergency incidents
- Security at Correctional/Juvenile Justice institutions
- Policing operations including but not limited to antisocial behaviour, saturation patrols, crime enforcement operations and support to specialist units.
- Safe movement of violent prisoners
- Chemical, Biological and Radiation response.

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There is sufficient information in the SPG's 'Role' document and the OSG 'Charter' document to indicate the SPG and OSG have differing functions in Policing. The OSG is Region based with no current statewide centralisation and / or coordination structure.

ACTUAL ROLE OF OSG ON 15–16 FEBRUARY 2004:

Sunday 150204

1812 Inspector Emery contacts Inspector Chambers re the availability of OSG and Vikings resources. Inspector Chambers advised that neither of those groups were operational at that time to his knowledge.

2104 There was a charge by a group of the rioters leading to a tactical withdrawal by Police.

2128 Insp Emery conferred with Inspector Chambers, looking for O.S.G. personnel. Inspector Emery is given the phone number for the Region Operations Manager, Inspector Snel.

2130 Insp Emery rings Insp Snel and asks for 20 OSG riot outfits and 20 OSG personnel.

The message was interpreted by Inspector Snel that there was a requirement for 20 OSG riot outfits. Insp Snel contacted the OSG Coordinator, Sgt Wade, who organised the OSG equipment to be delivered to the riot scene. At that time, Supt Smith and Inspector Emery and Smith believed 20 OSG personnel were being organised to attend via callout.

2200 Sgt Shearer, an OSG Field Supervisor, who, acting as a duty officer at Eastern Suburbs Command, begins involvement while at his station.

2223 An OSG supervisor calls on air for a sitrep and then goes and picks up equipment.

2248 OSG equipment truck and two supervisors call off at the Redfern Command Post at Lawson and Gibbons St.

These OSG supervisors noted that there was a Police line of 14 officers wearing dated riot equipment. The OSG officers immediately went to the rear of the OSG equipment truck, removing 18 shields, a quantity of leggings, 12 ballistic vests and 18 helmets.

2300 Supt Smith still believes that 20 OSG are on the way.

2300 A call went out for all OSG present to assemble at the Command Post and they found there were not enough to make up a line and then a call went out for further OSG operatives. The riot equipment was issued to officers present and 6 OSG officers. S/C Crowe conversed with Supt Smith for a short time and then spoke to Sergeant Shearer who had taken the role as OSG field commander. S/C Crowe takes command of the Police line.

2309 There was a general call for more Police, but the OSG field supervisor wanted the additional Police to be OSG only, but Superintendent Smith says, 'Any Police'. There is an observation that the call for which type of 'Police' is a responsibility of Supt Smiths'.

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S/C Crowe then organised available Police into 3 arrest teams consisting of 10 Police in each team. Four of the arrest team wore riot equipment to protect other members. He advised the line on tactics to counter actions by the rioters. For the next 30 minutes the line went forward in Lawson St for the purpose of bringing stability to the area and during this time several police were injured.

2300 Appeal for more OSG, by 12 midnight there were only 4 additional on duty OSG.

2320 There is still a belief by Inspector G. Smith that 20 OSG are being called out.

2358 There was a phone call from Flemington DO, Chief Inspector Ashton to Inspector Chambers. Inspector Ashton said he had two OSG available but he was advised that Inner Metropolitan OSG were wanted only.

Monday 160204

0100 The realisation that no OSG group had been called out as assumed, which caused phone calls between Inspector Smith, Sgt Wade and Inspector Snel. That occurred and over the next 90 mins 15 OSG arrived at the scene.

0117 There was a call from the OSG field supervisor to all cars to ensure those Police attending the riot scene did so in their ballistic vests.

0220 Supt Smith deployed a fire hose from the front line at the rioters.

0230 OSG Sgt O'Riordan and Stokes arrived with more OSG equipment and the fire hose is deployed. Sgt Shearer hands over the OSG field supervision to Sgt O'Riordan. Sgt Shearer then took up a forward supervisory role immediately behind the front line. There were fresh OSG officers arriving and they were rotated into the line relieving general duty Police. The maximum width of the line was 25 officers, being 23 OSG trained and two Redfern Sergeants. Sgt O'Riordan took over command of the line.

0300 Sgt O'Riordan conducted a briefing with 6 OSG trained Sergeants leading to a tactical approach with Polair overhead.

0330 The police line went forward and the OSG entered a virtually empty Eveleigh Street as the rioters had dispersed. The area was secured until investigations were completed.

ARREST, CHARGING AND EVIDENCE GATHERING CONSIDERATIONS

Options

Little consideration was evident of preparation for arresting rioters. Video footage shows in the early stages a wedge formed by police with the arrest team at the rear wearing no protective equipment. When missiles were thrown the arrest team had to retreat to safety.

Rioters were allowed far too close to the police line with little fear of being apprehended. This allowed rioters ample time to take full aim at police with bricks and Molotov cocktails.

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When the police line retreated after a barrage of missiles were thrown at them, the rioters simply collected their bricks and missiles and used them again. When police moved forward there was no attempt by Police to collect the bricks and missiles that had been thrown at them earlier.

The seriousness of offences being committed during the riot, in particular relating to the throwing of Molotov cocktails, required the availability of investigators for evidence gathering processes. No criminal investigators, with the exception of the Detective Inspector Bennett were on duty at the scene during the riots to gather this evidence.

Five persons were arrested on the morning of the riot, Monday, 16 February, 2004. However, not one was charged with offences connected to the riot that morning.

Serious consideration needs to be given to organising SOPS for arrest and charging in public order incidents with evidentiary identification protocols the major concern. More legally aggressive tactics for arrest should be included in the Public Order Management Policy.

APPROPRIATE ASSESSMENT OF INCIDENT SEVERITY

Redfern SOP's prior to February, 2004:

During March 1998 the Redfern LAC developed and implemented "Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for Eveleigh Street 'block' Area Redfern.". These SOPs were not fully adhered to during the riot, particularly in relation to the attendance of OSG.

The SOPs relate to perceived situations that may arise, categorising them into four levels of severity with predetermined responses for each level. These levels are listed below:

Level One: Pursuit of Offender

Matters to be considered,

- Officer Safety is paramount
- If ID of offender known, withdrawal rather than violent confrontation/escalation is preferable.
- Likelihood of arrest, in that particular pursuit, is remote.
- Seriousness/type/nature/circumstances surrounding the offence.
- Swift removal/safe custody of the offender from the scene.
- Security of Police vehicles.
- Protection/danger of pursuit to community.

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Level Two: Officers are unable to withdraw/isolated

- Notify VKG, request backup and attendance of Supervisor/DO
- Supervisor/DO to attend & decide upon additional resources & their duties LAC to be informed at discretion of DO
- Establish Command Post (Pre determined Locations provided)
- The 'block' intersections (Pre determined Locations provided)
- Use of protective equipment at discretion of Supervisor/DO
- ACLO's to be used at discretion of Supervisor/DO to be called out.
- Controlled withdrawal, when directed by Supervisor/DO
- De-brief & Sitrep.

Level Three: Major incident in area, riot ect.

- Supervisor/DO attend & immediately establish Command Post.
- LAC informed immediately
- Sitreps to VKG
- VKG to advise surrounding commands - Eastern Beaches/Botany Bay/Newtown/CELTS response vehicle.
- Request call out of Operations Support Group (Call out process attached)
- Safety of Police & Community must be paramount
- Establish perimeter area
- Make use of video and cameras to record incident & consider video unit
- Allow access/egress - VKG to remind o/s vehicles on parking locations
- Police directed to enter controlled area & leave car keys at Command Post
- Consider second marshalling point for vehicles
- Use protective equipment at discretion of Supervisor/DO
- When decision made to send Police into the area, trained Police to be used in front line when available. Use OSG if available when selecting Team Leaders.
- Form arrest teams

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- 2 Caged vehicles on standby at Command Post
- Consider splitting arrested persons between designated custody stations
- ACLOs used at discretion of Supervisor/DO - call out after hrs.
- All Police leave controlled area immediately on direction of Supervisor/DO.

Level Four Search Warrants

When executing search warrants Police will notify the LAC or DO prior to arrangements being made. Warrants will be executed under operational conditions established by this Command.

POST RIOT SOPS

In March 2004 these SOP's were enhanced with some minor alterations. Response in relation to *Unplanned arrests* remains the same as Level One. In relation to *Planned operations and Search Warrants,* procedures reflect the Level Four stage, with Redfern command to be notified in advance, and the operation conducted according to Redfern controls.

The SOPs detail predetermined responses to *Throw Missile incidents* which differ slightly dependent upon whether the offender is unknown or identified. The response mirrors the previous Level One response with the inclusion of HVP in response at the discretion of the Supervisor/DO.

In response to a *Major Incident* the new SOPs reflect a Level Three response and have incorporated some instructions to improve Command Post management techniques for marshalling, tasking of Police and maintaining the incident log. The procedure now also details requirements for investigative processes to be undertaken regarding incidents which have occurred in the subject location.

SKILLS OF COMMANDERS

Information obtained in this section relates to historical records maintained by corporate systems relating to attendance at service courses. The information provided cannot obviously extend to information relating to skills of individual officers experiences. Research of current training material inclusive of the Operational Commanders Training Manual, Duty Officers Manual and Sergeants course composition, does not include specific training in control of riotous behaviour.

- Information from the Leadership Development Directorate indicates that participants within their programme are not exposed to riotous behaviour management training.
- Limited numbers of Commanders have been exposed to Counter Terrorism/Politically Motivated Violence training through Task Force Pioneer experiences.

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- April 2004 SAP records indicate there were 55 officers at command level who have completed the Senior Emergency Management course. This course does not include components directly relating riotous behaviour management.

- The Emergency Management course is a pre-requisite for all leading Senior Constable positions across NSW Police and is offered to officers from the rank of Constable to Inspector.

- OSG personnel are all trained in dealing with riotous behaviour, with OSG Team Leader training including components relating to command of riotous situations. The majority of personnel in OSG are of 'constable ranks' and are not trained in relation to command of riotous situations.

- Local research indicated that very few Duty Officers and Commanders have training in unplanned civil disorder.

TRAINING

Education Services (ES) were consulted in relation to current and future training for NSW Police in relation to unplanned civil disorder incidents, providing three separate submissions to Strike Force Coburn.

The first submission provided information relating to current training materials available for NSW Polie.

The second submission canvasses a tiered approach to Public Order Management Training. This approach is in four levels:-

1. Level One – Recruit Level Training.

2. Level Two – Basic Operator, Operations Support Group.

3. Level Three – Forward Command and Control of Public Order Incidents.

4. Level Four – Command and Control of Public Order Incidents.

The third submission outlines proposed training courses by Operational Safety Training and Traffic Unit (OSTTU). These courses are as follows:-

1. Public Order Commanders Course (4 days)

2. Operations Support Group Commanders Course (2 days)

3. Operations Support Group Tactical Advisors Course (5 days)

4. Public Order Advisory Team.

5. Equipment/Training.

Additional research relating to training identified the San Diego Police Department's training course for their personnel in civil disorder. – (Justice Departments civil disorder Initiative Addresses Police Training Gap).

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FINDINGS - COMMAND AND CONTROL

1. Inadequate training at Command, Supervisor and Constable level for Unplanned Civic disorder resulted in the following

   - The Command Post was inappropriately positioned to be operationally effective.
   - The forward command post was inadequate.
   - Site co-ordination was inadequate and badly positioned.
   - Poor records and very few logs were kept.
   - Tactical and strategic options such as OSG, Mounted Police and Polair were not utilised appropriately.
   - Command and Control focused mainly on the police line where Commanders were situated.
   - Requests and follow up inquiries for Operations Support Group were not actioned in a timely fashion.

2. There was a lack of options for arrest, charging and evidence gathering.

3. There was a lack of trained investigators deployed to the scene.

4. IESOPS do not cater for a police response to unplanned civil disorder or public order incidents.

RECOMMENDATIONS - COMMAND AND CONTROL

1. Redfern SOPs to be updated re location of Command Post during the 'block' incidents.

   Education Services and OSTTU to consider current and future training requirements for all levels of NSW Police in relation to public order incidents, particularly in relation to command responsibilities, command post management, log keeping and utilisation of specialist units.

2. Public Order Management Policy be reviewed to include arrest and charging tactics.

3. Detectives to be included in the police response to unplanned civil disorder.

4. IESOPS to include information on the police response to unplanned civil disorder and public order incidents.

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SUBMISSIONS

POLICE ASSOCIATION CONCERNS

Following the incident the NSW Police Association convened a meeting with Association members attached to the Redfern LAC on 240204. The Association provided a preliminary response to Strike Force Coburn dated 260204 raising three main issues of concern: [3]

- **Equipment:** Including the adequacy, amount and condition of protective equipment which may have contributed to delaying resolution of the incident and resulting in injuries to police.

- **Training**: Including the number of police who were not trained in riot situations suggesting a higher number of Redfern based police should have been trained in the use of equipment.

- **Adequacy of Police Numbers:** Including the number of OSG qualified who were called to the incident and the apparent need for a full time OSG capacity.

The Association has provided Strike Force Coburn with a range of material that requires further consideration including prior submissions to the Executive for upgrading of OSG capabilities and equipment at the Redfern LAC.

Officer Safety

As outlined in a number of NSW Police Standard Operating Procedures, Police Officer safety is paramount during incidents such as the Redfern Civil Disturbance. Maintained appropriate equipment is one means of reducing the following risks for Police:

- Serious injury or loss of life
- Post Traumatic Stress Disorder
- Minor Injury
- Workplace Stress

Such risks impact upon sick leave, Hurt on Duty claims, Workcover, Workers Compensation, EAPS uptake, as well as the Police Officers wider family.

Command and Control

Concerns have been raised regarding command and control and lack of leadership during the incident.

3 Remfrey, P. 26/2/04. Memorandum to S/F Coburn.

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LIST OF SUBMISSIONS

NO.	NAME	POSITION	SUBJECT	DATE
001.	A/C Waites	Inner Metropolitan Region Commander	Incident Overview & Recommendations	30/03/2004
002.	A/C Hazzard	Commander –CTCC	Proposed OSG structure	03/05/2004
003.	A/C Goodwin	Operations Support Commander	State OSG Co-ordination / Corporate ownership	15/03/2004
004.	A/C West	Western Region Commander	Western Region OSG Plans	12/03/2004
005.	A/C Parsons	Northern Region Commander	Nth Region structure & proposed enhancements	21/04/2004
006.	C/Supt Gillam	State Protection Group Commander	Capabilities of SPG Including current equipment	19/04/2004
007.	Supt Burn	Burwood Local Area Commander	Draft interim report to Parliament	16/04/2004
008.	Supt Smith	Redfern Local Area Commander	Debrief & conversation with A/C Laycock	04/03/2004
009.	Supt Adney	Staff Officer to DCoP Operations	Event Reconstruction	27/03/2004
010.	Supt Corboy	VKG Sydney Commander	VKG response	03/03/2004
011.	Supt Mason	Darling River Local Area Commander	Proposed OSG structure	18/03/2004
012.	Supt Owens	Eastern Beaches Local Area Commander	Forum attendee	05/04/2004
013.	Supt Henderson	Quakers Hill Local Area Commander	Proposed OSG structure	19/04/2004
014.	Supt Newling	Deputy Director – Legal Services	Legal advice on Equipment/Tactics	24/03/2004
015.	C/Insp Parriott	Duty Officer – Coffs Harbour LAC	Proposed centralised OSG structure	16/03/2004
016.	C/Insp Hutchings	Crime Manager – Tuggerah Lakes LAC	Forum Attendee	05/04/2004
017.	C/Insp Birch	Duty Officer Campsie LAC	Campsie LAC POM plan	01/04/2004
018.	Det. Insp. Lynch	Crime Manager - Newtown		

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NO.	NAME	POSITION	SUBJECT	DATE
019.	Insp Minehan	Staff Officer to Western Region	Western Region OSG project. Risk assessment of riot	11/03/2004
020.	Insp Chambers	Duty Operations Inspector – VKG Sydney	Event Reconstruction, forum attendee & opinions.	05/04/2004
021.	Insp Withers	Duty Operations Inspector – VKG Sydney	How the DOI should be utilised & the role of LAC's	29/03/2004
022.	Insp Snel	Staff Officer – Inner Metropolitan Region	Event Reconstruction	26/02/2004
023.	Insp Sullivan	Duty Officer – Redfern LAC	8 Recommendations to enhance police response in riot situations	08/03/2004
024.	Insp Bennett	Crime Manager – Redfern LAC	Event Reconstruction & forum attendee	05/04/2004
025.	Insp Irvin	Duty Officer – Eastern Beaches LAC	Event Reconstruction & opinions	08/03/2004
026.	Insp Smith	Duty Officer – Redfern LAC	Forum attendee & debrief notes	05/04/2004
027.	Insp Nilon	Duty Officer – The Rocks LAC	Event Reconstruction & opinion	27/02/2004
028.	Insp McCarthy	Duty Officer – Parramatta LAC	Recommendation of police training in use of riot equipment	08/03/2004
029.	Insp Antonjuk	Duty Officer – Kings Cross LAC	Proposed OSG structure in the form of a Vikings unit	08/03/2004
030.	Insp Moore	Duty Officer – Redfern LAC	Forum attendee	05/04/2004
031.	Insp Green	Project Manager – ARC2	Opinions & full time OSG unit based on TRG	08/03/2004
032.	Insp Hunt	Duty Officer – Hurstville LAC	Observations of Policing during time spent at Redfern	08/03/2004
033.	Insp Emery	Duty Officer – Redfern LAC	Debrief notes.	22/02/2004
034.	Insp Martlew	Duty Officer – Gladesville LAC	Proposed Public order training	11/03/2004
035.	Insp Maxwell	Co-ordinator – Education Services	3 x Submissions on public order training & research on POM worldwide & Evaluation of LUPTON report findings	12/03/2004

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NO.	NAME	POSITION	SUBJECT	DATE
036.	Insp Freeman	Manager – Learning and Technology Systems	Hydra & Minerva training in POM	22/04/2004
037.	Insp Dawson	Duty Officer – Castlereagh LAC	Training in riot equipment	08/03/2004
038.	A/Insp Shearer	Duty Officer – Eastern Suburbs LAC	Event reconstruction & proposed OSG structure	19/04/2004
039.	S/Sgt Wade	Inner Metropolitan Region OSG Co-ordinator	Forum attendee, Event Reconstruction & Proposed OSG structure	06/04/2004
040.	S/Sgt Hinds	Operations Co-ordinator SPG Dog Unit	Forum attendee	05/04/2004
041.	A/S/Sgt Biffin	Team leader – Mounted unit	Mounted unit to be involved in POM issues	15/03/2004
042.	Sgt Hall	Team Leader – Macquarie Fields LAC	Recommendations on OSG training & training for more senior officers	13/03/2004
043.	Sgt Pieri	Intelligence Supervisor – Redfern LAC	Assistance with local Intelligence	29/03/2004
044.	Sgt Reitano	Crime Co-ordinator – Redfern LAC	Forum attendee	05/04/2004
045.	Sgt Aston	Team Leader – Botany Bay LAC	Water canon	08/03/2004
046.	Sgt Burke	Team Leader – Surry Hills	Use of riot shields	03/04/2004
047.	Sgt Ball	President – Police Association	Forum attendee	05/04/2004
048.	Sgt McIntosh	Team Leader – Redfern LAC	Forum attendee	05/04/2004
049.	Sgt Barlow	Scarce Resource Co-ordinator Southern Region	Overview of Sthn Region OSG submitted by A/S/Sgt Markham	01/04/2004
050.	Sgt Wood	Team Leader – POLAIR	Event Reconstruction & Forum attendee	05/04/2004
051.	Sgt Huxtable	Team Leader – Redfern LAC	Forum attendee	05/04/2004
052.	Sgt Martin	Team Leader – Mounted Police	Forum attendee	05/04/2004
053.	Sgt McDonald	Solicitor – Legal Services.	Legality of less than lethal options	10/05/2004

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NO.	NAME	POSITION	SUBJECT	DATE
054.	Sgt Mayer	Team Leader – SPG Dog Unit	Forum attendee	05/04/2004
055.	Sgt Baxter	Team Leader – Redfern LAC	Recommendations for Redfern LAC	26/02/2004
056.	Sgt Bullock	Team Leader – Holroyd LAC	Proposal for full time OSG unit	13/03/2004
057.	Sgt Maurer	Video Operations	Event Reconstruction & video equipment recommendations	08/03/2004
058.	D/Sgt Gordon	Investigator – State Crime Command	Information on past riots	08/03/2004
059.	D/Sgt Raymond	Crime Scene Operations - Maitland	Opinion & Organisational issues	21/04/2004
060.	L/S/C Brown	Castlereagh LAC	Suggestion of training and equipment issue in POM.	08/03/2004
061.	L/S/C McGowan	Ashfield LAC	Event Reconstruction & recommendations	11/05/2004
062.	L/S/C Bakker	Northern Beaches LAC	Suggestions of full time OSG & further training	08/03/2004
063.	L/S/C Burrows	Campbelltown LAC	Suggestions for full time OSG unit & further training	14/03/2004
064.	S/Cst Crowe	Surry Hills Weapons Training Unit	Event Reconstruction & proposal for full time OSG	27/04/2004
065.	S/Cst Fleming	New England LAC	Further training required for police & opinions on the current state of training	19/03/2004
066.	S/Cst Wallace	SPG Tactical Operations Unit	Use of "the Bearcat"	09/03/2004
067.	S/Cst Christopher	CTCC – Analyst Unit	Proposed OSG Command & Control Structure based on Army model	10/03/2004
068.	S/Cst Kilby	Task Force GAIN	Event Reconstruction	13/03/2004
069.	S/Cst Steggles	Firearms & Operations Response	The use of riot equipment	25/02/2004
070.	S/Cst Snowden	Botany Bay Highway Patrol	Event Reconstruction	25/03/2004
071.	S/Cst Harriss	Police Rescue	Forum attendee	05/04/2004

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NO.	NAME	POSITION	SUBJECT	DATE
072.	S/Cst Abbott	VKG Sydney	Event Reconstruction, Opinion & submission.	
073.	Cst Macklin	St George LAC	Event Reconstruction & Opinion	01/03/2004
074.	Cst French	Redfern LAC	Forum attendee	05/04/2004
075.	Cst Beeche	Task Force GAIN	Event Reconstruction & opinion	01/04/2004
076.	P/Cst Carroll	Holroyd LAC	Event Reconstruction & Opinion	14/03/2004
077.	Revd Peter Mumford	Senior Chaplain	Call out of Chaplains	18/03/2004
078.	Ms Doreen Peters	ACLO State Co-ordinator	Forum attendee	05/04/2004
079.	Ms Joanne Elliott	Media Liaison Officer – Police Media Unit	Event Reconstruction	03/03/2004
080.	Ms Jody Broun	Director General Department of Aboriginal Affairs	Interview notes with A/C Laycock & Insp Lee.	17/03/2004
081.	Ms Valerie Wilding	Assistant Aboriginal Project Officer	Forum Attendee	05/04/2004
082.	Mr Tom Lupton (Ret S/Sgt)	Former Head of School, Operational Safety & Tactics	Post course report for Public order training in London.	24/11/1998
083.	Mr Bob Morgan	NSW Police Association	Forum attendee	05/04/2004
084.	Mr Michael Ramsay	Project Director of Redfern/Waterloo Partnership Project	Interview notes with Insp Lee	26/03/2004
085.	Mr Ross Neilson	Director – Public Affairs Branch	Forum attendee Information on executive notifications	05/04/2004
086.	Ms Sandra Soldo	NSW Police Association	Submission by the NSW Police Association with 11 recommendations	04/04/2004
087.	Mr Sol Bellear	Director of Community Relations, Department of Aboriginal Affairs	Telephone conversation with Insp Lee	06/04/2004

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Item No.

21

Public Order Management Review Redfern - Preliminary Report

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Preliminary Analysis of the Redfern Civil Disobedience Events: 14 - 16 February 2004

Strike force Coburn
Stage I - Preliminary Report



27 February 2004

Coburn Review Team
Assistant Commissioner John Laycock
Detective Inspector Brenton Lee
Detective Inspector Michael Fuller
Inspector Michael Watkins

Project Management Unit
Ms Sandra Bilson
Inspector Barry Gallagher

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Dissemination

This Preliminary – Stage I Report is prepared for distribution to:

Copy No	Name	Location/Role
1.	**DC Dave Madden**	**Deputy Commissioner Operations**
2.	**Commissioner Moroney**	**Commissioner**
3.	**AC John Laycock**	**Assistant Commissioner**

Approval Record

Deputy Commissioner (Operations) Dave Madden	*Signature*	*Date*

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Executive Summary

On 15 February at 2100hrs and into the early hours of 16 February 2004, a crowd of up to 150 individuals (fluctuating from 30 to 150) staged an organised street battle with Police outside the Redfern Railway Station. During the 6-hour incident close to 250 Police, Ambulance and Fire Brigade personnel were deployed to the scene. Approximately 40 Police were injured during the incident.

The crowd threw rocks, bricks, cement, fireworks and petrol bombs at Police and NSW Fire Brigade personnel. The level of organisation and violence used by the crowd is unprecedented in recent times. The events were fuelled by a perception of Police involvement in the death of a youth the previous day. The hot evening weather and alcohol consumption are also believed to have contributed to the atmosphere on Sunday evening.

First Response

Initially 16 Police from the Redfern LACs responded to an initial incident that was believed to have been under control. Confronted by a crowd of up to 70 people throwing bricks Police were initially overrun and forced to retreat. Limited riot equipment supplies were distributed amongst Police (between 4 – 8 sets) to deal with the initial threat. Order was initially restored as the crowd move back into Eveleigh Street. With an inability to observe the block area Police believed the situation was under control.

Escalating Violence

Over the next 6 hours crowds of between 30 and 150 people emerged from Eveleigh Street attacking Police. The crowd used the 'Block' in Redfern as a staging location throughout the evening. By 2150 hours more riot equipment arrived at the scene where Police were maintaining defensive positions.

On several occasions Police attempted to move the crowd away from the Redfern Railway Station, which had been set alight. These attempts were met with escalating violence and growing crowd numbers. By 0100 hours up to 60 Police had converged on the scene from across the metropolitan area. Police numbers grew to 200 Police by 0300 hours. Up to 20 OSG personnel were deployed by 0200 hours.

Police Response

The Police strategy and tactics were to maintain a defensive (static & advance) line and keep the crowd away from the Redfern CBD area. On several occasions Police successfully moved the crowd away from the railway station in an attempt to deal with a small fire. On each occasion the crowd responded in greater numbers pushing Police back. To avoid escalating crowd violence, Police refrained from making arrests during the incident.

The Redfern LAC arrived at the scene at 2200 hrs with the first Executive notification occurring around 2228 hours via the DOI. The Region Commander arrived on the scene at 0130 hrs.

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The use of chemical agents was discounted as an option as Police were not issued with protective masks. The Police Commander used a fire hose at 0302 hrs in an effort to deflect projectiles and move the crowd back from Police positions.

Following the civil disturbance, the Commissioner of Police initiated strike Force Coburn on 17 February 2004. The Terms of Reference required information on the following:

I. Equipment
II. Communications
III. Awareness & Preparation
IV. Staffing
V. Command & Control
VI. Standing Capabilities:
    ⇒ Operations Support Group (OSG)
    ⇒ Special Protection Group (SPG)

Strike Force Coburn is under the command of Assistant Commissioner John Laycock who convened a Review Team and Committee with support from the Project Management Unit.

On 24 February 2004, the Review Team and Committee met to exchange information and provide direction. An extensive Data Collection strategy has been implemented to inform Strike force Coburn.

Given the short time frame, this Preliminary Report is based on very limited data/ information. Complete validation for data / information remains outstanding. The process of collection, analysis and validation will remain ongoing until the Final Report is completed with recommendations on 16 May 2004.

The Project notes that an extensive review of the Operations Support Group was completed in 1999 for CET and resubmitted mid-2002. Implementation of the several recommendations would have strengthened the NSW Police OSG capability. The recommendations validity for 2004 will be pursued in Stage 11.1

Submitted for your consideration.

Assistant Commissioner John Laycock
29 February 2004

1 OSG Report, Chief Inspector G.R. Parriott, dated 19 June 2002.

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Aim & Background

This Preliminary Report responds to the Terms of Reference:

- In consultation with relevant stakeholders, review the strategic & tactical capability of the NSW Police to respond to civil disobedience at the Redfern Riot (15 -160204) including:
  - Equipment
  - Communications
  - Awareness & Preparation
  - Staffing
  - Command & Control
  - Standing Capabilities (SPG, OSG, former TRG)

Stage I provides an micro-overview of the Redfern Civil Disturbance with limited analysis. Data collation and validation from multiple sources remains ongoing.

Methodology


Strike force Coburn was initiated as a operational project on 17 February 2004 following direction from the Commissioner of Police to review a range of issues arising from the Civil Disobedience at Redfern between 15 -16 February 2003 (Project Register No.000068). The NSW Police Project Management Framework is being utilised for purposes of standardised processes, accountability and transparency. Project roles are:

Role	Person
Project Sponsor	Deputy Commissioner (Operations) Dave Madden
Project Manager	Assistant Commissioner John Laycock
Project Team	Inspector Mick Fuller Inspector Brenton Lee Inspector Michael Watkins.
Steering Committee (not inclusive)	Redfern Local Area Command State Protection Group Policy & Programs, Sydney Communications Inner Metropolitan Region NSW Police Association.
Project Coordination & Support	Ms Sandra Bilson, Project Management Unit Inspector Barry Gallagher, Project Management Unit

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Data / Information Sources

DATA COLLECTION MODEL



The sources utilised to collect information this report:

Source	Comment
1) Briefings from key commanders	
2) Consultation	Review Committee Meeting 230204
3) Data & Information Collection + Analysis	Refer Data Collection Schedule at Attachment A. (need to prepare summary of information received)
4) Open Source Information (OSI) Research	Other Australian Jurisdictions, United Kingdom, Canada

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Event Reconstruction

KEY LAC TIMINGS (Duty Officer Log)	POLICE & EQUIPT DEPLOYED (Estimate)	EXECUTIVE (Estimate)
	12 FEBRUARY 2004	
14:20hrs – RF140 involved in incident during arrest.		
	14 FEBRUARY 2004	
11:15 hrs – Hickey accident.		
	15 FEBRUARY 2004	
16:30 hrs – Youths throw rocks from Eveleigh St	1630	
17:30 hrs – Side window on police vehicle broken – Eveleigh St	1700	
		● **1800 hrs (approx.)** LAC calls AC Waites (notified, no further assistance)
19:00 hrs – Briefing at Redfern LAC. Afternoon shift retained for 1 hour. DO contacts nearby LACs.	1800	
19:30 hrs – Youths throwing bricks at Railway Station. DOI monitoring by CCTV.	1900	
19:42 hrs – Brick thrown at RF17 in Lawson St.	● **2000 hrs** 16 Police on site	
20:26 hrs – All appeared quiet.	● **2000 hrs** 16 Police on site	
21:02 hrs – Riot gear requested from Redfern 14.	2000	● **2130 hrs** Snell calls AC Waites (Duty Officer requires equipment, not personnel)
21:03 hrs – 60-70 individuals run from Eveleigh St toward Police throwing bricks & bottles. Signal 1, Police retreat to concourse..	● **2100 hrs** 20 sets of riot Equipment requested from OSG, 2 OSG called out	
21:05 hrs – Permission given to wear riot gear.	2100 ● **2100 hrs 4 – 8 sets of riot equipment on hand.**	
21:28 hrs – Petrol bombs thrown at Police. NSWFB advised.	● **2128 hrs** DOI confirms CCTV camera down.	
	● **2129 hrs** NSWFB receive 1st call from Police.	
21:40 hrs – Rail Station alight. Police & NSWFB attempt to respond. Bricks & bottles thrown. Police retreat.	● **2147 hrs** 1st Ambulance Unit arrives at scene.	
21:49 hrs – OSG Van arrives with additional equipment.	● **2150 hrs** OSG Equipment arrives.	● **2219 hrs** DOI calls Adney re SITREP.
22:00 hrs – LAC arrives.	● **2200 hrs** 30-40 Police on site.	● Adney calls DOI 2237 hrs Adney calls Parsons & Madden re SITREP aproxmately 2250 hrs. (time tbc)
22:05 hrs – Crowd advanced, permission given by LAC to advance. Crowd retreats to Eveleigh St.	2200	
22:07 hrs – Police hit heavily by bricks and bottles at Eveleigh St.		
22:42 hrs – Dog Unit arrives.	2300	● **2330 hrs** LAC calls AC Waites. Continues But inhand.
23:33 hrs – BB16 attached at Eveleigh & Cleveland Sts, Police retreat.	2400	● **2345 hrs** Parsons calls Waites, talk of Waties attending. All in hand.
01:32 hrs – Crowd increased in no.s throwing bricks & bottles. RF1 calls for 20 more police.	0100 ● **0100 hrs** 60 Police on site & LAC calls for OSG.	● **0115 hrs** LAC calls AC Waites. Need extra Police.
01:34 hrs – Over 100 people, petrol bombs thrown.	● **01330 – 0200 hrs** – 17 OSG arrive.	
01:39 hrs – Dog injured.	0200 ● **0200 hrs** AC Waites requests advice on options for chemical munitions.	● **0130 hrs** AC Waites arrives. 0145 hrs POLAIR & video unit Requested. SPG called.
03:02 hrs – Fire Hose used to break up crowd.	● **0300 hrs** 200 Police on site.	
03:07 hrs – Polair arrives.	0300	
03:30 hrs – Polair advises numbers increasing again & collecting bricks within block area.		
03:51 hrs – Area under control.	0400	

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Death of Thomas James HICKEY

- **140204: AM:** Briefing was held at the Redfern LAC concerning bag snatch/robbery offences in the vicinity of Redfern Railway Station. An aboriginal male named Chris CARR was identified from CCTV footage as a POI for one of the offences. Redfern LAC Police working day shift conducting a patrol of `the block' area but CARR was not sighted.

- **140205: 1115 hrs**: Redfern 751 (single unit) reported to radio VKG to having sighted CARR in the vicinity of the TNT towers at Redfern. Redfern vehicles conducted a patrol in that vicinity and nearby locations.

- Redfern 17 (Csts Rimell & Rocha), Redfern 16 (Csts Hollingsworth & Reynolds) patrolled an area east of Botany Road.

- Redfern 16 were proceeding north in Cope Street Redfern and observed an unknown male (Hickey) riding his bicycle at speed south in Cope Street from the vicinity of Botany Rd and Regent St. He did not fit the description of CARR so they made no attempt to stop or pursue him.

- At that time Redfern 17 were proceeding north in Renwick Street (which runs parallel to Cope St but one street east) when they see an unknown male (Hickey) riding his bicycle at speed through the car park that joins Cope and Renwick Sts. They make no attempt to stop or pursue him.

- As Redfern 17 reach the intersection of Turner St Redfern 16 is making a turn out of that street into Renwick St to travel south. Redfern 17 allows Redfern 16 to turn into Renwick St in front of them.

- Redfern 16 proceeds south in Renwick St to the cul de sac, mounts the gutter and travels south along the pathway known as Byrne Lane, which in effect is a continuation of Renwick St. Redfern 16 proceeds almost down to Phillip St however there is a cyclone wire fence at the end of the pathway preventing vehicular access into Phillip St. There is a gateway though that allows access to pedestrians/bicycles etc between Byrne Lane and Phillip St. Redfern 16 makes a U turn and proceeds north back up Renwick St.

- By this time Redfern 17 has proceeded right into Turner St, right into George St and then right into Phillip St and as they approached Cope Street an older male in the fenced off rear yard of a Salvation Army complex at the corner of Cope St and Phillip St signals to Cst Rimell, driver of Redfern 17, that a male has gone up the driveway of No 1 Phillip St.

- Redfern 17 proceeds into the driveway to the end where it joins into a pathway running east/west at the southern end of No 1 Phillip St. Rimell and Rocha at first believe there is clothing or a backpack hanging off the fence, which borders that pathway but quickly realises it's the male they had seen riding the bicycle a short time earlier.

- Rimell immediately calls for urgent assistance over the Police radio. Rocha speaks with a Danny Townsend civilian witness and first person on the scene that is on his mobile to 000 requesting an ambulance. Townsend hands the mobile to Rocha to speak with the Ambulance because he's not sure of his location.

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- Redfern 16 arrives at the scene and all Police commence giving Hickey first aid. Cst Hollingsworths initially places his ungloved hand into the neck of Hickey to stop the flow of blood from an apparent severed artery.

- Other Police arrive at the scene including Cst Paton on Redfern 450, Supervisor Sergeant McIntosh and Duty Officer Inspector Emery.

- Ambulance arrives some minutes later and after initial treatment they convey Hickey to Prince of Wales Hospital under Police escort.

- Witnesses Jamie Zammit in a nearby park at the time hears the bicycle and a bang and then sees Hickey impaled on the fence. Does not recall seeing any other person in the area at the time.

- Witness David Keddie hears a crashing sound and sees Hickey airborne about 2 metres in the air and land on the fence. Runs to assist but sees a male with blonde hair (Townsend) lift Hickey off the fence. Sees Townsend on his mobile. States the first Police at the scene arrived about 2 minutes after it happened.

- Danny Townsend states he was in the middle of the park heard a loud bang, the sound of metal on metal and looked towards the high rise and saw a young aboriginal male hanging on a metal fence. Went to Hickey's aid, moved the bicycle as it was in the way, then dialled 000. States it would have been about 30 seconds between him hearing the crash and Police arriving at the scene. Townsend states he gave his details to a Police woman (Cst Paton) and said, "Were you chasing him?" The Policewoman replied "No. We saw him up at Redfern Station, but we didn't recognise him so we followed him to see who he was." Does not believe the Police were chasing Hickey as there were no lights or sirens. Townsend makes no mention of helping Hickey off the fence stating he fell off the fence onto the pathway to where he was eventually given first aid.

- Witnesses Thomas Connar and Iris Hobson were in the rear fenced `compound' area of the Salvation Army complex. Connar states he saw a Police vehicle driving down the pathway (Byrne Lane/continuation of Renwick St) with its blue lights flashing and a male (Hickey) riding a bicycle `pedalling as fast as he could' about two car lengths in front of the Police vehicle and then ride through the gap in the fence straight across Phillip St without stopping and into the driveway of the high rise. He saw the Police vehicle do a u turn and drive north back up the laneway towards Redfern St. Connar describes the Police vehicle as driving at a `reasonably slow speed' at the time. Hobson states she sees a boy riding a bike through the park from Cope St towards Phillip St `he was half out of the seat and pedalling really hard'. She states she sees a Police vehicle can't say if it's a truck or car but thinks it may be a car come down the laneway (Byrne Lane) `travelling very slowly'. She states she did not see or hear any sirens or blue flashing lights.

- Witness Nina Pfafflin states she was on the veranda of her flat in Raglan St and sees a male on a bicycle travelling at a `decent speed' into the recess area of the tower where the rubbish area is located then lost site of the rider and bicycle. Soon realises something is wrong when people start to gather in the area. Sees a Police vehicle arrive at the scene about 2 minutes later.

- A number of other civilian witnesses have been identified and are to be interviewed.

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- Csts Rimell, Rocha, Hollingsworth and Reynolds have provided statements re the incident, have then been interviewed on ERISP and also participated in video recorded re-enactments of their movements just prior to seeing Hickey riding his bicycle, after seeing Hickey riding his bicycle and at the accident scene. Each constable has denied pursuing Hickey or attempting to stop him at any time on 14 February 2004. Each constable denied any involvement in the accident resulting in Hickey's death. Each of the constable's state they did not know Hickey prior to 14 February 2004.

- There have been a number of statements as to how Hickey was removed from the fence on which he was impaled. One statement said Townsend removed him from the fence, another says Police assisted him off the fence, a third that he extricated himself from the fence and another that he fell from the fence. I believe either of the last two are the most likely scenarios.

- There is no evidence to indicate police pursued Hickey into the driveway of No 1 Phillip St or to the location where the accident occurred. There are no Police radio logs to indicate police from Redfern were in pursuit of any person during the relevant period.

- The evidence of Connar and Hobson is contradictory with Connar saying he saw blue lights flashing and Hobson she saw no blue lights flashing and heard no sirens. If Police were following Hickey in Renwick Street / Byrne Lane they could not have proceeded any further than the cyclone wire fence preventing vehicular traffic entering Phillip St. As previously stated Police from both Redfern 16 and 17 have denied pursing or attempting to stop Hickey at anytime.

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Reconstruction

The following outlines the Redfern Civil Disturbance based on information collated to date. Note S/F Coburn is completing a full chronology with reference to all logs etc. **Completion remains ongoing.**

- 2.20pm: Thursday 120204: Two officers from Redfern LAC pursued a wanted Aboriginal offender into Eveleigh Street. Upon police attempting to arrest the offender, they were surrounded by approximately fifteen Aboriginal males who assaulted the two officers. Attempts were made by offenders to remove the pistols of both constables. Information from the officers at the scene indicates some problems calling for assistance over police radio. One of the officers had his pistol pointed into his stomach before wrestling it from the offender. Eventually additional police arrived and the original offender was arrested. Police were pelted with rocks as they retreated with the offender. Technicians from Police VKG have subsequently reported that they have tested the police radio transmissions and the portable radios on hand at Redfern and they are of the opinion that Redfern has adequate police two-way radio coverage and the portable radios at Redfern Police Station were operational. There is no information presented to the Strike Force Coburn review at this time that indicates a correlation between the events of the 12 February and the subsequent civil unrest as a result of the Hickey death.

- AM: Saturday 140204: A number of bag snatch/ robbery offences occurred in the vicinity of Redfern Railway Station. An aboriginal male named Chris CARR was identified from CCTV footage as a person of interest for one of the offences. A briefing was held at Redfern LAC and police conducted high visibility patrols of the Redfern area including 'the block' area in an attempt to locate CARR. However, he was not sighted.

- 11.15am Saturday 140204: Redfern 751 (single unit) reported to radio VKG to having sighted CARR in the vicinity of the TNT towers at Redfern. A number of Redfern vehicles then conducted patrols of the area looking for the suspect CARR. As police were proceeding north in Cope Street Redfern they observed an unknown male (Hickey) riding his bicycle at speed south in Cope Street from the vicinity of Botany Rd and Regent St. He did not fit the description of CARR so they made no attempt to stop or pursue him. A number of Redfern vehicles continued patrolling streets in and around the area. A member of the public advised Redfern 17 of a accident involving a male person who had impacted a fence and police quickly realised it was the male they had seen riding the bicycle a short time earlier. Redfern 17 was quickly joined by Redfern 16 and police immediately provided first aid to the injured male during which time police were covered in the victim's blood. Ambulance and the Redfern Duty Officer arrived and Hickey was conveyed to Prince of Wales Hospital under Police escort. At the time police were unaware of Hickey's identity.

Sunday

- 1.10am: 150204: T J Hickey was visited in hospital by his mother Gail Hickey and aunty Rebecca Hickey. Hickey died as a result of his injuries. Gail Hickey advised a social worker at the hospital that she believed Police were responsible for the death of her son.

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Events after the death of Hickey leading up to the Civil Disorder

- 1.56am: Sunday 150204: Redfern 143 reported 'The Block' appears hostile after they had a brick thrown at their vehicle. (CIDS).

- 2.21am: 150204: Redfern 10 further advises at 2.21am that he had checked the area and all appeared quiet. (CIDS)

- 9.00am: 150204: Gail Hickey with a support person attended Redfern Police Station where she was spoken to by Duty Officer Emery. Emery showed Hickey the deceased's pushbike, which indicated little or no brakes on the cycle and no damage to the rear wheel. She was advised of the circumstances and was assured Police were not involved in the pursuit of her son.

- Daytime: 150204: Allegations that a number of phone calls were made to Redfern Police Station accusing police of involvement in the death of Hickey. Posters were displayed in the Redfern area depicting Police as child killers.

- 2.00pm: 150204: Relief duty manager at Redfern Railway Station commenced duty. He states when he commenced duty the rail station security guards indicated that youths were bricking cars in Lawson Street as they passed by. He states a number of rocks were being thrown at the railway station and he decided to close the roller shutters. He was advised by an Aboriginal male to get out of the station and take some of his workers with him as "something is going to happen tonight".

- 3.23pm: 150204: Redfern 144 reports locals in 'The Block' are throwing bricks and bottles into Lawson Street. (CIDS). Redfern 450 reported a windscreen broken by a rock thrown at the top end of 'The Block'.

- At 4.50pm Duty Manager Redfern Railway sees youths breaking up bricks at the top of Eveleigh Street (reported to police at 5pm)

- 5.00pm: 150204: Police attended Redfern Railway Station and the Station Manager advised police of the situation at the Railway Station and of the information relative to "something is going to happen tonight" related by the Aboriginal Male.

- 5.30pm: 150204: Police supervisor (D.O. Emery) arrived at the Railway Station and is appraised of the situation.

Operational Phase Commences: Countering Civil Disobedience

- 5.33pm: 150204: Duty Officer Emery attempts to contact the Duty Operations Inspector (Chambers) from Redfern Railway Station to provide a Sitrep. As Chambers is on the phone he then calls Emery back at 5.42pm. Emery advised that the roller shutter is down at the Railway Station and youths have a lot of ammunition. Emery advises Chambers that he has been trying unsuccessfully to call LAC Smith for a number of hours. He will keep station closed until he speaks with LAC Smith.

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- 6.12pm: 150204: Emery contacted the DOI and told him that he had been advised by the ACLO from Marrickville that a busload is rumoured to be coming from Walgett to kill the cop responsible for Hickey's death. They are expected to arrive at eleven. Emery advised that he and Garth Smith (oncoming D.O. at Redfern) are getting troops together to re-open the railway station after having spoken to LAC Dennis Smith. During this time Inspector's Emery and Smith confer and discuss tactical options for the civil unrest. A decision was made to hold back all morning shift police to supplement the oncoming night shift police.

- 7.26pm: 150204: DOI advised that Redfern police briefed and will stay away from Block. Both morning and afternoon shifts available and policing Redfern area. DO Smith indicates he has received information that those congregating in Block want confrontation.

- 7.45:pm 15-Feb-04 EMERY calls for DOI; speaks with Sgt KING who answers; EMERY tells KING they are closing off Lawson Street; a City car came screaming through with sirens etc which stirred things up; KING said it had been broadcast for proceeding calmly in the area; EMERY points out they are short staffed; EMERY says he doesn't have much confidence in Marrickville ACLO (ie info provided earlier).

- 8:51pm 150204: Emery advises DOI that he is calling around other commands to assist in obtaining staff to relieve his day shift. Advises that Commander Smith wants to keep a low-key presence.

- 9.00pm: 150204: Call to on call OSG commander for equipment 'only'. OSG commander calls out two officers to collect and deliver more equipment.

- 9.04pm: 150204: A large crowd emerged from Eveleigh Street and charged at police. **'Signal 1 called'**

- 9.05pm 150204: Redfern deploys their riot equipment to personnel at scene.

- 9:26pm: DOI calls for EMERY and speaks with Garth SMITH; SMITH says they've just finished a briefing; Redfern police with stay away from the Block and patrol Lawson Street only; DOI explains a message is coming over the air that a large group of youths are congregating and pelting people at the Lawson Street entrance but he is watching the CCTV and he can't see any large group of youths, nothing looks wrong; he has been watching for half an hour, youths haven't moved; SMITH says they've received calls like those congregating want confrontation; he will put a couple of police in the Railway Station.

- 9.28pm: 150204: EMERY calls DOI; EMERY says he is at the police station with a Constable and he is calling for the Fire Brigade; DOI says the CCTV cameras have gone off and asks why, has it been sprayed or something; EMERY says a couple of hundred have just charged and police had to retreat; EMERY thinks they are gearing up to go again; DOI says he can't get anything on the camera; EMERY says no emergency or OSG response (context unclear); DOI looks for the on call officer OPS Manager's phone number for EMERY

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- 9.30pm: 150204: Kevin on Channel A calls DOI; DOI says he was speaking with EMERY re the Fire Brigade being on standby; Kevin says advice over the air is that the rioters tried to set the railway station on fire; DOI says the CCTV cameras have been tampered with; Kevin says he has been asked to get on to City Rail to arrange that no trains stop at Redfern; DOI thought the trains already stopped; Kevin stated they were stopped on the upper lines but not the lower.

- 9.40pm: 150204: Insp NILON (Duty Officer at the Rocks) called the DOI; NILON stated they are light on at the Rocks; does Redfern need help; DOI says yes; DOI asked if EMERY had called them; NILON said no; DOI gives NILON EMERY's landline at Redfern.

- 9.40pm: 150204: DOI calls Police Media Branch and speaks with Georgie (Georgina) WELLS re the incident; DOI states the incident has escalated in last 15 minutes, railway is closed etc, 4-5 police injured, bricks and rocks being thrown etc; DOI gives WELLS the mobile number of the Duty Officer at the scene; WELLS says a media officer is down at the scene already; DOI says things are being kept quiet on the air; WELLS says stories started on the news after 5pm.

- 9.42pm: 150204: Insp Belinda SNEL (of Inner Metropolitan Region, relieving Ops Manager) called DOI; SNEL says EMERY called her for OSG equipment; SNEL asks for SITREP; DOI appraises her of situation - rail shut, no trains stopping at Redfern, 2 CCTV cameras in Lawson Street gone, Fire Brigade are on standby around the corner because police have heard of threats to set the Railway Station on fire; DOI gives SNEL Redfern Duty Officer's mobile number; SNEL says Mr WAITES not aware the Railway Station had been closed; DOI says the Railway Station was only just been completely closed; SNEL asks how many people are down there; DOI says he doesn't know; DOI said not much is going over the air.

- 9.49pm: OSG vehicle attends with two OSG officers called out. 20 additional OSG Riot equipment deployed at scene. Attempt to ID OSG trained staff.

- 9.57pm 15-Feb-04 Roger MAYER from the Dog Unit called DOI to notify he is the night shift supervisor, he is at Yallah with Dog 38 at that time [looking for a bloke]; he has a couple of blokes heading to Redfern (Dog 37 & Dog 54 is aware); MAYER tells the DOI that the Dog Unit is light on until he gets up there.

- 10.00pm: Superintendent Smith arrived. His intent was containment and negotiation pending further resources arriving.

- 10.14pm 15-Feb-04 Darren BENNETT of Redfern calls DOI re situation at The Block; BENNETT asks DOI if there's a helicopter on [BENNETT had called Aviation Support]; DOI says they isn't; DOI asks to speak with Garth SMITH; DOI tells SMITH he has to call Commissioner's Staff Officer to update the situation re the injured police etc; SMITH says he is just containing it now; SMITH says [re car on fire at top Eveleigh Street] they aren't going to the scene of the car on fire as they don't want to start a riot & the Fire Brigade says the fire is not a danger at present; DOI asks how many rioters there; SMITH says numbers vary, he has a bloke on top of Lawson Tower, there are at least 50 people but they were overrun by 200 or so; DOI says something's been done to the CCTV cameras; SMITH

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said it's hard to tell where the rioters are coming from (coming out of woodwork); SMITH says the car on fire is blocking the rioters' entrance which is to the favour of police; DOI & SMITH say media is encouraging the incident; SMITH emphasises channel 7; SMITH says he has OSG on the way; SMITH says there's fire at railway station; SMITH says the incident flairs up out of the blue; SMITH says he has blokes kitted up escorting Fire Brigade & they're not in much danger.

- 10.19pm 15-Feb-04 DOI calls Donna ADNEY with a SITREP; DOI tells ADNEY things flared up half hour to 45 minutes ago ; DOI says the police are kitted up and escorting Fire Brigade in but in no danger; ADNEY asks what DOI means by "kitted up"; DOI assumes police are using riot gear they've had [at Redfern] for some time; DOI thinks they've contacted the Inner Metropolitan Ops Manager & arranged for OSG; DOI tells ADNEY CCTV cameras not working; DOI tells ADNEY everything is ok at the railway station, 50 rioters are still around causing trouble; DOI tells ADNEY Police Media is at the scene; ADNEY asks if we need more LACs, DOI says no because EMERY is calling around (and Ops Manager); DOI says the incident started about an hour ago when it flared up; no one injured until an hour ago.

- 10.22pm: Decision to advance on the crowd. Crowd retreated into Eveleigh Street. A number of police were hurt and removed from the line. Next two hours continue to maintain line. Superintendent Smith was concerned if the line was breached the riot would spread throughout the Redfern shopping centre, dramatically increasing the threat on life and property.

- 10.37pm 15-Feb-04 ADNEY calls to speak with DOI and speaks with Sgt KING because DOI's phone line busy; ADNEY asks for a SITREP; KING transfers call to DOI (22:38:40 on E. 23949) – ADNEY says she's called PARSONS (Peter?) and he wants to know if Bob WAITES and Dennis SMITH have been informed; DOI says yes and that WAITES was unhappy that the railway had been closed; ADNEY asks if the LAC Commander is there; DOI offers ADNEY the mobile for the Duty Officer at the scene [DOI quotes Darren BENNETT's name] 0423783431.

- 11pm 15-Feb-04 Dennis SMITH calls the DOI; SMITH says they are gearing up for another strike at us now; got 20 OSG on the way on call; SMITH says he needs more GDs, approx 20 cops now to intersection of Gibbons/Lawson Streets; DOI says we've got you as many as possible, EMERY called earlier, he was calling for anyone; SMITH asks if we can go wider; DOI says he thinks EMERY tried Marrickville and Newtown; DOI asks for SMITH's mobile; SMITH says probably going to charge here again very very soon; SMITH says he needs people regardless of where they come from to the intersection of Gibbons/Lawson Streets; DOI asks which direction people should enter the area from; SMITH says don't come from Lawson or Abercrombie Streets, come from Regent or Elizabeth Street or any others that side; SMITH says if they can get any extra personnel he can let them go once OSG arrives.

- 12.30am: 160204: A large group gather at the top of Eveleigh Street. Smaller groups make several advances on police.

- 1.00am: 160204: Second call for OSG staff made to Mark Wade OSG commander for OSG staff from DO Smith. Asking for gas/SPG or any other help.

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He called 19 OSG staff. 30 minuted later OSG commenced arriving. 19 OSG arrived of the next two hours.

- 1.30am: 160204: Crowd continues to grow. Now over 100 Poi's throwing bricks and bottles.
- 1.30am: 160204: Region Commander Waites arrives at the scene.
- 2.00am: 160204: OSG Commander Waite's contacts Wade re deployment of gas. Unable to deploy due to weather conditions, environment, no gas masks for ground crew. Continue to hold the line with the use of fire fighting equipment.
- 3.07am: 160204: Polair arrives.
- 3.15am: 160204: Polair indicates only 20 persons in Eveleigh Street.
- 3.30am: 160204: Increase in numbers, some collecting bricks and bottle.
- 3.51am: 160204: Area under control of police. Police conduct a sweep of the 'block' and arrest 6 persons. 3 were charged for outstanding warrants. 3 were later released due to a lack of evidence.

Post Incident Criminal Investigation (Time Piece & Jensen)

Strike Force Time Piece was established after the civil disobedience in Redfern. Police are reviewing the available footage and interviewing witnesses.2

A full brief of evidence is being prepared in relation to the damage to the Railway Station and statements are being collected from police who attended.

As at 250204 the following investigative milestones have been achieved:

- Seven persons have been arrested and charged in relation to the riot.
- Five persons have been listed as wanted in relation to the riot.
- Six persons are the subjects of specific lines of inquiry.
- Four adults and ten juveniles are being investigated and their identities confirmed.

Strike Force Jensen - a critical incident investigation team was formed after the Redfern riot to investigate the death of Hickey. Detective Senior Sergeant Bob Dickson has provided detailed advice to the Review Committee. In his opinion, at this stage of the investigation, there is no evidence to indicate Hickey was pursued by police into the driveway of No 1 Phillip St or to the location where the accident occurred. There are no Police radio logs to indicate police from Redfern were in pursuit of any person during the relevant period. Strike Force 'Jensen' are still conducting a lot more inquiries including an extended canvass of the location where the accident occurred.

2 Source: Strikeforce Time Piece Situation Report, Detective Inspector Darren Bennett, Crime Manager Redfern LAC dated 250204

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1. Equipment

Riot equipment comprises personal protective equipment for the primary purpose of officer protection and safety. Additional equipment can multiply the impact force of Police with personal protective equipment. This includes, for example, chemical munitions or armour vehicles.

Redfern Riot Equipment

On the 150204, Redfern had between 4–8 full sets of riot equipment available (estimated). There are conflicting reports as to the exact number, condition and storage. Relevant events include:

- 2105: Redfern Riot Equipment was deployed following the "Signal 1" Call at 0903hrs. The Redfern Supervisors Vehicle (Redfern 14) is purpose-built to store and deploy 8 sets of Riot gear and attended Lawson Street, Redfern.
- 2100: LAC requested 20 sets of riot equipment + 2 OSG officers to deliver. This was to "kit up" unprotected Redfern officers.
- 2150: OSG equipment + 2 OSG officers arrive.
- After 1am additional equipment arrives from SPC

The personal protective equipment utilised is further described in Table 4a:

Table: NSW Police Riot Equipment Description

Equipment Type	Comment
Riot Shields	Redfern: Shield is ¾ and not inter-lockable. Note exposes lower limbs where number of police injuries suffered
Helmets	Redfern: Police stated significant reduced hearing, blocking command & control orders. Current issue not meet some standards and cannot be worn with respirator
Limb Padding	Redfern: Not all officers wearing limb padding
Gloves	Redfern: Standard issue
Footwear	Redfern: Standard issue – not steel capped
Clothing	Redfern: Standard issue clothing does conform to British International Standards or National Institute of Justice Standards

There were 42 injured officers (lower limb, head, shoulders and teeth):
- Inner Metro: 35 injured
- Greater Metro: 3 injured
- Specialist Area: 4 injured

S/F Coburn was advised that Police cannot just wear the equipment and stand in front of a crowd. The use of specialist equipment requires Police to work together as a team and use tactical formations to split and disperse the crowd. This skill base requires continuation training to practice and reinforce these skills.

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In terms of statewide context, the Redfern Riot Equipment allocation (pre and post 150204) is tabulated:

Table: Regional Equipment Breakdown (Pre/Post 150204)

Region	Shields		Helmets		Leg Protectors	
	Pre 1502	Post	Pre 1502	Post	Pre 1502	Post
Inner Metropolitan (+ Redfern)	(9)	155 (49)	(9)	240 (49)	(9)	240 (49)
Greater Met	-	70	-	120	-	-
Southern	-	45	-	45	-	45
Northern	-	45	-	70	-	100
Western	-	65	-	46	-	-

Force Multipliers

"Force Multipliers" enhance the capability of personal protective equipment.3 Inquiries from overseas indicate the following are available options for deployment. There are two general categories::

a) **Equipment:** For example gas, sting ball weapons, impact weapons, foggers, water canons, etc.

b) **Mobile:** For example ATV, Mounted, Bicycle, Air wing, Armoured Vehicles (positioned in front of officers), etc.

In terms of NSW Police capabilities, preliminary information indicates:

Table: Redfern Deployment of Force Multipliers

Capability	Comment	Redfern Deployment
Mounted Police	4 X horses working normal PM shift 4 X offered via call out Capacity: • Auth 34 horses: 16 fully trained • Auth 36 Police: 16 operational	Available for Deployment Issues include:4 • Concerned in using horses against children • Horses are a large target for firebombs etc. • Information received 270204, from Insp Don Eyb and Sergeant Wayne Biffin, 2IC of the Mounted Police: 4 X Mtd Units was insufficient. For the demonstrations, an additional 4 were required. Mtd Police indicated had they been

3 Wineger, S., "Crown Control: Planning for Civil Disobedience, Law & Order, October 2001, pp.158 - 162

4 Memo advice from Inspector Eyb.

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		deployed, they would have been able to come up behind the demonstrators. There are enough specialised horse boots for three horses to be deployed in an area covered by the glass.
K9	1 x dog attended Redfern 45 X Dogs General Purpose 5 X Dogs deployment daily in the Inner/Greater Metro. Note: Capacity for DOGS to wear protective footwear.	1 X Deployed and foot injured (no protective foot wear)
Airwing		Deployed: Note concerns expressed re response time for POLAIR (arrival at 0307 hrs)5. There was no PM shift Air wing. Had been deployed on a drug eradication program in the bush. Airwing have staff on call with 1-1.5 hours to response time.
Armoured Vehicle	Purpose built for CT Situations (not domestic riots) Unable to withstand missiles or fire. 6	Not Deployed
Weapons	"Mega Device" delivers 2 litres of OC using an inert gas Range 15 meters Weapon is person specific Developed on recurrent funding by the Armoury	Not Deployed: note now fully operational for field deployment No Police access to gas masks. Corporate sanction uncertain.

Fire Hose Use

During the Redfern Civil Disobedience incident, the Redfern Local Area Commander took the initiative and deployed a NSW Fire Brigade hose to assist in repelling rioters. At around 0303hrs, LAC Dennis Smith advised the NSWFB he could not guarantee Fire-fighter safety. LAC Denis Smith requested and was provided Fire Hoses to assist containment of the disturbance. The hoses were moved to the forward static line by Police and used to contain the disturbance.

The LAC Commander advised that there were limited options for countering escalating crowd violence.7 The use of water hoses was considered the best available option to defend police positions.

On 26 February 2004, the NSW Fire brigade advised NSW Police:

5 Smith, G. Duty Officer. Review Committee minutes. 24/2/04.
6 Gillam, P. SPG. Review Committee minutes. 24/2/04.
7 Smith, G. LAC. Notes from Review Committee meeting 24/2/04.

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'I am confident in the belief that if NSW Police had not used NSWFB hose lines the Police line would have been overrun by the group. Had this occurred the group would have then overrun the Ambulance triage area at the corner of Lawson and Gibbons Streets and then overrun the NSWFB staging point'.8

OC Spray / CS Gas

In addition, during the Redfern Civil Disobedience incident Police Commanders considered the options of OS Spray (OSG) and CS Gas (via the Special Protection Group).

Relevant events:

- 0145hrs: Assistant Commissioner Bob Waites contacted the State Protection Group and spoke to Chief Inspector Craig Jennings and discussed equipment, tactics and personnel options.9 It was agreed there were no viable options.

- 0200hrs: Assistant Commissioner Bob Waites contacted OSG and spoke to Sgt Wades. The option of chemical munitions was discussed. Sgt Wades advised that no chemical munitions (OC Spray) was possible as the Mega Device was being modified.10

Post 150204 advice from the Commander, SPG indicates that CS gas was not appropriate for the following reasons:

- Police were not adequately equipped (gas masks & training),
- Decontamination issues (surrounding public/private buildings),
- Adverse effect on innocent bystanders, and
- Method of deployment could have caused serious injuries to police / bystanders alike.

Furthermore, the SPG have no training in public order management (riots). The protective equipment available to the TOU is specifically designed for 'close quarter defensive tactics' and may have been a hindrance in riot type situations.

8 Letter to NSW Police from Superintendent P. Stathis, AFSM, Professional Standards and Conduct Officer, NSW Fire Brigade, dated 260204
9 Memo: Redfern Response (A/C Waites to A/C Laycock), dated 260204
10 Memo from Sgt Wades to "Coburn", dated 260204

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2. Communications

There is need for further data/information collection and analysis of VKG records to assess response and executive advising. There appears to be gaps in the communications between VKG/DOI, the field and the executive. A review of the VKG Duty Operations Inspector Telephone Logs the Radio Logs remains ongoing. It should also be noted that VKG SOPS have been revised since the Redfern Disturbance

Executive Advising

1800 hours: LAC Smith advises A/C Waites of situation.
2130 hours: A/Ops Manager Snell calls A/C Waites.
2330 hours: LAC Smith calls A/C Waites re SITREP.
2345 hours: DCOP Parson calls A/C Waites.
0115 hours: LAC Smith Calls Waites
0130 hours: A/C Waites arrives and briefed by LAC Smith.

Executive Advising - VKG

2219 hours DOI calls Adney re SITREP.
2237 hours Adney calls DOI.
2250 hours Adney informs DCOP Parson/Madden SITREP.
(Further analysis of executive advising continuing)

SOPS regarding advisings in this area have recently been revisited. Information still to be obtained from key personnel.

Media Unit

The Media Unit provides a 24-hour media advisory service to all police, ranging from over-the-phone advice to attending major crime scenes and managing critical issues. Products include Daily Briefings and Media Releases.

In relation to the Redfern Civil Disturbance:

- 160204 – Media Conferences by Duty Officer
- 160204 - Media Conference: A/C Bob Waites, Region Commander
- 200204 - Media Release: "Charges laid over Redfern Riot"

Further advice to be forthcoming from the Director of Public Affairs.

3. Awareness & Preparation

This section covers intelligence and Redfern LAC preparations prior to the Redfern Civil Disturbance.

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Intelligence

This section includes intelligence, in particular the identification of early warning indicators foreshadowing the Redfern Civil Disturbance:

- Broad crime trends at State, Region and LAC level (Riot & Affray, Street Offences, etc)
- Police Observations / Informants / Community Sources
- COPS Intelligence Reports
- Current Operations (including Controlled Operations)

Units with relevant intelligence responsibilities include Redfern CMU, Region Intelligence Officer and the State Crime Command. Due to time constraints, the report outlines the Redfern CMU and Redfern Intelligence Reports (two weeks prior to the incident). There appears to have been limited proactive intelligence from any Unit due to resource commitments.

In terms of crime trends, for Redfern LAC there has been a 300% increase in riot and affray since 2000:

Year	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	
Riot & Affray	3	6	12	10	15	
% change from each year	0	+100%	+100%	-17%	50%	300% since 2000

Police Observations / Informants / Community Sources

Community sources and observations from Redfern indicate a high degree of community distress culminating in overt warnings to Police from around 1700hrs (refer Event Reconstruction) including:

- 140204: Thomas HICKEY in bike accident and police / ambulance attend and deliver first aid. Police provide escort to Sydney Children's Hospital (Note: Since deemed a critical incident under investigation Leichhardt LAC). LAC Smith noted that there was "*No breakdown in communication, cultural awareness or sensitivity to issues associated with the traditional grieving process*".11

- Aunt of the deceased Thomas HICKEY attended Sydney Children's Hospital and expressed anger at the police regarding the death. The mother of the deceased received counselling by an employee of the Hospital. The counsellor indicated she blamed police for his death and indicated they were chasing him prior to the accident.

- 150204 – pm: LAC Commander Dennis Smith contacted community sources (who are connected to the block). At this stage there was no information re an organised civil disturbance

- 150204 - pm: Redfern LAC received telephone calls blaming Constable PACE (Aboriginal constable attached to Redfern).

11 Response from LAC Dennis SMITH to the COBURN Terms of Reference, dated 220204.

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- 150204 – 1523hrs: Redfern 144 reports locals at The Block throwing bricks and bottles.
- 150204 – 1630hrs: Approx 10 youths commenced throwing rocks at Redfern Railway Station.
- 150204 – 1730hrs: Police vehicle damaged in Lawson Street.
- 150204 - 1940hrs: Report of a civilian vehicle being damaged in Eveleigh Street and a second police vehicle is also damaged.

Note, Redfern LAC has three registered informants, enquiries remain outstanding.

Intelligence Reports

In terms of COPS Intelligence Reports, timeframe restrictions for this Preliminary Report have restricted collation and analysis of all possible relevant Intelligence Reports. Strike force COBURN has scanned 74 intelligence reports for the period 4 - 18 February 2004 (14 day period). Initial analysis indicates that the Intelligence Reports provided no indication of the likelihood of the events of 15 & 16 February 2004 occurring. The Reports are primarily routine police reports dealing with prohibited drugs, break enter and steal, and stealing.12

It is relevant that LAC Denis Smith advised that:

> "from a perusal of intelligence holdings, the event relating to the young persons death and information I have received from Team Members there appear to be no intelligence that suggested that a riot was planned."13

Operations (Controlled Operations)

In the last 12 months, three controlled operations were conducted in Redfern LAC:14 It should be noted that the illicit drug, in particular heroin supply / use is ongoing problem in the LAC. Controlled Operations have increased in the last 12 months targeting suppliers rather than low level possession / self-administer.

Significantly, analysis from Redfern LAC clearly places alcohol (as opposed to illicit drugs) as the primary driver of anti-social behaviour committed by adults / juveniles / children. It is fact, that The Block is littered with hundreds of empty beer bottles ("long necks"). On 150204, the weather was humid with lengthy direct sun and temperatures up to 33 Celsius.15 This potentially facilitated increased alcohol consumption.

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12 Source: Intelligence reports 4 - 18 February 2004 – Intelligence Information System (COPS).
13 Response from LAC Dennis SMITH to the COBURN Terms of Reference, dated 220204.
14 Report to S/F Coburn, Detective Inspector John Hooper, Redfern LAC, date3d 250204
15 Australian Government Bureau of Meteorology – NSW Regional Office – 14/15/160204.

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Table: Controlled Operations

Date	Type of Operation	Targeting	Results
121203 Operation 'Wells'	SLO/UC/Surveillance Operations in the vicinity of Shepherd Street, Darlington. Drugs being supplied into Sydney University	Drug Supply	Ongoing operation. 1 search warrants executed on 301203 (520 grams of cannabis seized). 3 arrests for possess/supply cannabis, heroin and cocaine
220104 Operation 'Husky'	SLO/UC operation targeting drug offender at a housing commission property in George Street, Waterloo	Drug supply	Ongoing operation. One controlled purchase of heroin on 220104. Awaiting purity analysis before proceeding further
010104 Operation 'Allunga'	SLO operation centred around the "Block" area	Drug Supply	The controlled operation is still in the application stage. As part of the operation 1 search warrant has been executed on 160104. 3 persons were arrested and cannabis seized.

Training

Training issues include:

- Limited training held for Redfern LAC in previous 12 months. Apart from 2 days training approximately 14 days prior, 1 training day in past 12 months. Only 3 applications received in the past 12 months from Redfern officers.16

- Training for the management of critical incidents is an issue for Redfern and the NSW Police Supervisors, in particular riot control training for Commanders.17

16 Wade, M. OSG. Review Committee minutes. 24/2/04.
17 Note the Redfern LAC has completed LAC Commander: Operational Command Course + Minerva Training (Duty Officers Training) also sourced: Hooper, J. Inspector. Review Committee minutes. 24/2/04.

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Redfern LAC Audit& Command Management Framework

NSW Police Audit Group has audited the Redfern LAC CMF in the preceding 18 months (Initial and Follow-Up Audits):

- November 2002: Audit Group completed Report noting need for improvements
- 19 -21 May 2003: Follow-Up Audit noted, "Redfern LAC should be commended on their efforts thus far. Significant improvements were sighted in most of the system, notably, General Exhibits & implementation of CMF."

There have also been 4 (TBA) audits by Inner Metropolitan Region. In terms of ongoing compliance, the Redfern CMF Six Weekly: Appointments, Weekly Monies Checks & general Receipt Books were completed regularly (collated from October 2003).

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4. Staffing

This section quantifies the NSW Police staff response to the Redfern Civil Disturbance. It includes limited analysis in terms of ratios, role, level and industrial compliance (First Response Policing Agreement)

Redfern Local Area Command Rosters

The Redfern Rosters for 14 – 16 February 2004 were used to inform the following tabulated analysis. It should be noted that on the 150204, the Day Shift was retained by the Duty Officer who delivers a briefing on the Redfern situation.

Table: Resource Availability

Classification	14/02/04	15/02/04	16/02/04
No.	No.	No.	No.
On Roster	153	152	152
On loan	10	10	10
Long Term Sick	4	4	4
Maternity Leave	1	1	1
Sick Leave	0	0	2
Restricted Duties	2	2	2
Courses	1	1	9
Court	0	0	1
Recurrent Leave	62	57	54
Rest Leave	32	39	9
Annual Leave	2	1	6
Addition Leave	1	2	0
Total NOT Available	**115**	**117**	**98**
Total Available	**38**	**35**	**54**
% Available	**24.8%**	**23.0%**	**35.5%**

The resource capability of Redfern LAC is significantly higher on the Monday (160204) than the other two days (24.8% + 23%). Due to time constraints, the demand figures (CIDS & Local Intelligence) have not been analysed.

Table: General Duty Availability

Classification	14/02/04	15/02/04	16/02/04
No.	No.	No.	No.
*GD Total	88	88	88
GD Available	27	28	29
% GD Available	**30.7%**	**31.8%**	**33.0%**

**N.B. includes the LAC, Duty Officers & Crime Manager*

It should be noted General Duty availability is static across the 3 days, around 31% mark .

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Table: General Duty Capability

Classification	14/02/04	15/02/04	16/02/04
No.	No.	No.	No.
Superintendent	0	0	1
Inspectors	2	2	3
Sergeants	3	3	4
S/Const	2	2	4
Const	8	7	9
P/Const	12	14	7
Total	**27**	**28**	**30**
% P/Con	**44.4%**	**50%**	**23.3%**

It should be noted the percentage of Probationary Constables to total GDs on shift is relatively high especially on the Saturday (44.4%) and Sunday (50%). However, Workforce Planning advise that there is no statewide benchmark in terms of ratio of Probationary Constables to other Police within Local Area Commands.

Table: Criminal Investigation Capability

Classification	14/02/04	15/02/04	16/02/04
No.	No.	No.	No.
CI Total	13	13	13
CI Available	2	3	7
% Available	**15.4%**	**23.1%**	**53.8%**

Table: Response Team Capability

Classification	14/02/04	15/02/04	16/02/04
No.	No.	No.	No.
Response Team Total	21	21	21
Response Team	8	4	9
% Available	**38.1%**	**19%**	**42.9%**

It should be noted that a number of Response Team (6) were assigned to Operation "Concertina"

Table: Crime Management Unit Capability

Classification	14/02/04	15/02/04	16/02/04
No.	No.	No.	No.
CMU Total	14	14	13
CMU Available	1	1	9
% Available	**7.1%**	**7.1**	**69.2**

It should be noted there is a significant variation between the number of CMU officers rostered on Saturday (7.1%), Sunday (7.1) and Monday (69.2).

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Redfern Civil Disturbance

The data indicates that approximately 255 persons from the NSW Police, NSW Fire Brigade were deployed between 2100hrs / 150204 to 0300hrs / 160204. This is tabulated below but requires further validation.

Table g: Estimated Total Staff Attending Redfern Civil Disturbance

NSW Police	
General Duties	16 police at 2100 hrs18 30 – 40 police at 2200 hrs 60 police at 0100 hrs 200 police at 0300 hrs
OSG	2 OSG at 2150 hrs19 20 OSG by 0200 hrs
Sub Total	*220 Police*
NSW Fire Brigade	
Station officers Fire-fighters and Inspectors	4 X officers from 2132 hrs (No 10 Station) 21 X officers from 2148hrs (City)
Sub Total	*25 Officers*
NSW Ambulance Service	
Paramedics, Ambulance Officers	2 paramedics from 2153 hrs 8 ambulance officers & 1 District Officer
Sub Total	*11 Officers*
TOTAL(20)	**256 Staff**

First Response Policing Agreement

The "in-place" Redfern First Response Policing Agreement (FRPA) was endorsed on 11 January 2000 by the then Redfern LAC and relevant Police Association Representative. It outlines 4 Units (Sunday – Wednesday) and 4 Units (Thursday to Saturday AM and 6 Unit PM). It should be noted that Redfern 45 (Railway Station) is a stationary unit and as is not included as a mobile unit.

Geospatial analysis of crime ("hot times/locations") for the purposes of intelligence-based deployment will be analysed in S/F Coburn Stage II.

18 Smith, G. Duty Officer at the scene. Memo 26/2/04.

19 Wade, M. OSG. 0100 hrs requested. In place progressively from 1330 to 1400 hrs. 24/2/04.

20 Estimated based on Duty Officer accounts noting Police from across the metropolitan area responded to the incident. NSW FB and NSW AS estimates are based on written reports from each service.

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Other Agencies

The Redfern Civil Disturbance was attended by the NSW Fire Brigade and NSW Ambulance Service;

Date	Time	Call-Out	Agency Response
150204	2147	TBA	**NSW Ambulance**: • 17 people treated on site • 5 transported to hospital (4 Police) • Ambulance personnel remained in attendance
150204		2132hrs	**NSW Fire Brigade:21** • First NSW Fire Brigade Unit arrives • Additional Units were called to the scene throughout the evening (TOTAL?) • 25 Fire-fighters were deployed to the scene • 5 Fire-fighters sustained minor injuries: – 1 from fire fighting operations – 4 from missile attacks

The NSW Fire brigade advised that:

- Est. 0224hrs: NSW Police line came under attack from a large group throwing missiles (bricks, bottles, Molotov cocktails, fire Works, etc). NSWFB were also attacked. NSWFB personnel were deployed with portable fire extinguishers to provide fire protection to Police and to assist removing injured officers.

- Est. 03024hrs: NSW Police under further attack from a large group who set fire to Redfern Railway Station. LAC Dennis Smith advised the NSWFB he could not guarantee Fire-fighter safety. LAC Denis Smith requested and was provided Fire Hoses to assist containment of the disturbance. Police moved the hoses to the forward static line.

In such circumstances, NSWFB reference Standing Orders 2002 – Civil or Jail Disorders that outlines the relationship with the NSW Police (including allocating a Liaison Officer to the Command Post).

NSW Police Legal Service advise there are no current Memorandum's Of Understanding in place in terms of support agency joint response to riots/ affray and/or public order incidents.

21 Source: Supt P. Stathis, NSW Fire Brigade, letter dated 260204

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5. Command & Control

A lot more work needs to be completed before an accurate picture can be obtained regarding command and control procedures. Access to key people and records has not been totally possible due to time constraints. Listed below are current guidelines in place and the tentative responses obtained so far.

Detailed comment on the command and control arrangements in place during the incident will be the subject of the second report (Stage II). The following comments are preliminary only and designed to provide an overview of responses by specific categories linked to key SOPs and guidelines.

By way of background a number of NSW Police documents guide police at civil disturbances including:

- NSW Police Handbook (Public Order Management – 2004 – Intranet)
- NSW Police Incident and Emergency Operating Procedures (2001)
- Redfern LAC SOPS – Eveleigh Street Block Area (March 1998)
- Redfern LAC completed Standing Operating Procedures for 'Riot & Affray' dated 28 June 2001
- Duty Officers Manual (updated June 2002)22

These documents and guidelines appear to focus predominantly upon public order management as opposed to riots. The following table provides an anecdotal indication of the known response by officers in command at the incident:

Duty Officer H/Book Reactionary Events	Redfern SOP Requirement	Response
a. Officially TAKE COMMAND and document the time you did so	a. Supervisor / Duty Officer to attend immediately and establish Command Post. LAC to be informed immediately.	Duty Officer attended and established command post at Gibbons and Lawson Street (approximately 2106 hrs). LAC advised by phone and updated (2106 hrs)23. LAC arrives at command post 2200 hrs (approximate). Region Commander arrives 0130 hrs24. Further analysis of the sequence of events is pending.

22 The NSW Police Duty Officers Handbook states that primary goal of police in circumstances such as the Redfern Civil Disturbance is the maintenance of law and order, public safety and security. To achieve this:

- Police should avoid action that will escalate the event .
- Police may need to exercise discretion in relation to some unlawful activity. Police use of force will be the minimum amount reasonably necessary for the circumstances existing at the time.

23 Smith, G. Duty Officer Chronology of Events dated 24/2/04.
24 Waites, AC. Email dated 25/2/04. Approximate timings by Region Commander.

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Duty Officer H/Book Reactionary Events	Redfern SOP Requirement	Response
b. Document all your decisions & actions c. Assess, continually reassess the situation & maintain communication with VKG	b. SITREPS to VKG	Communications maintained with VKG (combination of mobile phone and radio). Various communications between DOI and DO. Analysis of radio communications and DOI logs is pending.
	c. VKG to advise surrounding Commands	Resources sourced from neighboring commands. Discussion between DO and DOI regarding additional resources from surrounding commands25. Further analysis of command, DOI and radio logs is required to determine the exact times neighboring commands were advised.
	d. Request callout of OSG	Call out. OSG equipment requested 2100 hrs. 2 OSG staff called out. 0100 hrs LAC calls out OSG. Further analysis of the timing and actioning of OSG call outs of equipment and personnel occurred.
	e. Safety of Police and Community must be paramount	Police established a defensive line to protect Redfern LAC. Note: footage indicates a number of officers in frontline exposed to missiles at high risk to personal safety (no helmets).
	f. Establish Perimeter area	Lawson Abercrombie Lawson Gibbons Eveleigh & Cleveland (Perimeter established and moved as the incident unfolded). The timing and adequacy of the perimeter requires further analysis.
	g. Use of video / camera to record event	0945hrs: Communication Duty Operations Inspector (VKG) contacted the Police

25 Chronology of Events, dated 27/2/04. DOI telephone log @ 20:55 hrs.

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Duty Officer H/Book Reactionary Events	Redfern SOP Requirement	Response
		Media Unit – Media officer already in attendance. Media Unit response is outstanding as of 27/2/04. Region Commander requests Video Unit and POLAIR (approximately 0130 hrs).
	h. Police vehicles to be parked in Lawson Street – between Gibbons & Eveleigh Street – allow for egress/access.	Duty Officer attended and established command post at Gibbons and Lawson Street. LAC advised by phone and updated. The timing and adequacy of parking arrangements will be assessed in stage II.
	i. Use of protective equipment at discretion of Supervisor/Duty Officers	4-8 sets of protective equipment initially distributed at 2105 hrs. Further equipment requested from OSG at 2100 hrs. 20 additional sets requested 2100 hrs arriving at 2150 hrs.
	j. Utilisation of OSG – ensure protection of flan of the front line (Missiles from side street)	2 OSG staff arrives with equipment at 2150 hrs. Further 20 requested 0100 hrs (arrive 1330 to 0200 hrs).
d. Consider Arrest & Investigation Teams and Police numbers	k. Form arrest teams	Arrest team formed as a secondary line. Arrests not made to avoid provoking crowd. 0350hrs "sweep": Six persons arrested. Note three held on warrants. Three released due to lack of evidence.
	l. Caged vehicles on standby for prison transfer	Large number of vehicles in attendance. The number of caged vehicles on standby is yet to be determined.
	m. Consideration to splitting arrested persons to designated custody stations	0350hrs "sweep": Six persons arrested. Note three held on warrants. Three released due to lack of evidence.

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Duty Officer H/Book Reactionary Events	Redfern SOP Requirement	Response
e. Identify and communicate with leaders of the event		Numerous efforts to liaise with ATSI "Elders". Crowd not responsive to attempts by elders. The timing and extent of communications will be considered in stage II.
	n. ACLO	LAC Dennis SMITH reported that he believed "both ACLOs were unavailable".26
f. Contact the Media Unit g. Allocate Media Liaison Officer until representative from Police Media Unit attends h. As Commander, conduct all interviews with the media after consultation with Police Media Unit		Media Unit advised. Verification of timing of notifications and responses pending. Awaiting response from Media Unit.
i. Conduct a "Hot Debrief" after the event		To be confirmed with LAC. Review Committee meeting on 24/2/04 provided opportunity for debrief of LAC and Duty Officer.

26 Response from LAC Dennis SMITH to the COBURN Terms of Reference, dated 220204.

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6. Standing Capabilities (SPG & OSG)

Operations Support Group (OSG)

Further work has to be undertaken with regard to protocols for OSG activation.

The OSG response to Redfern is tabulated:

Table: OSG Redfern Response

Call-Out	No	Response
Call-Out to Redfern 150204	21	Direct contact by WADE 2100hrs: 2X OSG contacted / responded to deliver additional riot equipment – stay on site 1300hrs: 19 X OSA contacted / responded to attend Redfern
Call-Out Responded 150204	24	Note 3 persons Rostered On – OSG – Inner Metro

Redfern LAC has five OSG trained officers.

In terms of context, the OSG is a Region based capability with no current statewide centralisation and/or coordination. In short: 27

Table: OSG Staff & Call-Out

Region	Number OSG	Call-Out
Inner Met	153	LAC/ Duty Officer contacted the Region Operations Manager who will contact Sergeant Mark Wade who is the Region OSG Co-ordinator. He arranges either equipment or personnel to be called out.
Greater Met	87	Deployment is by request to the Region Operations Manager. The ROM then contacts the Operations Co-ordinator (in office hours) or the Region Planning Manger (after hours), one of these officers will then contact an OSG Team Leader from the Zone in which the equipment is to be used. The Team Leader is then responsible for having the appropriate equipment conveyed to the scene of the incident. Equipment is transported from the Northern Zone (Kuring-gai) and Western Zone

27 Inner Metropolitan Region is conducting a training course in March 2004 during which a further 30 OSG operatives will be trained. A further training course will be conducted in September, 2004 which will bring the total Inner Metro OSG numbers up to 213 operatives.

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		(Penrith) in designated crowd control trailers. At this juncture Southern Zone (Wetherill Park) is required to stock a trailer with appropriate crowd control equipment as a previously designated OSG Crowd Control Vehicle has been withdrawn and is yet to be re-placed.
Western	OSG not in place	
Northern	74	
Southern	90	
Total	404	

Special Protection Group (SPG)

The SPG have no training in public order management (riots). The protective equipment available to the TOU is specifically designed for 'close quarter defensive tactics' and may have been a hindrance in riot type situations. It was not deployed to Redfern.

Further comment will be provided in stage two in regarding issues relevant to SPG equipment, charter and deployment capabilities in response for civil disorder matters.

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Police Association Concerns

Following the incident the NSW Police Association convened a meeting with Association members attached to the Redfern LAC on 240204. The Association provided a preliminary response to S/F Coburn dated 260204 raising three main issues of concern: 28

- **Equipment:** Including the adequacy, amount and condition of protective equipment which may have contributed to delaying resolution of the incident and resulting in injuries to police.

- **Training**: Including the number of police who were not trained in riot situations suggesting a higher number of Redfern based police should have been trained in the use of equipment.

- **Adequacy of Police Numbers:** Including the number of OSG qualified who were called to the incident and the apparent need for a full time OSG capacity.

The Association has provided S/F Coburn with a range of material that requires further consideration including prior submissions to the Executive for upgrading of OSG capabilities and equipment at the Redfern LAC. This documentation will be considered as part of Stage II.

Officer Safety

As outlined in a number of NSW Police Standard Operating Procedures, Police Officer safety is paramount during incidents such as the Redfern Civil Disturbance. Maintained appropriate equipment is one means of reducing the following risks for Police:

- Serious injury or loss of life
- Post Traumatic Stress Disorder
- Minor Injury
- Workplace Stress

Such risks impact upon sick leave, Hurt on Duty claims, Workcover, Workers Compensation, EAPS uptake, as well as the Police Officers wider family.

Command and Control

Concerns have been raised regarding command and control and lack of leadership during the incident.

28 Remfrey, P. 26/2/04. Memorandum to S/F Coburn.

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